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I. INTRODUCTION

Consumer credit is older than money.' The practice of exchanging
things of value in return for the obligation of future repayment is,
paradoxically, one of humanity's most useful and dangerous social
inventions. The earliest form of credit was probably a version of "you
scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." The creditor was "in effect a gift
giver who merely expect[ed] a 'delayed' reciprocal gift from the
recipient."' Historians and archeologists speculate that interest itself
probably originated some time during the late Paleolithic or early
Mesolithic ages between, about 8000 and 5000 B.C.E.3 With farming, the
accumulation of capital in the form of livestock, tools, and seed took on an
1. SIDNEY HOMER & RICHARD SYLLA, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 3, 17 (3d ed. 1996).
"Credit long antedated industry, banking, and even coinage; it probably antedated primitive forms
of money." Id. at 3. Paul Einzig further explains:
Deferred payments played an important part in the life of primitive communities
from a very early stage .... Credit existed on a fairly extensive scale before the
stage of money economy was reached. There are many ethnographic instances of
credit in kind in communities where no trace of any medium of exchange or even
standard value has been discovered ....
Even during the most primitive phase of
barter when the exchange of goods assumed the form of reciprocal presents or
services, there was often a discrepancy between the time of making the original
payment or rendering the original service and that of the reciprocation. In a sense,
it is therefore true to say that credit existed from the very earliest phases of
economic activity, even before the evolution of barter proper.
PAUL EINZIG, PRIMITIVE MONEY INITS ETHNOLOGICAL, HISTORICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 36263 (1966).
2. WILLIAM CHESTER JORDAN, WOMEN AND CREDIT INPRE-INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOPING
SOCIETIES 13 (1993).
3. HOMER& SYLLA, supra note I, at 19.
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importance likely unfamiliar to the nomadic hunter-gatherers of earlier
eras.4 This desire to collect capital probably gave impetus to more clearly
define the terms of previously ambiguous credit.5 Loans were usually
payable in either grain, animals, or metal.6 The earliest historic interest
rates ranged from 20-50% per annum, later stabilizing at 33% for loans on
grain, and 20-25% for loans of silver.7 Loans were made to invest in future
production as well as for "nonproductive" purposes, the latter being
accurately characterized as consumer credit.8 There is, of course, no reason
to suspect that greed, or, more charitably, the desire to successfully
compete in a world of scarce resources, was any less a motive at the dawn
of civilization than it is today. 9 Because creditors often lent to those in
desperate need of food or shelter, the relative bargaining position of
debtors often placed them at a significant disadvantage.10 Also, in the
absence of standard currencies, ambiguity over what constituted acceptable
payment of a debt left wide latitude for abuse." Thus, "[h]uman nature
being what it is, trouble must have developed quickly. The rich extracted

4. See id. at 18-20; EINZIG, supra note 1,at 362-63.
5. James M. Ackerman, Note, Interest Rates andthe Law: A History of Usury, 1981 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 61, 63; see also A. LEO OPPENHEIM, INTRODUCTION TO LETTERS FROM MESOPOTAMIA:
OFFICIAL BUSINESS, AND PRIVATE LETTERS ON CLAY TABLETS FROM Two MIIIENIA 4-5 (A. Leo
Oppenheim trans., 1967) (noting the importance of records in a "storage economy").
6. See HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 21.
7. Id. at 21, 29.
8. Id. at 18; see also CHARLES 0. HARDY ET AL., CONSUMER CREDIT AND ITS USES 4-5
(1938) ("For the most part loans were not made to persons who, because they borrowed, were able
to increase their own earning power and through this increase repay their debts."); Ackerman, supra
note 5, at 63 ("The earliest loans were probably extended to people in immediate difficulty-what
we would call personal or consumer loans.").
9. HOMER & SYU.A, supranote 1, at 21 ("Along with the early development of money and
credit there also grew up abuses and prejudices. Some have continued to this day.").
10. See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 584 (8th ed. 1949).
11. The Babylonian Code of Hammurabi attempted to address this problem by asserting that
debts may be tendered in various types of goods. Ostensibly this prevented some abuses by creditors
by preventing creditors from requiring payment in some rare or out-of-season good. See THE
OLDEST CODE OFLAWS IN THE WORLD: THE CODE OF LAWS PROMULGATED BY HAMMURABI, KING

OFBABYLON B.C.E. 2285-2242, at 59 (C.H.W. Johns trans., 1905) [hereinafter THE OLDEST CODE].
Ifa man has to pay, in money or corn, but has not money or corn to pay with, but
has goods, whatever is in his hands, before witnesses, according to what he has
brought, he shall give to his merchant. The merchant shall not object, he shall
receive it.
Id. Historians no longer believe that the Code of Hammurabi is the oldest code of laws in the world.
Since Johns' book was published, a number of important archeological discoveries have outdated
his title. Nevertheless, Johns' translation and index to the Code are accessible and user friendly. A
more scholarly but less convenient translation is G.R. DRIVER & JOHNC. MILES,2THE BABYLONIAN
LAWS (1955).
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hard bargains and grew richer; the poor fell into perpetual debt and
forfeited their meager possessions."' 2 Consumer credit was one of the
earliest tools of forced poverty, social oppression, and enslavement. 3
Thousands of years later consumer credit has played a similar role in
United States history. With credit taking the form of indentured servitude,
many of the earliest European colonizers borrowed their way to America
using their bodies as security and often paying with their lives. 4 After a
constitutional crisis and civil war won freedom for African-American
slaves, the landed white Southern gentry turned to the high-cost credit
system of share cropping as the next best substitute for whips and chains.' 5
At the beginning of the twentieth century, entire generations of the working
poor in large Eastern cities sacrificed their chances of joining the middle
class to salary lenders.' 6 At the beginning of the twenty-first century,
"payday" lenders in almost every state have partnered with banks to avoid
regulation and sold the same credit products as salary-lending loan sharks
did a hundred years earlier.'" These and other lenders-variously called

12. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 63.
13. HARDY, supra note 8, at 4-5; H.W.F. SAGGS, BABYLONIANS: PEOPLES OF THE PAST 97
(1995); Ackerman, supra note 5, at 63-4.
14. See HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492-PRESENT 43
(Rvsd. ed., 1995) (arguing the profit to be had by purveyors of indentured servants, rather than the
servants themselves, was among the most powerful forces leading to colonization); Vern
Countryman, Bankruptcy and the IndividualDebtor-And a Modest Proposal to Return to the
Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 809, 812-13 (1983) ("It is estimated that nearly half of
our total white immigration came over under indenture.").
15. GERALD DAVID JAYNES, BRANCHES WITHOUT ROOTS: GENESIS OF THE BLACK WORKING
CLASS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH, 1862-1882, at 32 (1986); Donald G. Nieman, Introduction to
FROM SLAVERY TO SHARECROPPING: WHITE LAND AND BLACK LABOR IN THE RURAL SOUTH 1865-

1900, at x-xi (1994); James Smallwood, Perpetuationof Caste: Black Agricultural Workers in
ReconstructionTexas, in AFRICANAMERICANLIFE, 1861-1900: FROM SLAVERYTO SHARECROPPING
227, 229 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1994); HAROLD D. WOODMAN, KING COTTON AND His
RETAINERS: FINANCING AND MARKETING THE COTTON CROP OF THE SOUTH, 1800-1925, at 310-Il
(1968); C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1877-1913, at 207 (1951).
16. These creditors were known as the first "loan sharks." LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE
AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT 49-52 (1999); LOUIS N.
ROBINSON & MAUDE E. STEARNS, TEN THOUSAND SMALL LOANS: FACTS ABOUT BORROWERS IN 109
CITIES IN 17 STATES 11 (1930); CLARENCE W. WASSAM, THE SALARY LOAN BUSINESS IN NEW
YORK CITY 26 (1908); Mark H. Hailer & John V. Alviti, Loansharking in American Cities:
HistoricalAnalysisofa MarginalEnterprise,21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 125, 133-34 (1977); Peter R.
Shergold, The Loanshark: The Small Loan Business in Early Twentieth-Century Pittsburgh,45
PENN. HIST. 200, 202 (1978).
17. Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services
Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role
of Usury Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 605 (2000); Jean Ann Fox, Safe Harbor
for Usury: Recent Developments in Payday Lending, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA REPORT
9-10 (1999); Scott Andrew Schaaf, Note, From Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the Payday
Lending Industry, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 339, 357 (2001); see James J. White, The Usury Trompe
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predatory lenders, sub-prime lenders, fringe bankers, but more
conveniently and equitably termed "high-cost" lenders--continue to
extract the same hard bargains from the ignorant and desperate poor as
their progenitors did five thousand years ago.'"
Today a debate claiming such notable expositors as Hammurabi,
Moses, Plato, Dante, Shakespeare, Hai Jui, and Benjamin Frandin has
been forged anew. From the late 1970s through the mid- 1980s, many states
eliminated or relaxed their regulation of consumer credit.' 9 This was in
response to factors such as the high market equilibrium interest rates of the

1'Oleil,51 S.C. L. REV. 445,445 (2000). Turn of the century salary lenders and today's post-dated
check payday lenders both lend at interest rates typically around 10% per week--or 520% per
annum. Christopher L. Peterson, Comment, Failed Markets, Failing Government, or Both?
Learning from the Unintended Consequences of Utah Consumer Credit Law on Vulnerable
Debtors, 2001 UTAH L. REv 543, 548-49.
18. The term "high-cost credit" has grown in popularity since 1994 when the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) established enhanced disclosure rules and some
substantive regulations for home mortgages exceeding price threshold triggers. Home Ownership
and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 151, 108 Stat. 2190 (1994). The
relevant regulatory provision itself is entitled "Requirements for certain closed-end home
mortgages." 12 C.F.R. § 226.32 (2002). However, courts, along with most commentators, have
adopted the more convenient term "high-cost" to reference loans subject to HOEPA. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Gelt Fin. Corp. (In re Williams), 232 B.R. 629,636 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999) ("HOEPA
thus placed new restrictions on lenders dealing in so called 'high-cost' mortgages by establishing
additional 'advance look' disclosure requirements and imposing limits on some potentially abusive
substantive terms."). Some litigants and courts also use the description in non-HOEPA contexts.
See, e.g., DeBerry v. First Gov't Mortgage & Investors Corp., 170 F.3d 1105, 1107 (D.C. Cir.
1999). The convenient term has also found its way into recent state laws. See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n
v. Burke, 169 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64, 67-69 (D. Conn. 2001) (granting an injunction against
Connecticut Banking Commissioner blocking enforcement of state law prohibiting mandatory
arbitration clauses in "high-cost home loan[s]"); see also Alvin C. Harrell, Subprime Lending
Developments with Implicationsfor CreditorsandConsumers, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 238,
245 (1998); Kathleen E. Keest et al., Interest Rate Regulation Developments: High-Cost
Mortgages, Rent-to-Own Transactions,and Unconscionability,50 Bus. LAW. 1081, 1084 (1995);
Deborah Goldstein, Note, ProtectingConsumersfrom PredatoryLenders: Defining the Problem
and Moving Toward Workable Solutions, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 225, 232 (2000). For
purposes of this Article, the term "high-cost" is one of convenience, aimed at describing the upper
end of consumer credit usually extended to the poor and those with risky credit records. Admittedly,
at what point credit should be considered high-cost is open to debate. Some would say all consumer
loans have high-costs in comparison to commercial loans, while others would argue no loan has a
high cost if the borrower willingly agrees to it. This Article does not explore at what particular point
a loan should be considered "high-cost." Certainly, an 800% annual percentage rate (APR)
"payday" loan qualifies. A 6.7% APR thirty-year, fixed-rate mortgage with low poinits and fair
contractual terms does not. Whether a 29% APR revolving credit card contract qualifies as highcost is an open question.
19. PAUL R. BEARES, CONSUMER LENDING 12 (2d ed. 1992); KATHLEEN E. KEEST, NATIONAL
CONSUMER LAW CENTER, THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 54-55

(1995); Christopher C. DeMuth, The Case Against Credit CardInterest Rate Regulation, 3 YALE
J. ON REG. 201, 201 (1986).
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period (which raised depository lender's costs of funds to the point that
profitable lending was difficult within interest rate caps) 20 and the Supreme
Court's decision allowing banks to export their home state's usury law to
consumers in other states. 2' Since then the relatively low-priced consumer
credit supplied to the middle class has continued to grow, financing
consumer spending. In the wake of deregulation, however, markets for
much higher priced loans extended to the financially vulnerable lower
middle class, the working poor, and the desperate have seen comparably
enormous growth.22 Sensing widespread abuse, the nation's newsprint
media has complained vitriolically, touching off a timely national
discussion of an ancient topic. 23 For our society, like civilizations before

20. BEARES, supra note 19, at 12.
21. Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978); DeMuth, supra
note 19, at 215-16.
22. JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND THE
POOR 139 (1994) [hereinafter FRINGE BANKING] ("Over the 1980s, the number of pawnshops and
check-cashing outlets nationwide more than doubled."); JOHN P. CASKEY, LOWER INCOME
AMERICANS, HIGHER COST FINANCIAL SERVICES 59 (1997) ("It is also argued that reaching out to
these households is a good business proposition, since the number of households using the
alternative financial sector is large and growing."); KEEST, supra note 19, at 59 (stating that,
"[Credit costs] may not be a problem for most consumers, who typically use credit cards or retail
charge accounts for small-sum, short-term credit. But for other consumers, a variety of alternate
sources with effective rates that would make a loan shark jealous have sprung up."); Michael
Hudson, The PovertyIndustry, Introduction to MERCHANTS OF MISERY: HOW CORPORATE AMERICA
PROFITS FROM POVERTY 2 (Michael Hudson ed., 1996) ("Big companies are fueling the expansion
and 'incorporation' of the poverty industry by pouring in growth capital and providing the sheen
of brand-name respectability to transactions that Main Street and Wall Street once viewed with
distaste.").
23. See, e.g., Paul Beckett, Clashing Interest: Why PatriciaHeaton Could Cause Problems
fora GE-Owned Bank, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 30, 2001, at Al ("At stake is whether ...the GE-owned
bank ...can skirt consumer-protection laws in states such as Louisiana by basing its operations in
Georgia, which has relatively permissive rules on interest rates."); Ulysses Currie, Maryland's
Legal Loan Sharks, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1999, at B08 ("Maryland should ... prohibit the
practice of the payday loan, which preys upon our state's poor and financially desperate."); Dean
Foust, Easy Money: Subprime Lenders Make a Killing Catering to PoorerAmericans. Now Wall
Street is Getting in on the Act, BUS. WK., Apr. 24, 2000, at 107 ("[W]hat is new is the invasion of
mainstream financiers into what was once the sole province of check cashers, pawnshops, and the
like."); Adam Geller, Payday Lenders Find Ways Around Restrictions, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 6, 2001
("In all, [a customer] says she paid $1800-an annual interest rate of nearly 800 percent-and still
owed every penny of her original loan."); Molly Ivins, Feeding Offthe Bottom, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 12, 2000, at A19 ("Another form of legal robbery is 'payday lending,' a
practice that makes mob loan sharks look good."); Mary Kane, Subprime Mortgage Loans Raise
Concerns; High Rates, Fees Leave Little Equity, Lots of Risk, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE,

Apr. 9, 2000, at FI ("In a record economy.., it might seem odd for anyone to worry about home
ownership problems. But the growth of subprime lending-high rate, high-fee loans-along with
loans that require no down payments or allow for huge debts, is raising concern."); Peter T.
Kilborn, New Lenders With Huge Fees Thrive on Workers With Debts, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1999,
at Al ("[A]s borrowers amass loans, taking new ones to pay the fees on the others, the fastest way
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it, the central quandary in high-cost credit policy has been balancing the
need to protect the vulnerable with the need to facilitate economically and
socially useful trade in credit.
This Article does not purport to resolve so dense an impasse. Instead it
hopes to serve two more modest but related goals. The first is to provide
a new conceptual tool for organizing discussions of consumer credit in
general, and high-cost consumer credit in particular. The world's past
civilizations have employed only relatively few types of strategies for
addressing this fundamental dilemma. Unfortunately, historians-and in
turn policymakers and legal practitioners-have not recognized the
similarities between these strategies because most historical treatments
focus either on one culture or on one strategy. When we step back and
paint with the broader brush strokes of historical case studies, patterns of
common social responses to consumer credit problems emerge. These
patterns are important both because they provide a new way of organizing
discussions about consumer credit policy and because they shed contextual
light on the limitations of our current strategies. Sadly, most of our current
consumer credit policies have histories of failure dating back hundreds or
to payday becomes a fast way, too, to garnished wages and bankruptcy."); Paul Muolo, Be Careful,
FannieandFreddie,Subprime Land Mines Lie Ahead, 4 MORTGAGE SERVICING NEWS 5, 5 (2000)
("As any mortgage pro knows, subprime lenders these days are akin to 'predatory' lenders. A
predatory lender is a dressed up word for 'loan shark."'); Jane Bryant Quinn, Little Loans Come
at Staggering Cost, WASH. POST, June 13, 1999, at H02 ("A payday loan can help someone out of
a tight spot, provided that he or she borrows only once. But the lenders work hard at turning new
borrowers into repeat customers, paying fees again and again."); Terence Samuel, Support Grows
for Controls on "Predatory Lending," ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 16, 2000, at A 12
("[C]oncem is growing in many quarters that as that sub-prime lending market booms, many
people, particularly the elderly and the poor, are being savaged by unscrupulous operators who prey
on their ignorance, inexperience or desperation."); Edmund Sanders, Ameriquest Defends Loan
Practices;Mortgage: Sub-Prime Lender Says It Has Been Fair,But Activists See Examples of
PredatoryLending. The Two Sides Are Meeting to Resolve Their Differences, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9,
2000, at C I ("Scores of Protestors stormed into an Ameriquest Mortgage Co. office.., chanting
slogans like 'No more loan sharks!' and 'People over profits! '); Gwyneth K. Shaw, Battle Looms
Over High-Interest PaydayLoans, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 26, 2000, at AI ("A survey of 34

payday lenders [in Florida] showed interest rates average 400 percent for a two-week loan, and can
go up to more than 600 percent."); Kirsten Stewart, Survey Finds Tactics of Some Lenders
Questionable; Compliance with Disclosure Laws Lacking, Law Student Says, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Apr. 24, 2001, at El ("A University of Utah law student's random survey of check-cashing centers
in the Salt Lake area found that a majority don't fully comply with state and federal disclosure laws
designed to protect consumers from unfair lending practices."); Borrowing Trouble: How Can
LegislatorsNot Be Offended by Payday-AdvanceBusinesses thatChargeOutrageousFees to CashStrapped Consumers? Leaders, Step Forward, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 17, 2000, at A10
("Florida ought not to be a haven for people who prey on others in financial distress."); Senator
Seeking Input on Subprime Loans;Meeting to TargetPredatoryLending,DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Apr. 20, 2000, at I C ("The subprime market increased from $20 billion in 1993 to more than $150
billion in 1998."); Time to Restore Loan-SharkingLaws, SANTA FENEW MEXICAN, Apr. 9, 2000,
at F-8 ("[Flor the moment, nothing can be done about this traffic in human misery.").

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

even thousands of years. Policymakers must be re-apprised of these
failures.
The second insight of this Article is that, from a historical perspective,
consumer credit price disclosure rules, such as the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA),24 are a unique and relatively recent strategy for protecting
vulnerable consumers from abuse by predatory lenders. In the mid-1950s
policymakers and scholars came to realize that the middle class, which was
borrowing in greater numbers than ever before, was unable to compare the
prices of credit.2" Because creditors calculated interest rates in many
different ways, quoted prices bore no meaningful relation to each other.26
Following Massachusetts," Congress passed the Truth in Lending Act in
19682" which required lenders to use uniform annual percentage rate (APR)
terminology, as well as disclose many other aspects of credit contracts.29
The hope was that with uniformly disclosed prices, consumers would be
able to shop for the best deal, thus better protecting themselves and forcing
creditors to offer lower prices." Despite these hopes, in recent years credit
disclosure rules have fallen from the favor of consumer advocates, legal
service attorneys, and scholars bent on protecting working and lower
middle class consumers. Where thirty years ago critics of disclosure were
likely to be banking industry lobbyists, today's critics are more likely to be
non-profit consumer activists. These activists complain that watered down
disclosure laws are too complex, come too late in negotiations, and are not
accurate enough.3 Even worse, consumer activists complain the industry
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e(2002).
25. KATHLEEN E. KEEST & GARY KLEIN, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER TRUTH IN
LENDING 31 (3d ed. 1995).
26. Id.
27. Act of May 16, 1966 Mass. Acts 284; Act of Aug. 31, 1966 Mass. Acts 587 (codified as
amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140C, §§ 1-13 (West 1974), repealedby Act of Dec. 24,
1981, 1981 Mass. Acts 733 § 1); see also Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some
Lessons From the Truth-in-LendingAct, 80 GEO. L.J. 233, 252-53 (1991) (discussing effect of
Massachusetts disclosure laws on later federal law).
28. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e).
29. Id. The 1968 Act, entitled the Consumer Credit Protection Act, included provisions in
addition to the Truth in Lending disclosure rules. Id. The Truth in Lending Act has since come to
refer to the disclosure provisions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. See Rubin, supra note 27,
at 262. Because this Article is concerned primarily with disclosure, the phrase "Truth in Lending"
is used.
30. KEEST & KLEIN, supra note 25, at 31.
31. Steven W. Bender, ConsumerProtectionforLatinos: Overcoming Language Fraudand
English-Only in the Marketplace, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1027, 1029-30 (1996); Jeffrey 1Davis,
Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An Empirical Look at the
Simplification ofConsumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV. 841 (1977); Elwin Griffith, Truth in
Lending-The Right of Rescission, Disclosure of the Finance Charge, and Itemization of the
Amount Financed in Closedend Transactions, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 191 (1998); Jonathan M.
Landers, Some Reflections on Truth in Lending, 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 669; Jonathan M. Landers &
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uses meaningless disclosure rules to deflect legislative pressure for more
substantive consumer protections such as interest rate caps and generous
bankruptcy discharge provisions.32 While not denying these and other
arguments, this Article suggests the problems of Truth in Lending may be
those of a troubled adolescence rather than inherent limitations of the
strategy itself. Unlike virtually all other consumer credit policies,
disclosure is relatively untried. Having used disclosure regulations in
earnest for only less than half a century, we may not have yet learned how
to exploit their full potential. With aggressive and practical reform, Truth
in Lending may blossom into a much more effective strategy than those
which predate it by hundreds or even thousands of years.
Part II presents a new method of organizing consumer credit policy
based on six traditional policy strategies and relying on examples from
world history. Part III gives a chronological overview of consumer credit
history in the United States. Part IV deals with the innovation and
theoretical advantages of price disclosure as a seventh strategy. Lastly,
conclusions are drawn for policymakers, scholars, and law practitioners.
II. ORGANIZING THE PROBLEM: A SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT DEBTOR
PROTECTION STRATEGIES IN WORLD HISTORY

American consumer credit law is preposterously unorganized. "Upon
first exposure to the subject of credit regulation, the impression of the
average attorney might be that the field is a maze, if not a mess, and
probably both."33 One recent commentator, smelling something more
sinister, suggests the confusing character of consumer credit law remains
entrenched because it provides a mirage of debtor protection which
subverts more aggressive reform.34 Requiring some conceptual method of
organizing credit policy, legislatures, courts, attorneys, and scholars have
fumbled, seemingly at random, for a system of categorization to begin
thinking about credit law and policy. Thus, a wide variety of artificial
categories have developed which break up credit policy into conceptual
parts. For example, the Truth in Lending Act divides rules between open-

Ralph J.RohnerA FunctionalAnalysis ofTruth inLending, 26 UCLAL. REv. 711 (1979); Rubin,
supra note 27; see also Symposium, A Symposium on Truth in Lending, 9 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
1 (1984) (providing several additional examples); Howell E. Jackson & Jeremy Berry, Kickbacks
or Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread Premiums (Jan. 8, 2002), available at

http://www.law.harvardedu/faculty/hjackson/jacksonberry008.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2002).
32. See, e.g., Kathleen Keest, Whither Now? Truth in Lending in Transition Again, 49

CONSUMER FIN. L. Q.REP. 360, 360 (1995) ("[Truth in Lending] was never intended or designed
to substitute for substantive consumer protection. Yet, without any real thought or open debate, it
has apparently come to stand in that role.").
33. KEEST, supra note 19, at 36.
34. White, supra note 17, at 445.
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and closed-end credit." Some classify policies as either market-controlling
or market-perfecting.36 Others rely on the classic distinction between
procedural and substantive rules." Sometimes statutes and courts classify
based on the distinction between retail and non-retail lenders.3" The
bankruptcy code makes much of whether credit is secured or unsecured.39
Some creditors are depository institutions while others are not." Finally,
some statutes are "general" usury laws, while others are "special" usury
laws.4 Different rules, and in turn exceptions to those rules, exist for each
of these different categories in each different conceptual scheme. When
combined with simultaneous federal, state, and local regulation, these
intersecting vertices create an impossibly complex jumble of meaningless
distinctions. The result is not only that beginners have difficulty
understanding the law, but also that legislatures and courts have difficulty
designing rules which promote justice because these rules are based on
arbitrary classifications.
This Part suggests a more natural way of approaching consumer credit
policy based on the conceptual similarities between historical strategies.
While many scholars have provided a rich history of consumer credit, none
appear to have categorized the basic policy responses employed in
history.42 There have been six basic strategies for addressing the social
1

35. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1637, with 15 U.S.C. § 1638.
36. Robin A. Morris, Consumer Debt and Usury: A New Rationale for Usury, 15 PEPP. L.
REV. 151, 157 n.22 (1988).
37. Truth in Lending's disclosure requirements are often described as a procedural, where

interest rate caps are seen as substantive.
38. Id. at 43.

KEEST,

supra note 19, at 53.

39. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 506-507 (2002) (setting out rules for determination of secured
status and debt priority). See also KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE
BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 57-59, 64 (1999) (providing simple summary of the effect of security status
in bankruptcy proceedings).
40. Depository lenders usually include banks, credit unions, and savings and loan
associations. KEEST, supra note 19, at 41-43. Non-depository lenders include finance companies
and retailers. Id. at 41-44.
41. Id. at 37-38.
42. See, e.g., ARTHUR BIRNIE, THE HISTORY AND ETHICS OF INTEREST (1952); HUGH BARTYKING, THE WORST POVERTY: A HISTORY OF DEBT AND DEBTORS (1997); J.W. BLYDENBURGH, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF USURY (1844); ROBERT BUCKLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF USURY
(1817); RAYMOND DEROOVER, MONEY, BANKING AND CREDIT IN MEDIAEVAL BRUGES (1948);
ROSA-MARIA GELPI & FRANCOIS JULIEN-LABRUYERE, THE HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT:
DOCTRINES AND PRACTICES (2000); HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1; JORDAN, supra note 2; ODD
LANGHOLM, THE ARISTOTELIAN ANALYSIS OF USURY (1984); CAROL BRESNAHAN MENNING,
CHARITY AND STATE IN LATE RENAISSANCE ITALY: THE MONTE DI PIETA OF FLORENCE (1993);
PAUL MILLETT, LENDING AND BORROWING IN ANCIENT ATHENS (1991); J.B.C. MURRAY, THE
HISTORY OF USURY (1866); BENJAMIN NELSON, THE IDEA OF USURY: FROM TRIBAL BROTHERHOOD
TO UNIVERSAL OTHERHOOD (2d ed. 1969); JOHN T. NOONAN, THE SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OF USURY
(1957); MARK ORD, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF USURY (3d ed. 1809); FRANKLIN W. RYAN, USURY
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problems endemic to consumer credit (plus one more recent addition) that
retain significant relevance for contemporary American policymakers.43 An
exposition relying on historical examples sheds light on these strategies.
A. DebtorAmnesty: The Deceptively Simple Solution
Humanity's first conceptually distinct and enduring strategy designed
to protect vulnerable debtors from creditor abuse was to issue government
decrees forgiving, or at least ameliorating, debts. The Sumerians, generally
considered the world's first civilization, occupied the southernmost
segment of Mesopotamia between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers
stretching roughly from modem Baghdad to the Persian Gulf.14 Eventually
supplanted by the Babylonians, Sumerian civilization is credited with
developing the world's first wheeled vehicles, the first ox-drawn plows, the
first city-states, and the first system of writing. 45 Alongside other trade
practices, including pottery, weaving, metalwork, and masonry, was trade
in credit.46 Many documents dealing with credit have survived showing
a
47
system which carefully recorded and commonly extended loans.
Nevertheless, even in these first civilizations the harmful social side
effects to otherwise beneficial lending developed early on. The principal
AND USURY LAWS (1924); MELANIE TEBBUTT, MAKING ENDS MEET: PAWNBROKING AND WORKING-

CLASS CREDIT (1983); Ackerman, supra note 5; James G. Frierson, Changing Concepts on Usury:
Ancient Times Through the Time of John Calvin, 7 AM. BUS. L.J. 115 (1969).
43. There are other strategies which are beyond the scope of this Article because they do not
suggest relevant insight for contemporary United States policy makers. Foremost among these
untreated strategies are laws banning interest altogether. The first example of a civil interest ban
was Charlemagne's Admonito Generalis. GELPI & JULIEN-LABRUYERE, supra note 42, at 22-25.
And, although Islam provides for many alternative forms of banking, Shari'ah law prohibits the
taking of interest or riba.See generally Aidit bin Haji Ghazali, Consumer Credit from the Islamic
Viewpoint, 17 J.OF CONSUMER POL'Y 443,449 (1994) (providing a useful introduction to Islamic
credit practices). Another example might include the complex shell currency and credit system of
South Pacific Islander society on Rossel Island. In this society certain types of shells were valid
tender only for certain types of transactions. See ENZIG, supra note I, at 61-64. Currency traders
developed, borrowing from those who did not want a particular type of shell and lending to those
who did. Id. Interestingly, beliefs about magic of the currency traders, rather than laws, enforced
the consumer credit system. Id. Similarly, the credit policies of totalitarian regimes such as Stalin's
U.S.S.R. and Mao's China are probably distinguishable, but hold little relevance for contemporary
America.
44. THOMAS H. GREER & GAVIN LEWIS, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD 15-17
(6th ed. 1992).
45. Id.; M.E.L. MALLOWAN, EARLY MESOPOTAMIA AND IRAN 59-61 (1965); MARC VAN DE
MIEROOP, CUNEIFORM TEXTS AND THE WRITING OF HISTORY 9-11 (1999); OPPENHIEIM, supra note

5, at 8-9.
46. GREER & LEWIS, supra note 44, at 18; P.R.S. MOOREY, ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIAN
MATERIALS AND INDUSTRIES: THE ARCHEOLOGICAL EVIDENCE passim (1994).
47. HOMER & SYLLA, supranote 1,at 26; see alsoMIEROOP, supranote 45, at 19 ("The loan

is probably the most common private business transaction we find in the textual record ....
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problem then, as now, was how to deal with those debtors who could not
or would not repay their obligations. The normal penalties for default were
severe.4" Free males, as the heads ofhouseholds, were entitled to send their
wives, servants, or children into forced servitude to pay off debts. 9 If the
head of the household could not produce a working dependant, he was
often enslaved or imprisoned.50 Creditors who seized the human assets of
a debtor were essentially free to do with the slave whatever the creditor
chose. 5 1 The treatment of debt slaves was harsh indeed, often including
gouging out the slave's eyes to prevent escape, and only providing enough
food to sustain life.52 Creditors sold a significant portion of the Sumerian
population into debt slavery to live alongside prisoners of war.53
This treatment, at times apparently offending even the ancient sense of
social decency, led many Sumerian and Babylonian kings to "make
justice., 54 This claim, coming down in the form of aristocratic boasting,
"referred to the cancellation by royal decree of certain debts, such as any
which had forced free people to sell themselves or their families into
slavery. 55 For example, one of the earliest recorded legal codes, dating
from about 2350 B.C.E., includes relief aimed at controlling abuses
48. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 63, 66.
49. SAMUEL NOAH KRAMER, THE SUMERIANS: THEIR HISTORY, CULTURE, AND CHARACTER
78-80 (1963); C. LEONARD WOOLLEY, THE SUMERIANS 99, 102, 104 (1928). One loan contract from
this era translates:
Bak~igum has received [x] shekels of silver from Mannum-ki-iliya. He has placed
his son as pledge. If Bakigurn (wishes to redeem[?]) his son, he shall pay the
silver together with its interest. If (the son) dies or escapes, he will take his silver
from Bakigum. (7 witnesses, including a smith.).
J.N. POSTOATE, EARLY MESOPOTAMIA: SOCIETY AND ECONOMY AT THE DAWN OF HISTORY 194
(1992).
50. HOMER & SYLLA, supra note I, at 27.
51. KRAMER, supra note 49, at 78.
52. Cf id. (stating that slaves were usually well treated).
53. GREER & LEWIS, supra note 44, at 18; POSTGATE, supra note 49, at 194.
54. JAMES G. MACQUEEN, BABYLON 56-57 (1964); SAGGS, supra note 13, at 97.
55. SAGGS, supra note 13, at 97; see also POSTOATE, supra note 49, at 194-95 (describing
the Sumerian notion of amar-gi,"which meant 'return to mother,' and referred to the liberation of
members of a family enslaved for debt"). Enmetena, a King from the city of Laga§, inscribed these
words on the face of a building:
Enmetena annulled debts for Laga§, restoring mother to child and restoring child
to mother. He annulled grain loan debts. He annulled debts for the sons of Uruk,
of Larsa, and Bad-tibira, restoring them to the hands of lnanna at Uruk, to the
hands of Utu at Larsa, and to the hands of Lugal-Emu§ at the Emu.

Id. at 196.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss3/4

12

Peterson: Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Comsumer Credit: The Historic
HIGH-COST CONSUMER CREDIT: TRUTH IN LENDING ACT

associated with debt. 6 Urukagina, a Sumerian King who promulgated the
rules, included in his reforms amnesty for all persons imprisoned for
failure to repay debts." Similarly, Ammisaduqa (1646-1626 B.C.E.), a
later Babylonian King, also canceled the debts of enslaved former
citizens.5"
Although the details of these royal decrees of amnesty are sparse, they
begin to sketch the outlines of problems that have plagued similar
strategies ever since. Initially, forgiving some debts did not solve the real
problem, only treating its symptoms after the fact. Debtors would still
borrow, creditors would still lend, and in the absence of state intervention,
default and its attendant problems still developed. Moreover, each decree
was a limited one-time treatment rather than a permanent systemic reform.
Executive pardons did nothing for those not lucky enough to fall under
their limited jurisdiction. The conundrum of whether a creditor or debtor
should bear the losses associated with default still existed. All that amnesty
decrees could do was temporarily reverse fortunes of those who managed
to capture the attention of fickle authority.
Nevertheless, as a social strategy, granting debtors amnesty from their
obligations persisted. Then, as now, creditors tended to advocate harsh
penalties to deter default on loans. In 1531, during his reign of Holland,
Charles V of Spain passed a characteristic edict later described as the first
specific bankruptcy statute in the Netherlands. 9 In its preamble, the law
justified itself as attempting to remedy the expense connected with lawsuits
and to provide for a pure administration of justice which would deal
equally with the rich and poor.6 Hoping to deter debtor default, the law
provided that "all persons who absented themselves from their ordinary
residences with the object of defrauding their creditors were to be regarded
as common thieves, and if caught might be summarily dealt with and
publicly hanged."'" Ironically, the Spanish Crown consistently defaulted
on its own debts, finding itself bankrupt on six subsequent occasions
during the sixteenth century alone.62

56. KRAMER, supra note 49, at 79.
57. See id.; MACQUEEN, supra note 54, at 21-22.
58. SAGGS, supra note 13, at 97.
59. Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REv. 223,
246(1917).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 115. Credit as a social and economic institution
survived through the middle ages and into the enlightenment even in the face of staunch medieval
Catholic prejudices against interest. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 72-73; GELPI & JULIENLABRUYERE, supra note 42, at 38. Gelpi and Julien-Labruyere explain that "interest-bearing loans
were practiced throughout society at large, by princes, merchants, simple folk, and the church itself.
It was ahypocritical society, trying to disguise the forbidden practice, condemning it publically but
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Similar to Sumerian and Babylonian kings, Europe's princes also issued
decrees canceling debts. The crucial difference, however, was that
European princes usually canceled only their own loans or the loans of
their closest allies and associates. For example,
Philip the Fair (IV) of France, 1285-1314, borrowed heavily
at unstated rates, but instead of repaying his bankers he
banished them, canceled his own debts and decreed that the
principal of all other debts must be paid to the Crown. His
principal creditor, the Order of Knights Templar, which had
become largely a banking organization, was utterly destroyed.
Edward III of England, 1312-1377, likewise repudiated his
debts.., and ruined his Florentine bankers.63
Nobles were also known to orchestrate the cancellation of their debts by
availing themselves to lingering church doctrines prohibiting interest,
especially against foreigners.64 While consumer and commercial debtors
alike faced severe punishments such as summary public hangings, the
deliberate and fraudulent default of royalty "could be punished only by the
sanction of a future denial of credit."65 Such royal "amnesty" was common
enough to have market effect. Interest rates offered to nobility were much
higher than those to towns and commercial ventures since repayment by
nobles was relatively uncertain.66 This aristocratic abuse of power
demonstrates a central limitation of forgiving debt as a policy strategy: it
is difficult to devise fair and efficient rules determining who deserves
amnesty. Too often, those who receive discharge of their debts are those
who least merit it. As we shall see, it is precisely this difficulty which more
than any other afflicts the contemporary United States bankruptcy system.
B. Separating "Good" Creditfrom "Bad" Credit:Interest Rate
Caps and Other Loan ContractRestrictions
Mesopotamian societies were not content with market anarchy and
occasional capricious amnesty of their kings. The next great innovation in
consumer credit policy is best exemplified in the famous Babylonian Code

having to recourse to it privately, turning away from those who practiced it, yet tolerating them."
GELPI & JULIEN-LABRUYERE, supra note 42, at 38 (citation omitted); see also HOMER & SYLLA,
supra note 1, at 106-11 (cataloging interest rates of late medieval era); NELSON, supra note 42, at
29-72 (discussing in detail religious thinkers evolution toward acceptance of interest in the late
medieval era).
63. HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 99.
64. Id. at 112.
65. Id. at 94.
66. Id.
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of Hammurabi written in 1750 B.C.E.67 Legend tells us the Babylonian
King Hammurabi ascended a mountain where Shamash, the God ofJustice,
gave him a divinely inspired code of law.68 Under the rule of Hammurabi,
Babylon developed from an insignificant city to the national capital of
probably the most complex society of its time.69 Following Hammurabi,
Babylon remained the capital of the entire region for around 1500 years.70
The Code set out over two hundred laws addressing social problems
ranging from divorce to theft.7 Audaciously, it attempted to create a
comprehensive and timeless set of laws to govern Babylonian society.
Hammurabi' s laws included several distinct controls on the lending market
designed to protect debtors.72 Foremost was the world's first recorded
maximum allowable interest rate cap, which limited rates to about 20% per
annum for loans on silver and 33% on loans of grain.73 The text of the code
bears a remarkable similarity to interest rate caps adopted thousands of
years later and which are still in force in many areas. The Code states: "If
a merchant has given corn on loan, he may take 100 SILA of corn as
interest on 1 GUR; if he has given silver on loan, he may take 1/6 shekel
6 grains interest on 1 shekel of silver."74
A central insight behind interest rate caps is the recognition that while
some loans are useful social agreements, others cause more harm than
good. For early Babylonians, the central difference between acceptable and
unacceptable loans was price. Thus, loans at interest rates in excess of the
statutory caps were banned. However, the Code also prohibited dangerous
loan characteristics not directly related to price. For instance, recognizing
loans may have dangerous consequences not only for individuals but for
whole families, the Code required both a husband and a wife to sign loan
contracts encumbering joint property.75 Other rules included a maximum
allowable three years that a wife, servant, or child of a debtor could spend
in slavery to pay off a man's debt.76 Creditors could not take payments by
force without the consent ofthe debtor.77 Debts of either a woman or a man
incurred before marriage were not binding on the other spouse after
marriage.7" Moreover, to prevent violations, Hammurabi's Code required

67. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 66.
68. GREER & LEWIS, supra note 44, at 24.

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 24-25.
72. THE OLDEST CODE, supra note 11, at 68.

73. HOMER& SYLLA, supra note 1, at 30.
74. DRIVER & MILES, supra note 11, at 39.

75. HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 27; THE OLDEST

CODE,

supra note 11, at 21-22.

76. THE OLDEST CODE, supra note 11, at 21-22.

77. Id. at 20-21.
78. Id.at 30.
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creditors and debtors make their loan contracts in the presence of an
official and witnesses.79
Hammurabi's interest rate cap, along with its other lending format
restrictions proved remarkably durable. The rate cap remained intact as law
for 1200 years-well over an entire millennium. In 2000 years the only
significant change was to equalize the maximum allowable rate of grain to
match that of silver.80 It is nonetheless unlikely the interest rate cap and
other provisions were consistently enforced.8" Records still exist
documenting loans at 400% per annum during the period. 2 Still, the
enduring legacy of this approach testifies to the success of the law as
compared to what must have come before. Nevertheless, for a closer look
at potential cracks in the construction of this impressive regulatory feat, we
must turn to later civilizations with a more complete historical record.
Ancient Rome also set maximum allowable interest rate caps. Highcost debt played a crucial and volatile role in Roman politics from the
earliest stages. 3 In the fifth century B.C.E., Romans were only one of
several ethnic groups present in Italy, and were still far away from
domination of the Mediterranean. 4 Class struggle, which would reemerge
in centuries to come, manifested itself dramatically." In 494 B.C.E., a
violent civil revolt took place. 6 A large number of poor plebeians
withdrew from the city and gathered on a hill overlooking the Tiber River
where they preceded to elect their own shadow legislature, officials, and
tribunes, essentially seceding from the Roman republic.8 7 The revolt has
since come to be known as the first secession. 8 The outcome of this revolt
and many others like it during the period is historically unclear. However,

79. HOMER& SYLLA, supra note 1,at 27. Hammurabi's Code also formalized some standards

for granting debtor amnesty. For instance, the Code abated debts where debtors could not pay due
to natural disasters such as drought or flood. THE OLDEST CODE, supra note 11, at 12-13.
80. HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 27.
81. M.I. FINLEY, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN ANCIENT GREECE 162 (1981).
82. Edward L. Glaeser & Jose Scheinkman, Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender Be: An
Economic Analysis ofInterest Restrictions and Usury Laws, 41 J. L. & ECON. 1, 20 n.37 (1998)
(relying on C.H.W. JOHNS, BABYLONIAN AND ASSYRIAN LAWS, CONTRACTS AND LETTERS (1904)).
83. KARL CHRIST, THE ROMANS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THEIR HISTORY AND CIVILISATION 13
(Christopher Holme trans., 1984); STEPHEN L. DYSON, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY IN ROMAN ITALY

78(1992).
84. See generallyMICHAEL CRAWFORD, THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 31-42 (2d ed. 1993) (relating
brief history of the Roman conquest of Italy); CHESTER G. STARR, JR., THE EMERGENCE OF ROME
AS RULER OF THE WESTERN WORLD 7-13, 16 (1953).
85. CHRIST, supra note 83, at 12-15; STARR, supra note 84, at 22.
86. CHRIST, supra note 83, at 12-13.
87. Id. at 12-15.
88. Id. at 13; T.J. CORNELL, THE BEGINNINGS OF ROME: ITALY AND ROME FROM THE BRONZE
AGE TO THE PUNIC WARS (C.1000-264 BC) 256-57 (1995).
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the cause of the revolt is not: "[b]y all accounts the principal cause of the
first secession was a debt crisis."89
The situation facing poor Romans of the period should by now come
as no surprise to readers.9" Many historians, both modem and ancient, have
focused on one uncannily familiar story which may have lit the fire.9 '
Apparently, a war veteran's farm was destroyed during a battle with a rival
tribe.92 The loss of his farm, combined with government tax demands,
forced the veteran to borrow money at dangerously high rates.93 When he
was unable to pay, his creditor imprisoned and tortured him. 94 Eventually,
the veteran appeared in the city Forum where those who heard his story
were so enraged they took to the streets rioting.95
The first major codification of Roman law, called the Twelve Tables,
was in part a response to the debt crisis of the first secession. 96 For reasons
undoubtedly similar to those the Babylonians relied upon, the Twelve
Tables included an interest rate cap and some basic provisions to enforce
it. 97 Under the Twelve Tables the legal maximum interest rate was set by
weight at one ounce per pound per year, which amounts to 8 1/3% per
annum.18 Creditors found contracting for greater rates were liable in
Roman courts for fourfold damages. 99 This basic legislative approach

89. Id. at 266; see also CHRIST, supra note 83, at 13 ("In almost all the social disturbances
of the Graeco-Roman cultural world, land distribution and the cancellation of debt were primary
demands.").
90. One historian explains:
Debt provided the rural elite with another form of sociolegal control, binding free
rustics to them in a manner similar to that of slaves and freedmen. Roman law was
not kind to debtors. The rural ruling class could use the threat of prosecution laws
as a major instrument of control. This rural indebtedness apparently increased
during the second and third centuries [C.E.] and contributed to the protofeudal
system of the late Empire.
DYSON, supra note 83, at 134.
91. See, e.g., F.R. COWELL, THE REVOLUTIONS OF ANCIENT ROME 31, 39-40 (1962) ("There
was at first no limit to the interest that might be demanded on loans, so those in desperate want were
forced to accept any terms. Moneylenders in ancient times were notorious for their harsh, grasping
greed and, left uncontrolled as they were, they demanded thirty, fifty, a hundred percent interest and
more.").
92. Id.at 40 (quoting Livy).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. STARR, supra note 84, at 23.
97. HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 45.
98. Id.
99. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

remained intact for the duration of the Roman Republic and the Empire,
although the legal maximum varied with political tides. During the third
century B.C.E. the maximum legal rate was lowered for a short time to
4 1/6%.' In 88 B.C.E., Sulla raised the interest rate cap to 12% per
annum' l ' This rate remained the legal limit for centuries and was adopted
by the later Empire and the Byzantine Empire. °2
Although interest rate caps provided some protection for Romans, they
were poorly enforced throughout Roman history.0 3 Pawn shops and other
lenders that catered to the higher-risk poor consistently charged three to ten
times the legal maximum.' °4 The rate caps also proved too inflexible in
comparison to the volatile Roman economy. In particular, the availability
of gold and silver from mining and foreign conquest dramatically affected
market prices for the use of money.'0 5 Moreover, both the Republic and the
Empire faced the persistent problem of rich currency hoarders, who would
hide away vast fortunes in coins, thus decreasing the available supply of
cash and raising prices for the use of money. 10 6 When the supply of money
was low, interest rate caps were probably all but ignored, thus affording
almost no protection to debtors.
The problems with interest rate caps were not limited to Rome. Around
2000 years later on the other side of the globe, fundamentally analogous
problems plagued China during the late Ming dynasty. Following a
hundred years of foreign domination by Mongolians with the clan of
Ghengis Kahn at their head, the famous Chinese leader Chu Yuan-chang
(later referred to as the Hung-wu emperor) solidified control over many
competing factions and succeeded in driving the Mongolians out of
Northern China.0 7 In 1368, Chu Yuan-chang founded the Ming dynasty,
which would last for the terms of fifteen succeeding emperors until its
overthrow by Manchurian invaders in 1644.0' By the late sixteenth
century, the Chinese government suffered from inept administration of
rural agrarian masses by a literary bureaucracy. 0 9 Prevailing Chinese law

100. Id. at45, 52.
101. Id. at 52.
102. Id.
103. The "rapaciousfaeneratores, or moneylenders" are a staple in ancient Roman history and
culture. DYSON, supra note 83, at 78.
104. HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 59.
105. Id. at 38-39, 48.
106. Id. at 48.
107. F.W. MOTE, IMPERIAL CHINA, 900-1800, at 474, 549 (1999).
108. Id. at 564,776; FRANZ MICHAEL, THE ORIGIN OF MANCHU RULEIN CHINA: FRONTIERAND
BUREAUCRACY AS INTERACTING FORCES IN THE CHINESE EMPIRE 1 (1972).
109. RAY HUANG, 1587: A YEAR OF No SIGNIFICANCE: THE MING DYNASTY IN DECLINE 131

(1981).
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fixed a maximum allowable interest rate for loans at 36% per annum."0
The statutes also forbade the collection of interest at amounts greater than
the original principal."' Hoarding of coin wealth, supply limitations, and
failed attempts to introduce paper currency made cash a rare and expensive
commodity.'12 Nevertheless, lending for consumption purposes appears to
have been widespread."13 In 1587, over 20,000 pawn shops operated in
China." 4 Once again, the interest rate cap was poorly enforced. Wealthy
families commonly lent money to poor farmers at illegal interest rates."'
Foreclosures on the homes of poor rural farmers undercut, on an enormous
scale, the ability of the poor to survive." 6 As one historian explains:
Agrarian exploitation of the poor ... was far from limited
to... isolated incidents. It affected all walks of life and was
carried out on a large and small scale without surcease
generation after generation. Essentially, such exploitation was
the economic basis of the bureaucracy as an institution.
Official families, who collected rents from landholdings and
interest from the moneylending business, were an integral part
of the rural economy."'
When subsistence farmers fell behind on payments, wealthy creditors hired
local "roughnecks" to collect."'
The story of one eccentric civil servant explicitly shows the entrenched
role of high-cost lending at this time in China.' ' Hai Jui was a civil servant
who worked his way up the Chinese bureaucracy with a maverick attitude
extremely rare in the Confucian ordered civil service. 2° Hai Jui achieved
notoriety with the Chinese masses early in his career by remonstrating the
son of a powerful dignitary for financially abusing his position. 2 ' Having
attained fame for an unostentatious lifestyle, Hai Jui did the unthinkable
by openly criticizing the emperor Chia-ching. 2 Hai Jui wrote the emperor

110. HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 614.

111. HUANG, supra note 109, at 138 (noting a 3% monthly statutory maximum) (relying on
Ta-MingHui-tien,at 163.14, 164.25).
112. Id. at 146-47.
113. Id.at 140, 144.
114. Id. at 144.
115. Id. at 145-46.
116. Id.at 138, 140.
117. Id. at 145.
118. Id. at 138.
119. See id. at 130-55.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 132.
122. Id. at 135-36.
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a letter describing him as "vain, cruel, selfish, suspicious, and foolish."' 23
Reportedly, Hai Jui purchased a coffin and said goodbye to his family
before sending the letter.' 24 Chia-ching was deeply disturbed by the
reproach, and sentenced Hai Jui to death for insolence.'25 Before the
sentence was carried out, Chia-ching passed away and Lung-ch'ing
ascended to the throne in 1567.126 Lung-ch'ing commuted the sentence, and
Hai Jui emerged from prison more prestigious than ever.'27 Eventually, Hai
Jui attained the rank of governor over the richest and most developed
prefecture in the entire empire. 2 '
But for Hai Jui, challenging endemic high-cost lending proved more
politically dangerous than even challenging an emperor. As governor, Hai
Jui attempted to enforce previously ignored credit laws and stretched
procedural rules in order to prevent poor farmers from losing their
homes. 29
' In doing so he confronted the richest landowners in the province
who profited from money lending, and thereby created enemies who would
eventually erode his power. 3 ° When the poor learned the governor had
personally heard the complaints of dispossessed landowners, his offices
were flooded with as many as three to four thousand petitions a day.'
Other civil servants, possibly linked to lending interests, accused Hai Jui
of"encourag[ing] hoards of riffraff to make false charges against men of
substance."'3 These accusations, fueled by otherwise impotent claims of
personal impropriety, cost Hai Jui his post and forced him into early
retirement from which he never politically recovered.' 33 All this was in
spite of Hai Jui's formidable contribution
of organizing the dredging of
134
two commercially important rivers.
Perhaps Ming society would have done well to incorporate the lending
reforms Hai Jui attempted to establish. Within fifty years Ming society
entered a period of peasant rebellions hastening the overthrow of the
dynasty by Manchurian invaders from the North. 35 Hai Jui probably would

123. Id. at 145.
124. Id. at 135.
125. Id. at 136.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 137.
129. Id. at 138-39.
130. Id. at 139.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 140.
133. Id. at 141.
134. Id. at 138.
135. JAMEs BUNYAN PARSONS, THE PEASANT REBELLIONS OF THE LATE MING DYNASTY, at xiii
(1970); MOTE, supra note 107, at 795-96.
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not be surprised by the incident which one Chinese source attributes as the
cause of the first rebellions:
The incident involved four soldiers and an oppressive
moneylender, appropriately named Ch'ien (money). The
moneylender bribed the commander of the garrison to join
him in a plot to force the soldiers to repay much more money
than they had actually borrowed. This piece of chicanery
prompted the soldiers to mutiny and organize local famine
victims to ally with them in rebellion.'36
This story should not surprise us, given its remarkable similarity to the war
veteran thought to have provoked the first secession in Rome.
There can be little doubt that interest rate caps were a significant
improvement over the violent and chaotic markets of our earliest
civilizations. As a social policymaking strategy, interest rate caps
combined with other lending format restrictions have endured at least since
the Code of Hammurabi and are still in effect throughout much of the
United States and the modern world. Nevertheless, the experiences of
Rome and China begin to show the limitations of the policy. Interest rate
caps and other lending format restrictions presume to prevent mutually
agreeable contracts. Effective policing of these rules requires more
resources than most societies are willing to spend. Although extremely
different societies have chosen the "oldest continuous form of commercial
regulation[,]" interest rate caps and similar format restrictions have
traditionally garnered limited success in curbing harmful consequences of
high cost lending.'37 The policy has also cultivated black-market cultures
which have come to threaten the very foundations of otherwise successful
dynasties.
C. Separating "Us "from "Them ": Selective ProtectionStrategies
While some societies have attempted to separate harmful loans from
beneficial credit, others have attempted to separate individuals "deserving"
of protection from those who are not. This strategy of selective protection
is as old as that of interest rate caps. The best example of its evolution is
136. PARSONS, supra note 135, at 5 n.* (discussing CHI LIU-CH'I, MING CHI PEILUEH 4/1 a-b).
Parsons asserts, without citing evidence, that Chi Liu-ch'i's attribution of the soldier's story as the
cause of the rebellion is "undoubtedly an exaggeration." Id. He is probably right. The single
incident, if it happened at all, would alone not be enough to start a revolution. But, whether the
incident itself actually happened is irrelevant. What is important is that many people, including a
Chi Liu-ch'i, probably thought it did. The story points to the charged atmosphere surrounding high
cost lending which is indicative of the wide despair of debtors at the time. Id.
137. Robin A. Morris, Consumer Debt and Usury: A New Rationale For Usury, 15 PEPP. L.
REv. 151, 151 (1988).
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found not far from Babylon in ancient Israel. Unlike Babylon to the East,
which had a long tradition of monarchy, the Hebrew culture was tribally
organized prior to roughly the first millennium B.C.E.' The Hebrew
people were seminomadic in small ranges near towns, relying on herding
domesticated animals and occasional farming.'39 They lived both in tents
and in houses. 4 ' Having settled on the land bridge between Africa and
Asia, the Hebrew culture was subject to invasion from many directions and
by many peoples. 4 ' From early on, Hebrew culture developed a strong
sense of42tribal unity and cooperation in order to compete with outside
threats. 1
The early Hebrew laws concerning high-cost lending reflect this sense
of tribal unity, by extending legal protection only to other Hebrews.
Deuteronomy, which describes Yahweh's laws as delivered by Moses
(probably around the 13th century B.C.E.), states:
You shall not charge interest on anything you lend to a
fellow-country-man [1 'ahika],money or food or anything else
on which interest can be charged. You may charge interest on
a loan to a foreigner [nokri] but not on a loan to a fellowcountry-man, for then the LORD your God will bless you in all3
you undertake in the land which you are entering to occupy.11
Thus, the Hebrews took action to prevent corrosion of community
bonds and to provide at least some outlet for the wealthy to lend excess
capital. Protection against the dangers of owing interest to rival outsiders
was probably an added benefit in the competitive inter-tribal anarchy
which characterized the ancient East Mediterranean coast. Moreover, by
simply banning interest within the Hebrew community, the rule probably
had lower administrative costs than those legal systems forced to
distinguish between legal and illegal loans on the basis of interest rate
caps. Recently two economists described the likely role of the Hebrew

138. See B.S.J. ISSERLIN, THE ISRAELITES (1998).

139. See id.
140. Id. at 61.
141. Id. at 21-24.
142. Id. at 49-50, 59-64; JAMES C. VANDERKAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO EARLY JUDAISM 5-6
(2001); Niels Peter Lemche, The Relevance of Working with the Concept of Class in the Study of
IsraeliteSociety in the Iron Age, in CONCEPTS OF CLASS IN ANCIENT ISRAEL 89, 94-95 (Mark R.
Sneed ed., 1999).
143. Deut.23:19-20 (Oxford Study ed., 1976) (emphasis added); see also NELSON, supra note
42, at xix-xxii (discussing the linguistic roots of ancient Hebrew terms for foreigner and clan
member). The Hebrews also had a few other ancillary rules. For instance, The Bible prohibits
holding clothing as collateral. See Exod. 22:26. Also, the Jubilee Year rule established a crude
debtor amnesty system which required returning of property sold under duress to the original owner
every fifty years. See Glaeser & Scheinkman, supra note 82, at 20 n.37.
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rules as trying "to make sure that individuals did not reduce themselves to
a level of poverty, where they would be burdens on the community. 144
Not surprisingly, the Hebrew injunction against charging any interest
to other Hebrews was followed infrequently.145 The story of Nehemiah is
enlightening in this regard. By the 5th century B.C.E. the Persian empire
dominated Israel. 46 During the reign of Artaxerxes I (464- 424 B.C.E.),
Nehemiah, a Jewish cup bearer to the King, was appointed governor of
Jerusalem.147 Nehemiah tells his own story in his rare, first person dictated
book in the Old Testament. 41 Apparently arriving in 445 B.C.E. from the
Persian capital of Susa, Nehemiah organized the rebuilding of the walls
around Jerusalem. 149 Nehemiah instituted a number of reforms directed at
high-cost lending:' 50
There came a time when the common people, both men and
women, raised a great outcry against their fellow-Jews. Some
complained that they were giving their sons and daughters as
pledges for food to keep themselves alive; others that they
were mortgaging their fields, vineyards, and houses to buy
corn in famine; others again that they were borrowing money
on their fields and vineyards to pay the king's tax. "But," they
said, "our bodily needs are the same as other people's, our
children are as good as theirs; yet here we are, forcing our
sons and daughters to become slaves... ." I was very angry
when I heard their outcry and the story they told. I mastered
my feelings and reasoned with the nobles and the magistrates.
I said to them, "You are holding your fellow-Jews as pledges
for debt." I rebuked them severely and said, "As far as we
have been able, we have brought back our fellow-Jews who
had been sold to other nations; but you are now selling your
own fellow-countrymen, and they will have to be bought back
by us!"... "What you are doing is wrong ....
Let us give up
this taking of persons as pledges for debt. Give back today to
your debtors their fields and vineyards, their olive-groves and
houses, as well as the income in money, and in corn, new
wine and oil." "We will give them back," they promised, "and
exact nothing more. We will do what you say." So,

144. Glaeser & Scheinkman, supra note 82, at 21.
145. Norman K. Gottwald, The Expropriatedand the Expropriators in Nehemiah 5, in
CONCEPTS OF CLASS INANCIENT ISRAEL 1, 7 (Mark R. Sneed ed., 1999).
146. H. Tadmor, The Periodof the First Temple, the Babylonian Exile and the Restoration,
in A HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE 91, 175 (H.H. Ben-Sasson ed., 1976).
147. Id. at 175-76.
148. Id. at 176.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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summoning the priests, I put the offenders on oath to do as
they promised.... And they did as they had promised.''
There is no independently corroborating evidence of Nehemiah's
actions.'52 One historian interprets Nehemiah's credit reforms as similar to
earlier acts of Sumerian and Babylonian Kings who granted amnesty to
those sold into slavery for debt. 5 3 Although Nehemiah's reforms did not
fundamentally change the Hebrew rule in Deuteronomy, they do shed light
on its social operation. It would seem that, without strong leadership, early
Hebrews lent and borrowed from one another with serious social
consequences in spite ofthe injunction in Deuteronomy.'54 Moreover, from
a contemporary American perspective, the racial orientation of the strategy
is unadaptable to a democratic society committed to equal protection.
Historically, it is unclear whether the moneylenders' new-found filial
charity derived from Nehemiah's exhortations had any enduring effect.
Most scholars doubt that the situation facing Hebrew debtors significantly
changed for at least another three hundred years.' 55 Their lot probably only
improved when the Hebrew Hasmonean state expanded, making foreign
poor people a suitable substitute for religiously protected Hebrews.' 56
Many other cultures have used formal and informal mechanisms to
protect favored groups from the consequences of high-cost debt. For
instance, the Indian Dharmasastrasprovides for different interest rates
varying with the caste of the debtor.' 57 Under the rule, lenders provide
much lower rates to Brahmins than other caste members, without regard to
the personal credit history of the individual. 5 ' While selective protection
strategies may have some success for protected group members, they also

151. Neh. 5:1-13 (Oxford Study ed., 1976).
152. Tadmor, supra note 146, at 175.
153. Id. at 176; see also KRAMER, supra note 49, at 82 (discussing reforms of Urukagina of
Lagash in Sumeria); SAGGS, supranote 13, at 97 (discussing reforms of Ammisaduqa in Babylon);
Gottwald, supra note 145, at 8 (comparing Nehemiah's reforms to Solon's).
154. See Gottwald, supra note 145, at 7 ("We are basically left with the wider biblical
attestation that in spite of numerous measures to combat impoverishment through debt, none seems
to have been effective over any great length of time.").
155. FINLEY, supra note 81, at 163; Gottwald, supra note 145, at 9.
156. FINLEY, supra note 81, at 163; see NAOMI PASACHOFF & ROBERT J. LITTMAN, JEWISH
HISTORY IN 100 NUTSHELLS 56-58 (1995) (for a convenient description of the Hasmonean
kingdom).
157. K.V. RANGASWAMI AIYANGAR, ASPECTS OF ANCIENT INDIAN ECONOMIC THOUGHT 108
(1934).
158. Id. Ancient Mesopotamiarn cultures may have had social norms which led to similar,
albeit less formal outcomes. One letter from the city of Ugarit reads, "[g]ive [in the meantime] the
140 shekels which are still outstanding from your own money but do not charge interest between
us-we are both gentlemen!" A. LEO OPPENHEIM, ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA: PORTRAIT OF A DEAD
CIVILIZATION 88 (1977).
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probably encourage class division and racism. Despite egalitarian
pretensions of the United States, as we shall see, this strategy too was later
imported to the new world.
D. Everyone for Themselves: Self-Help Free Markets
While the earliest high-cost credit policy strategies attempted to prevent
or remedy undesirable credit outcomes through government or religious
rules, later strategies began, in one way or another, to harness market
forces. While microeconomic theory as we currently recognize it did not
begin to develop until the eighteenth century, social and governmental
strategies for mitigating the problems associated with high-cost debt began
to recognize the benefits of relying on market forces much earlier. Reforms
adopted in the surprisingly liberal society ofancient Athens are illustrative.
At the zenith of its power and cultural sophistication, ancient Athens had
"no law restricting the rate of interest."' 9 Foreshadowing the economic
arguments of thinkers such as Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and David
Ricardo, Athenian culture focused on individualism, personal
responsibility, and balance in determining economic outcomes. 60
The story of how Athenians arrived at this approach probably starts
around the beginning of the 6th century B.C.E. At this time, Athenian
society had intensely polarized. Recent advances in trading throughout the
Mediterranean, the growing use of coined money, and competition from
free slave labor had put pressure on subsistence farmers around Athens.' 6 '
Credit was already common and took on many different forms: some credit
was secured by land, but often it was secured by the freedom of the debtor
where, similar to other early civilizations, default meant slavery. 62 The gap
63
between rich and poor became so wide that revolution threatened.
Although this situation was complex, early writers are universal in their
agreement that the primary cause of the crisis was high-cost debt.' 64 One
historian summarizes the situation thus:
Solon tells us plainly of the overt abuses in his own day. A
large part of the soil of Attica had come into the possession or
at least under the control of the rich; many Athenians were

159. MILLETT, supra note 42, at 181.
160. GREER & LEWIS, supra note 44, at 63.
161. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 68; see also I FRITZ M. HEICHELHEIM, AN ANCIENT
ECONOMIC HISTORY: FROM THE PALEOLITHIC AGE TO THE MIGRATIONS OF THE GERMANIC, SLAVIC

AND ARABICNATIONS 281-82 (Joyce Stevens, trans. 2d ed. 1958) (giving a more thorough account
of the causes of the Solonic crisis).
162. HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1,at 34, 36.
163. Ivan M. Linforth, Solon the Athenian, in CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY 52 (1919).
164. FINLEY, supra note 81, at 156.
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suffering under a load of debt; some of these debtors, helpless
to relieve themselves, had been forced into exile and had been
living so long abroad that they had forgotten the good Attic
speech; others, free-born though they were, had become
slaves; and of these many had been sold into slavery abroad
and so were in the worst case of all. Broadly speaking, the
land and the greatest part of its products belonged to the rich;
and the poor were constrained to toil for them as their slaves
without mercy or redress. Here were causes enough for
bitterness and discontent. While the rich enjoyed their ease
and all the luxuries and comforts that the times afforded, the
poor were condemned to a life of hopeless drudgery at home
or the worst of evils in the ancient world, exile in a foreign
land.'65
To stave off collapse of the city-state, the community appointed the
poet and orator Solon, later called the father of Athenian law, to
unilaterally rehabilitate its government. 166 The situation must have been
very grave judging by the radical character of Solon's reforms and their
acceptance.167 Solon took several one-time measures to stabilize the
situation including canceling or reducing many debts, freeing all enslaved68
for debt, and repurchasing those sold abroad for debt at state expense.1
Solon also permanently outlawed enslaving defaulting debtors. 169 But this
relief came at a price, for Solon is attributed to the law, "[m]oney is to be
placed out at whatever rate the lender may want."' 7°
Solon's deregulation encouraged Athenians to rely on their own
judgment.' 71 Unregulated interest rates reflected Athenian commerciallyoriented values. 7 2 Historians speculate it was this deregulation which
helped creditors accept Solon's reforms. 7 3 In any case, the changes appear
to have had a lasting and generally positive effect on the Athenian society.
Unregulated credit prices proved effective in encouraging the finance of
maritime trade. 74 "Bottomry loans," where a creditor advanced maritime
traders the value of the ship's cargo before a voyage and assumed the risk

165. Linforth, supra note 163, at 48-49 (citations omitted).
166. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 68; HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 34; GREER & LEWIS,
supra note 44, at 58-59.
167. HOMER & SYUA, supra note 1, at 34-35.
168. Id. at 34; see also FINLEY, supra note 81, at 157 (discussing the linguistic meaning of
Solon's reforms).
169. HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 34.
170. MILLETT,supra note 42, at 50 (alterations omitted).
171. Linforth, supra note 163, at 67-68.
172. HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 38-39.
173. Id. at 34-35.
174. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 68.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss3/4

26

Peterson: Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Comsumer Credit: The Historic

HIGH-COST CONSUMER CREDIT' TRUTH IN LENDING ACT

of shipwreck, played a vital role in Athenian trade.17 Lenders could invest
in shipping loans at whatever price the risks of the voyage demanded.'76
Merchants engaging in risky, long distance trade could shop for highpriced loans from respectable law abiding creditors, rather than black
market money lenders.' 77 One scholar emphasizes that in Athens, credit
was more often used to the mutual benefit of people in similar economic
situations, as opposed to lending by the rich to the poor-common in most
of the ancient world. 7 ' Athens developed a banking system which
"changed money, received deposits, made loans to individuals and states,
made foreign remittances, collected revenues, issued letters of credit and
money orders, honored checks, and kept complete books."' 7 9 Although
lending did not develop to modem standards of complexity, it nevertheless
had its own kind of sophistication which was fundamental to sustaining the
ancient Athenian lifestyle.'
But, for the poor and unwary, the historical record tells a different story
indeed. Unregulated credit prices allowed unscrupulous lenders to charge
the highest rates to those in extreme need.' 8 ' In this period we find some
of the most expensive loans in recorded history-as high as 9,000% per
annum.8 2 Borrowers probably intended these loans, like most high-cost
loans, to be short term, but they were nevertheless often compounded over
long periods of time. 83 Creditors were free to calculate interest in whatever
way they chose, probably charging interest compounded at frequent
intervals.'84 Because high-cost lending was so profitable, a class of
creditors catering to the vulnerable poor and ignorant grew and thrived.' 85
High-cost lenders became prevalent enough to create a deep and lasting
influence on Greek drama and literature and an ancient variety of modem
loan sharks became a typical character in Athenian plays.' 86 Perhaps it was
the dramatic social pain associated with expensive debt which induced
contempt for lending by two of the world's greatest philosophers. We
should not underestimate that both Plato and Aristotle, observing the effect
of unregulated interest rates on their society, concluded that all interest

175.
176.
177.
178.

HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 35-36.
Id.
See id.
MILLETr, supra note 42, at 219-20.

179. HOMER& SYLLA, supra note I, at 38.
180. MILLET-r, supra note 42, at 220-21.

181. HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 35-36.
182. Id. at 40 (relying on AUGUSTUS BOECKH, THE PUBLIC ECONOMY OF THE ATHENIANs 179
(Anthony Lamb trans., 1857)).
183. Id.
184. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 68-69.
185. HOMER& SYLLA, supra note 1, at 35.

186. Id. at 38.
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should be banned." 7 Plato, for example, condemns lenders for "'planting
their own stings into any fresh victim who offers them an opening to inject
the poison of their money; and while they multiply
their capital by usury,
' 188
paupers."
the
multiplying...
also
they are
The Athenian credit market is emblematic of the free market strategy
for controlling the harmful consequences associated with high-cost
lending. Moreover, it mirrors much of the debate concerning credit
regulation today. Athens stands as an example that since ancient times
unregulated interest rates (with basic limitations such as the elimination of
debt slavery) could be socially and economically productive. Yet, modern
advocates of free market lending should also stand warned that unrestricted
interest rates left sophisticated lenders free to exact ruinous contracts on
those in vulnerable bargaining positions.
E. Give Them What They Want: CharitableLending
Even societies deeply committed to controlling credit markets have
come to realize the benefits of harnessing market forces in designing social
policy. A fifth strategy, still often used in contemporary America, looks to
undercut high-cost lenders by offering cheaper, less dangerous loans
subsidized by the charitable impulses of powerful social or government
institutions. An early example of the use of this strategy to control the
harmful consequences of high-cost debt evolved in late fifteenth-century
Italy. Influenced by Aristotelian contempt for credit as well as the ancient
Hebrew impulse to protect vulnerable group members, medieval Roman
Catholic religious doctrine strongly condemned taking any interest.8 9 Most
historians agree that the prejudice fundamentally retarded commerce. 90
Merchants had difficulty devising strategies to finance business ventures.' 9 '
Throughout the middle ages the poor were afflicted by extreme poverty,
due in no small part to the lack of strong international and domestic
trade.' 92
But toward the end of the fifteenth century, things began to change. The
threat from the black death improved considerably.' 93 Increased
international and domestic trade invigorated the economy.' 94 The printing
press was invented.' 9 Eventually the ideological grip of medieval

187. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 69-70.
188. Id. at 69 (quoting PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 280 (F. Cornford trans., 1945)).
189. BARTY-KING, supra note 42, at 8; HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 70-7 1.
190. BARTY-KING, supra note 42, at 10- 11; HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 71-72.
191. HOMER& SYLLA, supra note 1, at 71.
192. GREER & LEWIS, supra note 44, at 273; HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 98.
193. HOMER& SYLLA, supra note 1, at 104.
194. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 74; GREER & LEWIS, supra note 44, at 286-87.
195. GREER & LEWIS, supra note 44, at 346.
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scholasticism finally began to loosen. 196 Questioning the wisdom of their
outright interest ban, Italian religious and secular authorities began to
search for new ways to alleviate the suffering of the poor. Black market
money lenders and pawnshops catering to the desperate poor had long
existed in spite of religious condemnation.'97 In this period many Italian
leaders came to agree that small loans to the poor were inevitable and even
necessary to save those in extreme need. 98
As a result, religious leaders established charitable pawnshops which
intended to charge only enough to cover costs of operation. 99 Called mons
pietatis, such pawnshops met much controversy, but nevertheless found
Papal approval at the Fifth Lateran Council in 1515.200 The term translates
literally as "mountain of piety. ' 0 ' Appropriately, the Latin word for
mountain often carries a loose proverbial reference to making large
promises followed by small performances.2 2 Papal authorities reasoned
that where the montes pietatum charged more than the original principal

they were
not receiving usury but, rather, contributions to defray operation
20 3
costs.

The montes pietatum offered key theoretical advantages which may

explain their acceptance in the face of strong opposition from many
Catholic thinkers. Rather than simply prohibiting certain types of loans, the
montes required no one to do anything against their will, thereby
eliminating the risk of motivating a black market. 2 4 By offering cheaper
credit to the poor, the montes harnessed the market force of demand to put

196. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 74;

GREER & LEwis,

supra note 44, at 318-19.

197. HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 72.
198. Id. at 78-79, 104-06; JORDAN, supra note 2, at 15.
199.

CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING,

supra note 22, at 13-14; HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at

78-79; JORDAN, supra note 2, at 37; M.R. NIEFELD, THE PERSONAL FINANCE BusiNEss 18-19
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namely 2 percent per month." William Linn Westermann, Warehousingand Trapezite Banking in
Antiquity, 3 J.ECON. & Bus. HIST. 30, 47 (1931). Buddhist monasteries in China also had a

tradition of offering a small number of subsidized pawn loans at least as early as 200-300 A.D.
HOMER& SYLLA, supra note 1,at 608. Monasteries also appear to have made pawn loans for profit
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200. NELSON, supra note 42, at 19-20.
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private lenders out of business.2" 5 Debtors had no reason to pay the high
prices of traditional pawnshops, since they could obtain money from a
more trustworthy source at a lower price.20 6 It is probably exactly these
reasons which have fed charitable attempts to undercut private lending
throughout history.
Harnessing these market forces, the montes pietatum did find some
success. By 1509, eighty-seven of these pawnshops had been set up in the
Italian peninsula.207 Over the next two centuries the idea spread throughout
the continent under sponsorship of the church, municipalities, and
independent charities. 0 8 As the Catholic church lost influence, many of the
montes failed, but others were taken over by municipal governments. 20 9 A
few of the largest and strongest still exist today.2 °
Unfortunately, the montespietatumand strategies like them have faced
several drawbacks in spite of their visionary appeal. First, charitable
attempts to undercut private lenders such as the montes pietatum are
subject to the tides of ideological fashion, whereas private lending is
supported by the inexorable and constant desire for profit. For instance, the
most vocal advocates of the montes at their outset were the Franciscan
" ' Their charitable motives where at least
Observant Order of Friars.21
by their demagogic antisemitism. 212
dominated
possibly
supplemented and
"Paced by Bernardino da Feltre (d. 1494), the Observantine preachers
regurgitated the oft-discredited charges of ritual murder, incited mobs to
attacks on Jewish life and property, and harangued the people and their
magistrates to destroy the Jews . . ,,213 The noble intentions of early
administrators of the montes were polluted by the desire to drive Jewish
pawnbrokers from business and from Italy itself.214 Whether the montes
would ever have grown from infancy without the fuel of racial hatred is
unclear.

205. See HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 106, 110 (comparing the 20% legal mazim for
pawn loans in Florence with the 6% offered rate at montes pietatis).
206. Id.
207. NELSON, supra note 42, at 19.
208. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra note 22, at 13-14.
209. Id. at 14.
210. See id. at 13-15. Currently enduring municipal pawnshops include the "Dorotheum" in
Vienna and the "Credit Municipal" in Paris. Mexico also has numerous municipal pawnshops. Id.
at 14 n.3; John Dornberg, Vienna's Dorotheum: A SingularAuction House and Hockshop, 21
SMITHSONIAN 110, 110-20 (1990).
211. NELSON, supra note 42, at 19; NIEFELD, supra note 199, at 18.
212. NELSON, supra note 42, at 19.
213. Id.(footnote omitted).
214. Id. Similarly, vicious antisemitism existed throughout Europe. See, e.g., BARTY-KING,
supra note 42, at 10.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss3/4

30

Peterson: Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Comsumer Credit: The Historic

HIGH-COST CONSUMER CREDIT: TRUTH IN LENDING ACT

Charity is also easily corrupted on a much smaller level, and often with
spoiling consequences. English attempts to institute charitable pawnshops
in the early 1700s are illustrative. The first major charitable pawnshop to
appear in England, the Charitable Corporation, was founded in 1699, and
chartered in 1707.215 It operated without incident for about thirty years
"until rumors that huge amounts of money were being embezzled on the
basis of fictitious pledges began to gain credence. 21 6 After Charitable
Corporation 'officials fled the country, an enormous scandal ensued
creating a long standing public mistrust against charitable alternatives to
pawnbrokering in England.217 Lamentably, in consumer credit as
elsewhere, the motivation of charity is rarely more contagious than hate or
greed.
A separate drawback to charitable attempts to displace private lenders
derives from private lenders' desires not to be displaced. Obviously
pawnbrokers resent attempts by government or charitable institutions to
drive them out of business. This resentment may be more acute where the
social reformers engage private lenders in subsidized competition, rather
than instituting uniform command and control style rules such as interest
rate caps. The former attack private lending at the root of its business-the
demand for credit-whereas the latter merely regulates the way business
may be conducted. Such private opposition to charitable lending often
stifles charitable lending institutions in their infancy. A hundred years after
the Charitable Corporation debacle, British reformers again tried to
organize a charitable pawnshop, which again met with failure.218 This time
private lenders organized a strong resistance aimed at government,
investment, and customer levels.219 The opposition proved so effective as
to convince one disgruntled ex-pawnbroker to state:
A little more mature reflection convinced us that a few
individuals with a limited fund could not hope to withstand
for more than a very short period the opposition of a body so
powerful their in number, their riches, and their union as the
pawnbrokers of the Metropolis, and that if a successful
competition should ever be established against them it must
be by a body as numerous, as rich, and as united as
themselves.220

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

TEBBUTT, supra note 42, at 109.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 109-10.
Id.
Id. at 110.
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This opposition was not merely for the purpose of mobilizing support and
resources for charitable lending projects. It is easy to imagine private
pawnbrokers strategically engaging in marketing and price campaigns to
drive vulnerable charitable lenders, who still required customers to pay
overhead, out of business. But even where private lenders do not
intentionally besiege charity credit, benevolent lenders usually advocate
thrift and are unwilling to encourage indebtedness, thus carrying a much
lower profile and in turn a smaller base of customers. Charitable lending
strategies have historically lacked the profit-driven zeal to successfully
compete with private lenders.
However, the most formidable obstacle faced by charitable lending
regimes is mobilizing sufficient capital resources. This problem is also
doubtlessly engendered by the opposition of private lenders, but is still a
menacing limitation to the strategy in its own right. Even the earliest of the
montes pietatum, founded at the headwaters of the social current creating
the most successful of Europe's charitable pawnshops, often found
accumulation of capital reserves for their non-profit venture prohibitive.22 '
Wealthy Christians, despite the considerable religious pressure towards
charity exerted by the fourteenth-century Italian Catholic church, were
simply unlikely to invest in the montes.22 Although some of the montes
survived past infancy, quite simply, "many suffered or failed from
undercapitalization. '' 223 Without profit there is little or no incentive to
supply the necessary assets to conduct charitable lending on any
meaningful scale.
Advocates of this strategy often turn to government to help mobilize the
capital when they realize the support of private beneficiaries is inadequate.
A noted British scholar has concluded, based on failed British attempts to
establish charitable lending, that governmental support is a virtual
prerequisite to any meaningful success. 224 However, successful
governmental rent-seeking behavior is costly, inconsistent, and
unpredictable, especially when opposed by powerful, organized private
lobbies. While the supply of expensive capital for consumer lending has
continued unabated for millennia, the supply of governmental subsidies for
low-cost loans to the poor has been meager and sporadic. 225' Governments,
almost always controlled by the society's power elite, face the same
absence of incentive to provide charitable lending to the poor as private

JORDAN, supra note 2, at 37.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. TEBBUTT, supra note 42, at I11.
225. See, e.g., MENNING, supra note 42, at 259-60 (noting the lack of sufficiant capital in
Florence's monspietatisuntil the Medici family began using it to pay interest on deposits and lend
large sums to a wealthy clientele).
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citizens. 226Additionally, government strategies are burdened in stimulating
lower-priced loans by the costs of immobile bureaucracy and tax
collection.227
The limitations ofcharitable attempts to undersell private lenders aside,
this strategy nevertheless has retained advocates and limited successes for
centuries-and for good reason. The strategy harnesses the demand for
lower-price loans to extend protection to vulnerable debtors.
Unfortunately, as the montes pietatum demonstrated, these successes are
limited by serious structural problems, particularly supply problems, which
have come to afflict similar American strategies in the twentieth century.
F. Strength in Numbers: Cooperative Lending
For thousands of years, families have extended low-cost and noninterest bearing loans to family members to insulate the family from the
dangers of high-cost debt.228 This informal cooperation can be an effective
method of pooling a small and trusted group's resources to overcome short
term deprivation and income shocks. However, the potency of this familial
cooperation is limited by the size of the family's resource pool, as well as
by the strength of the familial bonds tying the group together. In
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe, some groups began to expand
and organize this cooperative lending strategy. The earliest formally
organized cooperative lending groups were probably the British building
societies. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, Great Britain
was in the nascent stages of industrialization and undergoing a revolution
in financial markets.229 A new class of urban salaried industrial workers
was emerging.23 ° Demographic shifts from rural agricultural work to urban
industrial work contributed to widespread housing shortages.23 ' The
enlightenment fostered a new focus on self-help and entrepreneurialism.232
Seeking to cope with the industrial revolution, a small group in
Birmingham innovated a new way of pooling resources to purchase
homes.2 3 In 1775, a small club, Ketley's Building Society, formed with the

226. Id.
227. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 462-63, 712, 716 (15th ed.

1995).
228. HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 17.
229. Id. at 153-54.
230. GREER & LEWIS, supra note 44, at 511-13; CHARLES FERGUSON & DONAL MCKILLOP,
THE STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT OF CREDIT UNIONS 15

(1997).

231. M. MANFRED

FABRITIUS & WILLIAM BORGES, SAVING THE SAVINGS & LOAN: THE U.S.
THRIFT INDUSTRY AND THE TEXAS EXPERIENCE 1950-1988, at 12 (1989).
232. MARK BOLEAT, THEBUILDING SOCIETY INDUSTRY 3 (1982); HOMER& SYLLA, supra note
1, at 153-54, 181-84.
233. FABRITIUS & BORGES, supra note 231, at 11-12.
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purpose of pooling resources to purchase homes for members of the
club.234 None of the members alone were able to gather enough cash to
cover the cost of building a new house.235 In the newly formed club,
members could contribute a specified amount each week into a common
building fund.2 36 As soon as enough resources were gathered, the club
would purchase land and build a home for one of the members as
determined by lot.237 Members who had received their home were obligated
to continue making their weekly contributions.23 When the club had
purchased a home for every member, the society was terminated.239
Although the first Birmingham building society and the others which
followed were limited to providing purchase money for home building,
they nevertheless furnished their members with the ability to permanently
acquire relatively inexpensive credit. 24 0 After a group member acquired a
home, the member would have significant real property upon which to
secure relatively low-cost loans to overcome short term needs or income
shocks. 241' By establishing a building society, a group could insulate
member families, and in turn entire neighborhoods, against financial
predators.242
As Germany began to experience the same structural precedents which
spurred British building societies, it too developed organized cooperative
lending institutions. Unlike British building societies, German institutions
did not limit themselves to financing homes.243 Modem credit unions trace
their genealogy to two upper-middle class German financial innovators.244
Herman Schulze, mayor of the town of Delitzsch, sought to create an
institution which could lend capital to mechanics, tradesmen, and other
local merchants. 245 After unsuccessfully pursuing charitable investments
from wealthy benefactors, in 1850 Schulze turned to organizing
cooperative societies which would pool resources.246 These early SchulzeDelitzsch credit cooperatives sold shares, then lent the proceeds to

234.
235.
236.
237.

BARTY-KING, supra note 42, at 165.
Id.; BOLEAT, supra note 232, at 3.
BARTY-KING, supra note 42, at 165.
BOLEAT, supra note 232, at 3.
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239. Id.
240. HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 154.
241. See DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING INTHE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SOCIAL
POLICY IN AMERICA 60-61 (1999) (making a similar point in a contemporary context).
242. BARTY-KING, supra note 42, at 165-66; BOLEAT, supra note 232, at 3-5; FABRITIUS &
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members who could demonstrate efficient operation and a likelihood of
profit for their small businesses. 47 Members bought their share in the
union on an installment plan, similar to British building societies' weekly
investment requirement.248 Because every member of the union shared
equally in the risk that a borrowing member might default, SchulzeDelitzsch organizations excluded all but relatively stable small merchants
from membership. 49
Frederick William Raiffeisen, mayor of the village of Flammersfeld,
organized similar cooperatives hoping to focus not on merchants, but on
impoverished families. ° After many failed ventures, Raffeisen forswore
all charitable efforts and instead focused on self-sufficiency and mutual
benefit.25 ' Thereafter, he limited membership to individuals with
unimpeachable character, widely vouched-for moral responsibility, and
steady incomes, with successful results.252 With careful management, both
men organized credit unions which successfully loaned money not based
on collateral, but upon the character of the borrower as judged by all other
members of the union. 3 With widespread and growing demand for these
basic financial services, the early German credit unions grew quickly.2 4 By
1882, Germany boasted over 3,000 Schulze-Delitszch credit
cooperatives.2 5 By 1888, there were 425 Raffeisen credit unions.25 6 Taking
c'ue from British and German predecessors, cooperative credit
organizations spread to Italy, Austria, France, Belgium, and then
throughout Europe. 7 Organized cooperative lending spread across the
Atlantic first into Quebec, Canada and then into the United States.25" In the
latter half of the nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century,
cooperative lending institutions grew rapidly both in variety and in number
throughout the western world. 59

Id.; FERGUSON & MCKILLOP, supra note 230, at 15-16.
DUBLIN, supra note 243, at 143-44.
Id. at 143.
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Nevertheless, when viewed as a strategy for providing protection
against the dangers of high-cost debt, cooperative credit organizations
have, like other social strategies, encountered significant structural
limitations. For instance, vulnerability to fraud and incompetence tends to
make cooperative lending institutions unstable. Cooperative credit
organizations have a strong incentive to add more members, and thus pool
more resources. More members mean each member suffers less loss upon
loan default. But as the union's membership grows, losses may become
more likely, since members are less capable of judging the credit
worthiness of individual members applying for loans. Moreover, the larger
the group, the more conflicting perspectives to accommodate.
Thus, as cooperative lending groups became larger, they were forced to
adopt democratic ideals and management checks and balances in order to
safeguard the common pool of funds. For instance, the New World's first
credit union, the Caisse Populare in Quebec, organized trustees into
different committees to oversee the operation of their credit union. 6 Some
members were assigned to a conseild'administrationwhich watched over
the day-to-day affairs of the union, while the commission de surveillance
was responsible for guaranteeing the books were properly kept.261 The
spirit of cooperation was essential because those with oversight
responsibilities were ineligible to receive loans in order to avoid conflicts
of interest.262 And, unlike commercial banks, trustees received no
compensation."' While these policies and their natural outgrowths, such
as salaried professional management, have made large-scale cooperative
lending possible, they have not succeeded in eliminating the risks. As the
1980 savings and loan scandal made clear, cooperative lending may be as
vulnerable to fraud and mismanagement today as it was two centuries ago.
But, perhaps more importantly, cooperative lending by its nature tends
to exclude those who are in most desperate need of its advantages. From
the beginning, organized cooperative lenders have rigorously limited their
membership to those with common bonds and relatively stable financial
backgrounds. The first British building societies confined membership to
groups of no more than twenty close neighbors and friends.264 Many
German cooperatives required costly entrance fees which functionally
excluded undesirable members.265 Early Quebec credit unions excluded all
but respected French speaking Catholics and garnered community support
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with anti-Semitic hate speech.26 6 Moreover, many potential members who
met the racial, religious, and character prerequisites of cooperative credit
did not meet formal and informal financial requirements.267 It took little
time for cooperative lenders to recognize that impoverished applicants had
nothing to offer other members in the way of mutual benefit. 268 These
applicants sought not cooperation but charity, and were therefore excluded.
III. ECHOES OF THE PAST: HIGH-COST CONSUMER CREDIT POLICY
IN THE UNITED STATES

The United States has permutated variations of each of these major
high-cost consumer credit policy strategies. Debtor amnesty, interest rate
caps and other contract restrictions, selective protection, deregulated free
markets, charitable lending, and organized cooperative lending have all
been used by American policymakers for at least a century. However,
American high-cost consumer credit policy has materialized obedient to no
logical pattern, instead tracking the twists and turns of history and cultural
change. This Part briefly surveys this evolution by focusing on the
recurrent strategic limitations which have plagued our imported high-cost
credit policy strategies. This Part also discusses the radical cultural
revolution in middle-class American values with respect to consumer
credit.
A. High-Cost Consumer Credit Policy Priorto 1900
European colonies in North America established their first laws dealing
with high-cost credit following the English system of the time. 269 The basis
for most modem state usury laws comes from imported English interest
rate cap statutes. In particular, the colonies applied the Statute of Anne,
which set a maximum allowable interest rate of five percent per annum.270
The Statute of Anne, passed in 1713, was deeply influenced by receding
but still influential medieval predispositions against the taking of interest:
"[t]he statute[] ... bear[s] witness to the Church's continued prejudice
against the practice of usury in any form."27' Specifically, the statute
forbade charging interest "above the value of five pounds for the
266. RUDIN, supra 261, at 5, 11.
267. Id. at 27.
268. PUGH & INGRAM, supra note 258, at 6.
269. HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 274 ("The colonists from England brought with them
seventeenth-century English attitudes toward credit and interest.").
270. KEEST, supra note 19, at 37; Ackerman, supranote 5, at 85; Tracy A. Westen, Usury in
the Conflict ofLaws: The Doctrine ofthe Lex Debitoris, 55 CAL. L. REv. 123, 131 & n.45 (1967);
Laurence M. Katz, Comment, Usury Laws andthe CorporateException, 23 MD. L. REv. 51, 52 &
n.Il (1962).
271. Katz, supra note 270, at 52.
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forbearance of one hundred pounds for a year., 272 The statute attempted to
send a strong message of deterrence by including a damages provision
establishing a fine which was triple the amount lent for charging above the
five percent cap.
[A]I1 and every person . . . which shall . . . receive . . .
payment for one whole year, of and for their money or other
thing, above the sum of five pounds for the forbearing of one
hundred pounds for a year... shall forfeit... the treble value
of the monies, wares, merchandizes, and other things so
lent.273
The basic interest rate caps of the colonies and (after independence) the
States, modeled on the Statute of Anne, formed the backbone of attempts
to control harmful consequences of high-cost lending in the United States.
The caps set interest rate ceilings at different levels ranging between four
percent and ten percent. 274 After independence, most states set their
maximum interest rates at six percent.275 Many of these interest rate caps,
now called "general usury laws," have survived in one form or another
until today. 276 The colonies also fashioned debt enforcement laws in the
English pattern, which strongly favored creditors.277 States at times would
raise or lower their ceilings.278 In 1867, Massachusetts followed the lead
of England and other European countries in abolishing its interest rate
cap. 279 A few states in turn followed Massachusetts. 2" Nevertheless, the
legislative approach of low interest rate caps was relatively stable,
normally encountering only mild tampering. "With very few exceptions,
general usury laws were the only statutes regulating credit costs in the
United States prior to the twentieth century. '28' The simplicity and
durability of the early State interest rate caps echos many historical
precedents. Thus, the American "combination of rigorous enforcement of
debt and legal maximum rates of interest comes down from Hammurabi

272. Act to Reduce the Rate of Interest, 12 Ann., c. 16 (1713), reprinted in Katz, supra note
270, at 52 n. 11.
273. Id.
274. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 85.
275. Id.
276. KEEST, supra note 19, at 37.
277. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 85.
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through Rome, through seventeenth-century England, to the modem
United States."2 2
1. The American Thrift Ethic
Culturally, Americans viewed debt supporting commerce as necessary
and enterprising, but conversely placed a large social stigma on borrowing
for personal consumption purposes." 3 One author in 1838 explained
widespread American comfort with commercial lending in terms of
personal trust:
As the credit system is the offspring of confidence, and as no
man reposes confidence where he deems it likely to be
abused, the existence of this extensive and universal system
of credit may be taken as evidence of a general beliefamong
those who have commodities for sale, that those who desire
to obtain them, have the disposition, and will have the means
of paying for them, in such manner and at such times as may
be agreed upon.28
This focus on confidence is enlightening in regard to the reluctance of
mainstream commercial lenders to extend credit for consumption purposes.
Quite simply, unlike commercial debtors, consumption borrowers were not
trusted.285 The papers of Benjamin Franklin reveal popular thinking about
individuals who borrowed for consumption purposes:
Think what you do when you run in Debt; You give to another
Power over your Liberty. If you cannot pay at the Time, you
will be ashamed to see your Creditor; you will be in Fear
when you speak to him; you will make poor pitiful sneaking
Excuses, and by Degrees come to lose your Veracity, and sink
into base downright lying; for, as Poor Richard says, The
second Vice is Lying, the first is running in Debt.... Poverty
often deprives a Man of all Spirit and Virtue: Tis hardfor an
empty Bag to stand upright .... The Borrower is a Slave to
the Lender, andthe Debtorto the Creditor,disdain the Chain,
preserve your Freedom; and maintain your independency: Be
industriousandfree; be frugal andfee.286
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But in spite of strong social messages against personal debt, especially debt
at high prices, "[h]igh rates no doubt existed in commercial and personal
transactions. But high interest rates were vigorously opposed by colonial
law and custom and were therefore negotiated secretly ....""' Low
interest rate caps reflected this cultural norm. 88 It was not possible for
lenders to make a profit from short term loans of small amounts without
charging rates in excess ofthe legal limits. 9 Accordingly, normal citizens
generally could not purchase the use of money from legal lenders. 9 ° In this
way, the law acted as an agent of socialization against all borrowing for
consumptive purposes.
The American thrift ethic stifled development of debtor amnesty
policies. Defaulting debtors, particularly consumer debtors, found little
public sympathy. 9 ' In addition to interest rate caps, colonists also imported
English debtor prisons.292 Imprisonment for debt was surprisingly common
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries:
Thus, in 1830, there were in Massachusetts, Maryland, New
York, and Pennsylvania three to five times as many persons
imprisoned for debt as for crime. The Suffolk County Jail in
Boston alone for the decade 1820-1830 contained 11,818
imprisoned debtors from a total population ranging from
43,000 to 63,000.293
Although some states pushed for reform in the 1830s, debt peonage was
not federally outlawed until after the Civil War.294 Northern states only felt
compelled to outlaw debtor prisons when Southern whites began circumventing emancipation with debt peonage. 95
Gradually, the bankruptcy system evolved to become the primary
mechanism of providing American debtor amnesty. Throughout Europe,
the earliest bankruptcy rules were exclusively creditor collection remedies
which provided virtually no protection for debtors. 96 It was not until 1706
SAVING TO SPENDING 9-10 (1991); 7 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 342-49 (Leonard W.

Labaree ed., 1963).
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that short-lived English bankruptcy law included discharge of a limited
number of debts for a limited number of debtors.297 Nearly a century later
in 1800, the United States adopted its first bankruptcy law.29 Like early
American interest rate caps, debtor amnesty provisions included in early
American bankruptcy laws bear a surprising resemblance to their ancient
Mesopotamian predecessors. Like the occasional Sumerian and Babylonian
royal decrees forgiving debts for favored subjects, nineteenth century
American bankruptcy debtor amnesty rules responded to financial crises,
were short lived, and were capriciously limited in scope.29 9 For example,
a financial panic spurred the 1800 Bankruptcy Act, which was repealed in
only three years.300 While the act included narrow provisions providing for
discharge of some debts, only merchants were eligible.30 ' And, while the
law allowed release from debtor prison for those obtaining discharge, there
is some evidence that only the relatively influential consistently acquired
this amnesty.30 2 For instance, Robert Morris, a member of the
Constitutional Convention and a prominent financier, managed to liberate
himself from a Pennsylvania debtor prison.30 3 Those without such
prominence were not so lucky.3 "4
Our second and third bankruptcy rules were similarly inconsistent in
providing amnesty for imprisoned and defaulting debtors. The Bankruptcy
Act of 1841, which became effective in 1842, was promptly repealed in
1843.305 Perhaps contributing to its short life was the controversial
innovation of extending limited debt discharge rights to non-merchant
debtors. 3 6 The post-Civil War economic crisis spawned the relatively
enduring Bankruptcy Act of 1867.307 It also provided limited debt
discharge rights, but survived for less than a decade.30 8

of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 5, 7-8 (1995).
297. McCoid, supra note 296, at 163-65.
298. Tabb, supra note 296, at 6-7.
299. Both British and American bankruptcy laws have consistently suffered from
inconsistency. Both have exhibited a "pattern of lapse [and] revival." McCoid, supra note 296, at
181.

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Countryman, supra note 14, at 813.
Id. at 811-13.
Id. at 813.
Id.; Tabb, supra note 296, at 15.
See Countryman, supra note 14, at 813; Tabb, supra note 296, at 14-15.
Countryman, supra note 14, at 814-15.
See id.
Id.

308. CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY INUNITED STATES HISTORY 13-20 (1935); Countryman,

supra note 14, at 815-16; Tabb, supra note 296, at 14, 18-22.
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2. The Origin of American Selective Protection: Our Tradition of
Credit Discrimination
The American credit culture prior to the twentieth century only can be
understood against a backdrop of formal and informal discrimination
against non-European races and women. This fact is easily overlooked
given the stark absence of treatment of race and gender in most financial
and credit histories. For example, a discussion about credit for AfricanAmericans prior to the Civil War can only be dominated by the institution
of slavery. Rather than asking whether credit was available to slaves,
scholarship often focuses on how slaves were used to secure credit for their
European captors.0 9 It is naive to suspect that after emancipation equal
access to inexpensive credit became easily available for AfricanAmericans. At the end of the Civil War, over ninety percent of blacks lived
in the South, where the white elite was determined to preserve as many of
the economic aspects of slavery as possible.31 African-Americans usually
" ' Highhad no resource to provide for themselves besides their own labor.31
cost credit played an important role in perpetuating the power of white
elites. A large portion of the black population found sustenance in
sharecropping, which relied on a cycle of poverty and debt to enforce the
subordination of black workers.3" 2 Sharecroppers received no pay for their
work until the sale of the crop at harvest time.31 3 With no available cash
source, black agricultural workers were forced to turn to high-cost credit
to survive.314 Interest rates on supplies and money loaned to Southern
blacks were high, often exceeding fifty percent.31 5 When the farming
season ended and black workers sold their share of the crop, there were
rarely enough proceeds to cover debts from the previous season.316 Thus,
sharecroppers were forced to borrow again year after year, each time

309. See, e.g., RICHARD HOLCOMBE KILBOURNE, JR., DEBT, INVESTMENT, SLAVES: CREDIT
RELATIONS IN EAST FELICIANA PARISH, LOUISIANA 1825-1885 (1995) (conducting a systematic
historical study of the role of slave property in securing credit contracts).
310. Nieman, supra note 15, at vii-viii.
311. Smallwood, supra note 15, at 227.
312. For general discussions of sharecropping in the nineteenth-century South, see WILLIAM
COHEN, AT FREEDOM'S EDGE: BLACK MOBILITY AND THE SOUTHERN WHITE QUEST FOR RACIAL

CONTROL, 1861-1915 (1991); RONALD L.F. DAVIS, GOOD AND FAITHFUL LABOR: FROM SLAVERY
TO SHARECROPPING INTHENATCHEZ DISTRICT, 1860-1890 (1982); JAYNES, supra note 15; ROGER
L. RANSOM & RICHARD SUTCH, ONE KIND OF FREEDOM: THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
EMANCIPATION (2d ed. 1977); JAMES L. ROARK, MASTERS WITHOUT SLAVES: SOUTHERN PLANTERS
IN THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

(1977);

CRANDALL A. SHIFFLETT, PATRONAGE AND

POVERTY IN THE TOBACCO SOUTH: LOUISA COUNTY, VIRGINIA, 1860-1900 (1982).

313.
314.
315.
316.

Smallwood, supra note 15, at 238-39.
Id. at 229.
Nieman, supra note 15, atx.
Smallwood, supra note 15, at 229.
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hoping that the next crop would allow them to pay off their debt and
perhaps save a little extra money. Moreover, white landowners and
creditors often cheated black workers. In Texas, for example, the
widespread practice of shutting out black workers without compensation
immediately before harvest, after they had farmed the entire agricultural
season, found judicial sanction in the courts.3 17 Very few AfricanAmericans were resourceful enough to gather enough cash and credit to
purchase their own farms, hence almost all black agricultural workers
faced lives
of gripping poverty exacerbated and entrenched by high-cost
31
lending.
Similarly, it is somewhat futile to speak of access to credit when
women had neither governmentally recognized, protected property rights,
nor the right to vote. In American history, access to credit for women was
often a function of their relationships to men. 319 The ability to borrow
requires a creditor's trust that the debtor will be able to raise and turn over
the amount loaned plus interest. Because women were excluded from the
basic mechanisms of the market economy, they could not consistently
guarantee repayment without enlisting in some way the cooperation of a
male. Where women did try to borrow, their exclusion from lower-priced
lenders forced them to turn to pawnbrokers or other high-cost lenders,
often with "devastating effects upon a family's real income., 320 The story
of one New York single mother is illustrative:
Mrs. Zulinsky... one day found that her entire life's savings
of six hundred dollars had been stolen from her mattress.
Charity could not support three children, so Mrs. Zulinsky
was forced to become, in the slang of the day, "a furniture
dealer." Her table, her two beds, all her chairs, and "even the
marble clock surmounted by a bronze horseman armed with
a spear" were hauled down to the pawnshop and "put up the
spout." When night fell, Mrs. Zulinsky's family was "sitting
on boxes and sleeping on the
2 floor," but the immediate
emergency had been bridged. 1
Throughout the nineteenth century approximately three quarters of
pawnbroker customers were women, usually borrowing at rates around
300% per annum.322

317.
318.
319.
320.

Id. at 238-39.
Id. at 229.
See, e.g., TEBBUTT, supra note 42, at 1.
Id.
321. CALDER, supra note 16, at 43; see also ELIZABETH EWEN, IMMIGRANT WOMEN IN THE
LAND OF DOLLARS 159 (1985).
322. CALDER, supra note 16, at 47-48.
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3. The Rise of Salary Lending
High-cost consumer debt was by no means limited to ethnic minorities
and women. By the latter half of the nineteenth century, there was an
upsurge in lenders catering to a clientele of married, working class, white
men with steady jobs.323 These creditors, known as salary lenders,324 were
the precursor to today's payday lenders. Their borrowers "were frequently
regular employees of large organizations: government civil servants,
railroad workers, streetcar motormen, and clerks in firms such as insurance
'
companies."325
Such workers, often recent immigrants or former
agricultural laborers, formed the foundation of the emerging lower middle
class of urban American society. 32 6 For the lender, they represented good
credit risks. These men usually borrowed to meet unexpected needs such
as family illness or moving expenses. 327 Nevertheless, they held steady jobs
and had family obligations which prevented them from skipping town.328
High-cost lenders targeted such workers because they had a steady supply
of disposable income which made them likely to repay.329 Moreover,
frequent minor income shocks made the workers likely to borrow.33°
It was these high-cost lenders whom working class people in the
Eastern U.S. cities first came to describe as "loan sharks. '33' Although the
term was new, the tactics of the lenders were not. Initially, these loan
sharks charged very high interest rates.332 In fact, rates in excess of one
thousand percent annually were common.333 Reminiscent of high-cost
loans in ancient Athens, principal amounts were generally small, and due
in a short period of time.334 But, very often the loans would end up
compounding over great periods of time. 33' The records of one salary
lender in New York City showed that out of approximately 400 debtors,
163 had been making payments on the loans for over two years.336 Nor was
the length of these loans merely a result of the debtor's unwillingness or

323. Hailer & Alviti, supra note 16, at 127-28.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 128.
326. Id. at 127, 129.
327. Id. at 128.
328. Id. at 128-29.
329. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 5, at 89.
330. Id.; Robert W. Kelso, Social and Economic Backgroundof the Small Loan Problem, 8
LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS. 14, 15-20 (1941).
331. Hailer & Alviti, supra note 16, at 125-26.
332. HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 428.

333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Haler & Alviti, supra note 16, at 133.

336. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss3/4

44

Peterson: Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Comsumer Credit: The Historic
HIGH-COST CONSUMER CREDIT TRUTH IN LENDING ACT

inability to pay. The most essential characteristic of these early salary
lenders, and perhaps all loan sharks in general, was the tendency to
' This was accomplished by a broad
manipulate loans into "chain debt."337
variety of means. The first and perhaps most important were late fees,
which were often assessed even where the creditor was only minutes or
hours late.33 Commonly, creditors "deliberately maneuvered a borrower
into a late payment, by falsely suggesting that a late payment would be
overlooked or by claiming that a payment sent by mail arrived after the
' It is easy to imagine the incentive a salary lender
payment deadline."339
might have in closing shop early on a Friday afternoon when working
customers might rush in to make a last minute payment. Sometimes,
individual late fees were nearly as much as the principal itself.34 We can
expect that other tactics reflected those used throughout history, including
"creative" calculations of the interest, a broad assortment of other fees
(such as origination fees, collection fees, broker fees, pledge storage fees,
and insurance fees), and refinancing induced by balloon payments. The key
in chain debt is for the lender to collect the most money while reducing the
"'
amount owed to as little as possible.34
In a typical transaction, a debtor would borrow five dollars on Monday,
and repay six on Friday.342 This 20% per week loan translates into a 1040%
per annum rate.343 African-Americans borrowing in the South were often
charged rates twice as high in the same type of transaction, where a loan
of five dollars was repaid with seven at the end of the week.344 The charge
of one or two dollars itself seems fairly innocuous for any one given week.
But, when a debtor lost a job, was not paid for his work, became ill, had a
family member become ill, or was prevented from paying for any other
reason, the simple transaction rapidly swelled into an enormous drain on
an already strained budget.
Profits from extended-term salary lending fueled the late nineteenthcentury upsurge in high-cost lending.3 45 As the industry grew, so too did
the horror stories, often the only circulated evidence ofwhat was becoming
a crisis. Moreover, the surge in high-cost lending would significantly
contribute to a transformation in American culture:

337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

342. HOMER& SYLLA, supra note 1, at 428.

343. Id.
344. Id.
345. PETER W. HERZOG, THEMORRIS PLANOF INDuSTRIAL BANKING 5-6(1928); KEEST, supra

note 19, at 38-39; Haller & Alviti, supra note 16, at 125.
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There was, for example, the employee of a New York
publishing house who supported a large family on a salary of
$22.50 per week and had been paying $5 per week to a salary
lender for several years, until he had paid more than ten times
the original loan. Or the case of a Chicagoan who borrowed
$15, paid back $1.50 per month for three years before fleeing
the city to escape the debt. Or the case of a streetcar
motorman who, in 1912, had seventeen Chicago loan
companies attempting to collect $307 on an original loan of
$50 after he had already paid $360. Or the claim of another
Chicago borrower that he had borrowed $15, ten years later
had repaid $2,153 and still owed the original $15. 46
In this period, pawnbrokers also grew quickly alongside salary lenders.
In 1812, New York City had ten licensed pawnbrokers, but by 1897 the
number had grown more than ten times to 134 licensed pawnbrokers.347
Similarly, San Francisco, where there were no state usury laws, was home
to 243 pawnshops by 1897.348 Moreover, credible turn of the century
studies estimated one in five American workers owed money to salary
lenders.349 Although individuals indebted to salary lenders and
pawnbrokers could not have known it, their stories bore remarkable
similarity to those told for thousands of years.
Unfortunately, as in Babylon, Rome, and Ming China, government
interest rate caps provided little or no protection for those in the grips of
such high-cost lending.35° First, many lenders evaded usury caps by
phrasing the contract as a purchase or assignment of future wages, rather
than a loan.351 Second, lenders could easily take advantage of the timeprice doctrine to avoid interest rate caps.352 Under this doctrine, where a
physical good was purchased over time on installments, it was not
considered a loan under English law for purposes ofa statutory interest rate
cap.353 Because American general usury laws were modeled on their
English predecessors, U.S. courts almost invariably considered purchases
of physical products over time as exempt from usury laws.354 This led some

346. Hailer & Alviti, supra note 16, at 133-34.
347. CALDER, supra note 16, at 46.
348. Id.
349. See id. at 52 n.39 (relying on ARTHUR H. HAM, THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE LOAN
SHARK 1 (1912); Shergold, supranote 16, at 202).
350. See, e.g., DAVID J. GALLERT ET AL., SMALL LOAN LEGISLATION: A HISTORY OF THE
REGULATION OF THE BUSINESS OF LENDING SMALL SUMS

17 (1932) (characterizing early interest

rate caps and their enforcement provisions as "piecemeal" and prone to "frequent failure").
351. Id. at 180; CALDER, supra note 16, at 50.
352. KEEST, supra note 19, at 38.

353. Id. at 37-38.
354. Id. at 37.
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lenders to avoid interest rate caps by, for example, requiring the debtor to
"purchase" a worthless oil painting at the time the loan contract was
signed.355 The debtor would owe the same amount of money, and could
immediately throw the painting away, but the transaction would be at least
superficially legal.356 Third, statutes indicating the interest rate cap often
did not clearly describe how interest was to be calculated under the cap,
leaving wide ambiguity over the actual amount legally chargeable.357 Some
lenders would engage in "note shaving," where a loan would be offered at
a legal rate, but additional mandatory fees would create a true price well
above that contemplated by legislators. 58 Other lenders would charge
interest on money already repaid by the debtor, thus dramatically
increasing the overall amount the debtor would have to repay.359 Fourth,
lenders would also require debtors to sign forms when taking out the loan
which granted the creditor power of attorney long before any payment
dispute arose.36 When and if the debtor tried to challenge the contract in
the judicial system, he might find out he had already waived his right to do
so. 361 Whether or not this was in fact legal, power of attorney forms no
doubt deterred many debtors from trying to contest the contract.36 2 Even if
the debtor was not dissuaded, the creditor could, without the debtor's
knowledge, appear before a court and confess judgment on an unpaid debt,
thus enlisting the power of the state to help in collection. 63 Fifth, some
state court systems were structured such that the income of lower justices
of the peace and magistrates was provided for through court fees.364 Thus,
"Djustices who found for salary lenders could often attract a good deal of
business and thus earn tidy sums, so that it was in the economic interest of
' Sixth, even where
justices to look with favor upon suits by lenders."365
there was no economic incentive, lenders still retained the formidable
advantage of initiating suits.366 Pleadings, choice of venue, and choice of
jurisdiction could all offer litigation savvy lenders the ability to shape
355. CALDER, supra note 16, at 50.

356. See, e.g., id.
357. See, e.g., Act to Reduce the Rate of Interest, 12 Ann., c.16 (1713), reprinted in Katz,
supra note 270, at 52 n.l1.
358. CALDER, supra note 16, at 116.

359. These lenders were commonly called Morris Plan Banks. EVANS CLARK, FINANCING THE
CONSuMER 69 (1930); HARDY ET AL., supra note 8, at 32; KEEST, supra note 19, at 39; see also
HERZOG, supra note 345, passim (providing detailed if somewhat generous description of Morris
Plan lending).
360. Hailer & Alviti, supra note 16, at 134.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 135.
365. Id.
366. Id.at 134.
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lawsuits to their advantage.3 67 For example, we can expect lenders would
know when to bluff and when to sue simply because they had inside
information about the personal views of various judges. Seventh, loans
made above interest rate caps prior to the turn of the century must have
made their way to the courts for adjudication relatively infrequently.36
This is not to say that there were no cases where courts found loans above
the statutory limit.369 But, compared to the number of illegal loans that
were made, we can expect only a very few of these cases ever made it to
court. After all, anyone who had the money to hire an attorney to sort
through salary lenders' complex legal contracts would use that money to
pay off the debt. Eighth, public prosecutors would very rarely take the
initiative to seek out those lending in excess of legal limits.37 Outside of
New York, there was not one state officer specifically charged with
enforcement of usury laws.37 ' This meant that the complex and time
consuming business of enforcing interest rate caps was easy for officials
to ignore. In this way, generations of lenders offered and collected upon
loans which violated certainly the spirit, if not the letter, of general usury
laws. Moreover, high-cost lenders' legal ingenuity helped them to maintain
at least a thin veil of legality throughout much of the nineteenth century.
Even without resorting to the judicial system, creditors could place
enormous pressure on debtors. A nineteenth-century creditor was free to
confront the friends and family of a debtor who had already paid the
principal of a loan thrice over, subjecting the borrower to terrible social
embarrassment.372 A common tactic was
to employ a "bawler-out"-usually a woman with a stentorian
voice and rich vocabulary. The bawler-out went to the
borrower's place of work or neighborhood and, in a loud
voice, denounced him for his dishonesty in refusing to repay
the loan. To avoid further embarrassment or the possibility
7 of
being fired, the borrower might well seek a settlement.1 1
367. Id. at 134-35.
368. For example, the number of reported cases is paltry in comparison to the number of salary
lenders openly operating in violation of general usury limits. The Russell Sage Foundation
estimated about 300 lenders were doing business in New York City alone around the turn of the
century. GLENN ET AL., 1 RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION, 1907-1946, at 138. Although Russell Sage
advocates attempted to investigate and find attorneys to deal with the large volume of illegal
lending, it is clear their efforts were an exception to the norm. Id.
369. See, e.g., State v. Halburt, 72 A. 1079, 1080 (Conn. 1909) (holding salary wage
assignment invalid under state interest rate cap).
.370. GALLERT ET AL., supra note 350, at 53-54.
371. Id.
372. See, e.g., Haller & Alviti, supra note 16, at 134 n. 14.
373. Id. (citing FOREST HALSEY, THE BAWLEROUT (1912); Frank M. White, The Story of a
Debt, in WORLD WORK 346 (Jan. 1912)); see also CALDER, supra note 16, at 54 (providing a
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The lender could also threaten to garnish the wages of the debtor, which in
the social climate of the time was tantamount to threatening the debtor
with unemployment. 74
Lingering Victorian condemnation of personal debt created a culture of
silence which masked the increasingly pervasive indebtedness of the
working and lower-middle class.37 With debtor prisons only recently
outlawed, debtors kept their obligations private. Although there are a
number of surviving records of commercial lending at legal or nearly legal
rates, there is very little surviving documentation of higher-priced illegal
loans.3 76 In the late 18 80s, Congress became concerned enough to direct the
census of 1890 to estimate the total amount of private debt.377
Robert Porter, the census superintendent, "feared that the
people regarded their debt.., as a part of their private affairs,
and that they would resent any inquiries in regard to it." The
image was not a pleasant one: unarmed census workers
thrown out of the homes of angry debtors resentful of
governmental prying into their personal affairs. Porter
concluded that any attempt to ask the people about their debts
would cause collateral damage to the rest of the survey,
enough to wreck the entire 1890 census.378
Realizing the citizenry would never reveal the extent of their personal
debts, census officials relented and instead tried to estimate private debts
on the basis of public records.379
4. Policy Responses to the Late Nineteenth
Century High-Cost Credit Boom
The social havoc associated with late nineteenth-century salary lenders
and pawnbrokers forced American credit policy into a period of dramatic
evolution. Elites, as well as the working and still vulnerable middle class,
united to adopt a variety of policies new to America, but not to world

similar description).
374. In re Home Disc. Co., 147 F. 538, 546 (N.D. Ala. 1906) ("Railroad companies, owners

of furnaces and mills, and other large employers of labor, made and enforced rules, for their own
protection, that employes [sic] who had unsettled disputes about an assignment of their wages
should be laid off, and if the dispute were long-continued, should be discharged.").
375. CALDER, supra note 16, at 19.
376. HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 275.
377. CALDER, supra note 16, at 39-40.

378. Id. at 40 (quoting Robert Porter, Public and Private Debts, 153 N. AM. REV. 610-12
(1891)).

379. See id.
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history. For instance, many Americans searched for redress in the
philanthropy of the rich.3"' Social elites founded several charitable lending
institutions in the late 1800s.3"' Following the European monspietatis and
later municipal pawnshops, a group of wealthy Boston citizens organized
a philanthropic pawnshop called the Collateral Loan Company in 1859.382
Like its European predecessors, the Collateral Loan Company aimed to
provide relatively inexpensive pawn loans to poor clients in need of
emergency credit.383 If loans were not repaid, the pawned security was sold
at public auction. 384 A board of directors chosen by shareholders who had
invested capital in the company, as well as the mayor of Boston and the
governor of Massachusetts, led tie company.38 5 Shareholders would
receive limited dividends on their capital investment, but the real appeal
of the business was almost certainly charitable.386
Other institutions, both in Boston and elsewhere, emulated the
Collateral Loan Company.387 In 1888, Massachusetts expanded charitable
lending beyond philanthropic pawn loans by incorporating the
Workingmen's Loan Association in Boston.388 The Massachusetts state
legislature acted to create a business "for the purpose of loaning money
upon pledge or mortgage of goods and chattels or of safe securities of
every kind or upon mortgage of real estate. 389 The most prominent
example of a charitable lending company in the United States is the
Provident Loan Society of New York, founded in 1894.390 Key charitable
investors included J. Pierpont Morgan, Percy Rockefeller, and Cornelius
Vanderbilt. 391 Similar to the Italian monspietatis,the charitable pawnshop
charged rates that were low compared to commercial pawn shops, but still
"high enough to cover all costs of operation . . . and to allow an
accumulation of a surplus-which could be used only for expansion of the
business or for gifts to charitable organizations, not to increase the return
to contributors of capital., 39' The society's founders feared that personal
financial problems exacerbated by high unemployment rates following the

380. See CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra note 22, at 23.
381. See id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. See generally id. (providing a brief historical discussion of the Collateral Loan
Company).
387. Id.
388. CALDER, supra note 16, at 120.
389. 1888 Mass Acts ch. 100.
390. CALDER, supra note 16, at 120-21.
391. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra note 22, at 23-24.
392. GLENN ET AL., supra note 368, at 66 n.2.
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recession of the early 1890s were
causing "deterioration in the social
393
class.
working
the
of
conditions
Widespread high-cost lending also spurred the middle class to more
aggressively organize cooperative lending associations in order to insulate
themselves from the risks of high-cost debt. The first American building
society, modeled after earlier British counterparts, was formed in 1831, and
by the late nineteenth century savings and loan associations became
entrenched.394 By 1893, thirteen states--California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Tennessee-boasted more than 100 savings and loan
associations.395 While the first credit unions modeled on German and then
Canadian institutions did not appear in the Untied States until 1909, they
thereafter quickly followed on the heels of British modeled societies.396
Finally, the rise of the loan sharks along with the financial panic of
1893, created momentum to once again attempt to pass a federal
bankruptcy law.397 Opposition to a federal bankruptcy law by Western and
Southern representatives fearing Northern bias stalled the law until 1898,
when numerous amendments favorable to debtors secured its passage.398
Growing middle class access to credit, as well as increasing sympathy for
the plight of non-commercial debtors who had been preyed upon by
unscrupulous lenders, brought about a fundamental change in the purpose
of American bankruptcy law.39 9 While previous laws were primarily
creditor collection devices with parsimonious discharge provisions meant
only to ease temporary financial crises, the 1898 Act aimed to give
bankrupts a "fresh start."4 ' Although the focus of Congressional debates
was still upon commercial transactions," 1 under the new law, consumers
and merchants alike were free to voluntarily enter bankruptcy.402 Discharge
was no longer contingent upon creditor consent.40 3 The list of restrictions
on the right of discharge was significantly narrowed and, in fact, only a few
debts were exempted from discharge.4" 4 And, perhaps to limit the use of
bankruptcy as a salary loan collection device, creditors could no longer

393. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra note 22, at 24.

394.
395.
396.
NUGENT,
397.
398.
399.
400.
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FABRITIUS & BORGES, supra note 23 1, at 12-13.
Id. at 16, tbl. 2.1.
DUBLIN, supra note 243, at 146; FERGUSON & MCKILLOP, supra note 230, at 18-20;
supra note 259, at 75-76; PUGH & INGRAM, supra note 258, at 2.
See Tabb, supra note 296, at 23.
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See Countryman, supra note 14, at 817.
Id. at 817-18.
Tabb, supra note 296, at 24.
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force wage earners into involuntary bankruptcy proceedings." 5 Thus, the
1898 law was not only a device to secure an equitable division of property
among creditors, but also a device to deal out discharge of debts to
deserving debtors.40 6
With more generous discharge provisions came increasingly complex
and costly procedural rules for administering bankrupt estates. "At least
seventy percent of the [1898] Bankruptcy Act, if not more, was
procedural. 4 7 The process soon became so complex that a specialized
sub-discipline of law practice emerged.408 Creditors elected a trustee, and
organized into a creditors' committee.4" 9 Although venue was in federal
district courts, it was necessary to appoint "referees in bankruptcy."4"0
Federal district court judges delegated almost all of the judicial and
administrative duties to referees, who eventually evolved into today's
bankruptcy judges.41' The subject of bankruptcy policy debate switched
from whether to grant discharge to the best way to grant it, thus charging
the courts with a whole new system of commercial administration.412 After
1898, bankruptcy debates became contests between efficient formalistic
rules versus justice-oriented discretionary standards.413 Despite these
complexities, the law became America's first non-transitory bankru ptcy
law, and
although it was often amended, it remained in force for eighty
4 14
years.

B. High-Cost Consumer Credit Policyfrom 1900 to the
End of World War HI
The progressive new bankruptcy law, combined with interest rate caps
and fledgling charitable and cooperative lending efforts, proved incapable
of stemming the growing and dangerous tide of late nineteenth century
high-cost credit. As the twentieth century began, the number of high-cost

405. Id. at 818.
406. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 4, 30 Stat. 544-547; Countryman, supra,note 14, at
817-18; David A. Moss & Gibbs A. Johnson, The Rise of Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution,
Revolution, or Both?, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 312-14 (1999); Tabb, supra note 296, at 23-26.
407. Lawrence P. King, The History and Development of the Bankruptcy Rules, 70 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 217, 218 (1996).
408. Tabb, supra note 296, at 25-26.
409. Id. at 25.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 24.
413. Robert Weisberg, CommercialMorality, The MerchantCharacter,andthe History ofthe
Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 5 (1986).
414. Moss & Johnson, supra note 406, at 312-14; Tabb, supra note 296, at 23-26; Weisberg,
supra note 413, at 5.
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creditors and debtors continued to grow .41 By 1907, 90% of the employees
of New York's largest transportation company made weekly payments to
salary lenders. 416 An influential study estimated one in five American
workers owed money to a salary lender.417 Others have argued, based on
analysis of data from Pittsburgh, that this ratio actually underestimated the
number of debtors obligated to turn-of-the-century "loan sharks."4' 8 While
rates ranging from 20% to 300% were normal, rates well in excess of
1,000% were also still common. 41 9 The situation of many of the nation's
poor was becoming so acute that socially sensitive elites could no longer
42°
Newspapers around the country ran exposds and aggressive
ignore it.
editorial campaigns on the evils of loan sharks, with headlines
indistinguishable from those found today.4 2' Even the slow-to-change
judiciary began to respond with a smattering ofharshly worded opinions.422
One federal judge characterized a high-cost lender as having "brought on
conditions which were yearly reducing hundreds of laborers and other
small wage-earners to a condition of serfdom in all but name." 4 "
For the first time in American history, significant numbers of wage
earning consumer debtors began to seek amnesty from their creditors by
declaring bankruptcy under the 1898 law. But salary lending and other
forms of high-cost credit persisted. Prior to becoming Attorney General,
Charles D. Thatcher noted many consumer debtors only declared
bankruptcy after a struggle to pay off their debts, which often included
turning to salary lenders as a last resort.424 Borrowers would often attempt
to negotiate a repayment plan to satisfy their obligations.425 Using
aggressive collection tactics, salary lenders would undermine the
effectiveness of these informal work-out plans by crowding out other

415. CLARK, supra note 359, at 7-8.
416. CALDER, supra note 16, at 52.
417. Id. at I (relying on ARTHUR H. HAM, THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE LOAN SHARK I
(1912)).
418. Id. at 52.
419. Id. at 50; GALLERT ETAL., supra note 350, at 54; HOMER& SYLLA, supra note 1,at 428.
420. KEEST, supra note 19, at 38-39.
421. CALDER, supra note 16, at 120.
422. See, e.g., Willson v. Fisher, 75 Misc. 383, 387 (N.Y. 1912) ("I do not see how any one
can look at this transaction as a whole and escape from the conclusion that it is not only usurious,
but that plaintiff has been fully paid, and more."); State v. Hurlburt, 72 A. 1079, 1080 (Conn. 1909)
("[T]o allow loans at a rate of interest exceeding 15 percent, a year, where the lender disguises the
true nature of the transaction by exacting an absolute conveyance, would frustrate the main object
of the enactment, which was to protect borrowers from extortion."). See alsoGALLERT ETAL., supra
note 350, at 54 (listing additional cases).
423. In re Home Disc. Co., 147 F. 538, 546 (N.D. Ala. 1906); see also GALLERTETAL., supra
note 350, at 54 (demonstrating scholarly perception of these changes by 1932).
424. Moss & Johnson, supra note 406, at 318-19.
425. Id. at 318.
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creditors.426 Salary lenders often served as a final weight breaking a wage
earner's back and forcing him into bankruptcy.427
Charitable and cooperative lending societies grew in response to wider
perception of high-cost lending problems. In 1909, fifteen philanthropic
lending societies existed throughout the United States.42 By 1915, this
number more than doubled to thirty-eight. 9 Moreover, cooperative
lending institutions also grew quickly between the turn of the century and
the stock market crash of 1928.430 While these charitable and cooperative
endeavors helped many people, they were not nearly large enough to deal
with the magnitude ofproblems associated with high-cost lending.43' Much
like their European predecessors, inadequate capital and staying power
bedeviled United States charitable lenders.432 Of the early charitable
lending societies, almost all failed due to years of operating losses, either
falling to the wayside of history or reverting to regular commercial
pawnshop operations. 433 Early twentieth-century scholars explained:
Important as the service has been which these remedial
loan societies have rendered, their facilities are not adequate
to the need and cannot be used by the poorer type of
borrower. It must be remembered that these societies were
organized as, and for the most part remain, semi-philanthropic
in purpose. Though their capital has grown, it has not kept
pace with the needs of the borrowers.
The notable exception was the Provident Loan Society of New York.
It survived by commanding greater charitable capital from its fabulously
wealthy benefactors, deriving a unique advantage from New York City's
unusual population density, more than doubling its original interest rate of
twelve percent, and by highly underestimating the value of security in
comparison to normal pawnbrokers. 435 But, even this most rare charitable
organization failed to displace traditional commercial pawnbrokers in New

426. Id. at 318-19.
427. Id.
428. GALLERT ET AL., supra note 350, at 54.
429. Id. at 55.
430. PUGH & INGRAM, supra note 258, at 2-3; NUGENT, supra note 259, at 76.
431. GALLERTETAL., supra note 350, at 13.
432. See CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supra note 22, at 24.
433. See id.
434. GALLERTETAL., supra note 350, at 13.
435. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, supranote 22, at 24 ("The Provident Loan Society probably
survived when the others did not because it was the largest and best capitalized of the remedial loan
societies, enabling it to weather years with operating losses. It also undoubtably gained from the
dense population of New York City .... ).
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York City. 43 6 Ultimately, charitable lenders suffering from haphazard
management and undercapitalization "were no more effective in solving
the problem of illegal lending than the publicity campaigns run by the
newspapers... their loans amounted to a drop in the bucket."437
Although cooperative lenders were becoming more important for the
upper-middle class, the vulnerable working and lower-middle class were
still excluded. Almost a full century after the first American building
societies appeared, a scholar complained:
Not even the savings institutions, which are commonly
thought of as workingmen's banks, have served the masses
with credit. While the average savings banks have accepted
deposits from people of small means, they have not, except in
the rarest instances, been willing to make them loans. Unlike
the commercial banks, they have offered only a small part of
the traditional banking services to their customers.
Like their British counterparts, cooperative lenders could only function by
limiting cooperation to relatively small, homogeneous, and stable groups.
Those who most needed the benefits of cooperation were precisely those
who were excluded.
1. The Small Loan Laws
The failure ofnon-governmental responses to the problems of high-cost
loans contributed to a growing dissatisfaction with state general usury
laws. Before the Great Depression, Americans, distrustful of government,
were not yet ready to ask it to help provide credit for the disadvantaged.
Instead, reformers hoped to raise interest rate caps in order to attract legal
private capital to markets for consumer loans. 439 The intellectual roots of
this position were not new. Classical economists consistently argued that
legislating interest rates only forces the high-risk loan market underground,
thus requiring the borrower to pay a premium to the lender against the risk
of being caught.44' By making a special exception to general usury laws

436. See id. at 26.
437. CALDER, supra note 16, at 121-22.

438. CLARK, supra note 359, at 6.
439. See KEEST, supra note 19, at 39.
440. Adam Smith explained:
When the law prohibits interest altogether, it does not prevent it. Many people
must borrow, and nobody will lend without such a consideration for the use of
their money as is suitable, not only to what can be made by the use of it, but to the
difficulty and danger of evading the law.
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allowing higher rates for small loans, reformers hoped to make consumer
lending profitable to banks and other commercial creditors."' Honest,
respectable private lenders would flow into the market for costly consumer
loans, creating healthy competition and driving the dishonest loan sharks
out of business." 2 Thus was born the first of what are now commonly
called "special usury statutes." Special usury laws provided certain
specified lenders licenses to lend at rates in excess of a state's general
interest rate cap.443 At the time, these first special usury laws were
commonly called small loan laws. The new statutes allowed lenders-who
would agree to licensing, bookkeeping, security interest, and collection
practice rules-to lend less than $300 at between thirty-six and forty-two
percent per year. ' "
The primary advocates of the small loan special usury laws were
scholars and business persons associated with the Russell Sage
Foundation, a charity fund established by the wife of a railroad tycoon.4 45
The foundation sponsored several groundbreaking studies and organized
lobbying efforts to raise interest rates for small personal loans. 446 Most
importantly, the foundation drafted uniform small loan laws, which many
states relied on in passing their own legislation.447 Many small loan lenders
saw themselves as performing an important social service in lending at
reasonable terms to disadvantaged people in need.448
The passage of the small loan laws was a watershed event in both the
law and culture of American high-cost credit. The small loan laws opened
the door for states to amend the hitherto untouched general usury laws that
descended from the Statute of Anne. A wide variety of different creditor
organizations began lobbying for their own exceptions to state general
usury laws. One state legislature and one interest group at a time, a simple
and common body of law transformed into an obscure and arcane
patchwork of legal exceptions, restrictions, fees, limitations, and

97-98
(Richard F. Teichgraeber, III ed., Random House 1985). Herv6 Moulin has recalled the same point
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

more recently. See HERVI

MOULIN, COOPERATIVE MICROECONOMICS: A GAME-THEORETIC

INTRODUCTION 7 (1995) ("[Tihere is the concern that a well-intentioned politician who invokes
ethical principles to interfere with the market process.., is likely to be countereffective... illegal
usury is more expensive because the borrower must pay a premium to insure the lender against the
risk of being caught .... ).
441. KEEST, supra note 19, at 39.
442. See id. at 48.
443. See id.
444. GALLERT ET AL., supra note 350, at 89; KEEST, supra note 19, at 48.
445.
446.
447.
448.

CALDER, supra note 16, at 124-25; KEEST, supra note 19, at 48.
CALDER, supra note 16, at 125-27.
KEEST, supra note 19, at 48.
CALDER, supra note 16, at 150.
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definitions. State legislatures passed a hodgepodge of industrial loan laws,
installment loan laws, retail installment sales acts, insurance premium
finance regulations, and home equity loan laws." 9 Each state cultivated its
own unique regulatory environment.
Culturally, the act of governmental approval of licensed high-cost
lenders dramatically changed the social symbols and discourse Americans
had used to refer to high-cost lenders for over two centuries. After passage
of the small loan laws, high-cost creditors began a steady march toward
legitimization. Small loan legislation, along with the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, began a process of erasing the government-sponsored line of stigma
which had separated commercial and consumer lending in Western culture
for centuries. These were
the first steps in what has since been described
as a "credit revolution. ''45°
2. The Credit Revolution: Financing the Middle Class
From the 1920s through the Great Depression, the business of lending
under the small loan laws boomed.4"' The ranks of lenders seeking to earn
a profit lending at rates below the special usury interest rate caps of
between thirty-six and forty-two percent swelled.452 These lenders
aggressively worked to distance themselves from the salary lending "loan
sharks" which dominated turn-of-the century consumer financing." 3 Many
small loan lenders called themselves "personal finance" companies, hoping
to call up images of respected commercial banks rather than neighborhood
pawnshops.4 4 Reflecting the optimistic expansion of the industry, one
personal finance executive went so far as to say, "I think I can confidently
predict that within a very brief period of time we will no longer be thought
of as 'moneylenders' but as financial physicians to the American
family."4 " Nevertheless, an increasingly overshadowed class of illegal or
marginally-legal lenders persisted, borrowing and collecting from the most
desperate debtors. While the numbers of debtors increased in the Great
Depression (probably due to cautious lending based on fear of default),
indebtedness was less severe than one might expect.
Of more lasting influence was the new era of accepted middle class
durable consumer good financing. Many commentators have pointed to
this era as a turning point when the culture of thrift and rugged

449. Id. at 49.
450. Id. at 156.
451. CALDER, supra note 16, at 147; CLARK, supra note 359, at 45, 191-92.
452. CALDER, supra note 16, at 147; KEEST, supra note 19, at 48.
453. CALDER, supra note 16, at 147.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 153 (quoting Burr Blackburn, FinancialConsultationServices, 16 PERS. FIN.NEWS
22 (1932)).
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individualism of early America gave way to one of consumerism and
personal debt.456 Beginning roughly in the 1920s, businesses began to
realize the advantages of not merely advertising products, but promoting
new ideas and ways of life.45 7 "Through newspapers, magazines,
billboards, radios, and motion pictures, advertising invaded the countryside
' Led by
as well as the city-pushing new ideas, habits and tastes."458
automobile dealers looking to expand their market, installment lenders
charged rates in excess of the old general usury laws, but still far below
what turn-of-the-century salary lenders expected. This new class of creditor
used installment loans to finance home furnishings, sewing machines,
pianos, washing machines, vacuum cleaners, phonographs, and jewelry.459
Unlike the shady, back door, fly-by-night loan sharks, these lenders
included many of the nation's most respected businesses. Although the
older, more dangerous high-cost lenders were still around, they were more
than happy to let the new, brash, and well-capitalized middle class
corporate financiers take the spotlight. High-cost lenders had always
preferred relative anonymity. It was in this era that names like General
Motors, Sears, Singer, Montgomery Ward, and Steinway & Sons changed
forever the way middle class America viewed debt.460
C. High-Cost Consumer Credit Policy after World War II
By the time America hit the economic boom following the Second
World War, consumer credit had already become a culturally and morally
accepted part of life. However, the depth of the "credit revolution" had
only just begun. A leading cultural historian on the subject of consumer
credit summarized the entire postwar period with one word: "more. 4 6 1
More installment lending, more lending from cooperative lenders such as
credit unions and mutual saving banks, more lending from retailers, and
even more lending from the biggest and last player to embrace consumer
credit-large banks.462 A movement to the suburbs created demand for
456. See LOREN BARITZ, THE GOOD LIFE: THE MEANING OF SUCCESS FOR THE AMERICAN
MIDDLE CLASS 64 (1989); DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM 21,6970 (1976); THOMAS C. COCHRAN, CHALLENGES TO AMERICAN VALUES: SOCIETY, BUSINESS, AND
RELIGION 86 (1985); JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 170-72 (2d ed. 1969);
CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN AGE OF DIMINISHING

EXPECTATIONS 53 (1978); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE PERILS OF PROSPERITY, 1914-1932,

at 197 (2d ed. 1993); TUCKER, supranote 286, at 114-15; Hailer & Alviti, supra note 16, at 140-42.
457. See GALBRAITH, supra note 456, at 171; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 456, at 197;
TUCKER, supra note 286, at 115.
458. TUCKER, supra note 286, at 115; see also BARITZ, supra note 456, at 64.
459. BARITZ, supra note 456, at 80.
460. See id. at 64, 80; CALDER, supra note 16, at 164-65; GALBRAITH, supra note 456, at 171.
461. CALDER, supra note 16, at 291.
462. See id at 291-92.
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housing, automobiles, and household furnishings. The cultural trend away
from early American thrift became even more pronounced as themes like
"be the first on your block to own" were pushed by advertisers and
accepted by millions.463 Middle-class Americans took on previously
unheard of levels of debt and gradually paid it back without unmanageable
difficulties. 4"
The social acceptance of consumer debt in America became
unbreakable with the coming of the credit card. Retailers as early as 1914
had issued charge cards specific to their stores to encourage loyalty in their
most wealthy customers.4 65 Gasoline suppliers and airlines made similar
efforts beginning in the 1930s. 466 The first "third-party universal" card
which has become the contemporary norm was issued by Diner's Club in
1949.467 The credit issuer acted as broker between customers and firms
(usually restaurants). Customers gained the convenience of not carrying
cash, and the ability to borrow money over a short term. Sellers gained
access to market share by catering to a card carrying clientele. In spite of
early growing pains, credit cards steadily gained in popularity, growing
into the currently recognizable industry by the late 1960s. 46' Eventually
backed by the capital of the nation's largest banks, the credit card industry
solicited business through advertisements to consumers in every media. In
1971, half of all American families used at least one credit card.469 In
subsequent years, by sending out billions upon billions of mailed
solicitations, credit card companies succeeded in making third party
consumer credit almost a medium of currency unto itself.47° By 1995, credit
cards had "outstripped coins and folding money as the payment of choice
for consumer transactions. 471
1. Echoes: Modem Credit Policy with Ancient Mistakes
American credit policymakers have scrambled to keep up with
sweeping cultural change. Late twentieth-century consumer credit policy
has become an astonishingly complex patchwork offederal, state, and local
463. BEARES, supra note 19, at 11.
464. CALDER, supra note 16, at 291, 302-03.
465. SCOTT B. MACDONALD & ALBERT L. GASTMAN, A HISTORY OF CREDIT AND POWER IN
THE WESTERN WORLD 227 (2001); LEWIS MANDELL, THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY: A HISTORY XIIXIII, at 23 (1990).
466. MACDONALD & GASTMAN, supra note 465, at 227.
467. Id.
468. MANDELL, supra note 465, at xv.
469. LEWIS MANDELL, CREDIT CARD USE IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1972).
470. MACDONALD & GASTMAN, supra note 465, at 227-30; MANDELL, supra note 465, at 1,

2, 4, 22-23.
471. TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS N DEBT 108

(2000).
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laws. While our policy directed at controlling the excesses of the credit
market has evolved to accommodate millions of new middle class
borrowers, its underlying nature echoes the strategies of the past.
Debtor amnesty rules, best exemplified by debt discharge in
bankruptcy, have continued to provide an important safety valve, but have
been unable to prevent the latest upsurge in high-cost lending. While
bankruptcy laws retained the underlying structure of the 1893 Act until
1978, the protection afforded to consumer debtors lurched back and forth
often depending on little more than the mood of Congress, the influence of
creditor lobbyists, and the economic circumstances of the day.472 For
instance, Depression era legislation focused on debtor rehabilitation and
placed significant restraints on the ability of creditors to seize collateral.473
The Chandler Act in 1938 presumed to make the administration of
bankruptcies more fair and efficient.474 It included a revision of Chapter 13
which dealt with wage earner reorganization plans. 4" In 1946, Congress
changed the compensation of Bankruptcy referees from hourly fees to a full
time salary.476 In 1960, Congress created a committee on bankruptcy rules
to explore ways to simplify the complex and inefficient system of sorting
through bankrupt estates. 477 During the pro-consumer Johnson era,
bankruptcy reform efforts culminated in amendments that made discharge
self-executing rather than an affirmative defense.478 In 1973, bankruptcy
referees were renamed bankruptcy judges.479 After a decade of study,
Congress adopted a new bankruptcy code in 1973 which substantially
expanded the jurisdiction of bankruptcy judges. 4' 0 A 1978 Act created a
pilot program, later adopted throughout the country, dividing labor
between bankruptcy judges and newly created bankruptcy trustees.48 '
Trustees handled the administrative work, allowing judges to focus on
adjudication.4 2 Soon after the new code was in operation, Congress, at the
instigation of creditors, passed a series of laws making many different
types of debt unsusceptible to discharge, In 1984, the United States
Supreme Court forced Congress to clarify the constitutional status of

472.
473.
474.
475.

See Tabb, supra note 296, at 26-27.
Id. at 28.
See id. at 29-30.
Id.

476. Id. at 31.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.

See King, supra note 407, at 218-19; Tabb, supra note 296, at 31.
Tabb, supra note 296, at 32.
Id. at 31-32.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.

482. King, supra note 407, at 236; Tabb, supra note 296, at 35.
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bankruptcy judges, which created an opportunity for the credit industry to
once again significantly narrow available consumer credit protections. 83
All these changes occurred against the backdrop of growing personal
bankruptcy filings. Diagnosing the cause of increased filings has been a
subject of much dispute. The credit industry and its patrons have
consistently complained ofthe decreasing stigma associated with personal
bankruptcy."' For nearly a hundred years, they have attributed growth in
bankruptcy rates to this "loss of shame."' 5 Others argue bankruptcy filings
have simply tracked the rapid increases in consumer borrowing. 86 By all
accounts, mainstream credit card debt has become the type of credit most
likely to send consumers into bankruptcy. 87 Yet, in the last two decades
the growth of high-cost second-tier fringe debt has played a more
important role, concurrent with a sharp decline in the median income of
bankrupt families. Because bankruptcy only provides an after-the-fact
safety valve, it has not, and cannot, prevent problematic high-cost debt
situations before they arise. Obviously, an amnesty law so widespread as
to cure the debt ills of all troubled debtors would ruin the credit industry
to everyone's detriment. The discharge provisions of our costly and
complex bankruptcy system have doubtlessly improved on the
capriciousness of Mesopotamian royal decrees of amnesty. But like their
ancient Mespotamian forbears, bankruptcy discharge only provides a lucky
and sometimes undeserving few relief at the expense of their
creditors-and by driving up interest rates at the expense offellow debtors.
In at least one respect, Mesopotamian amnesty decrees may have been
better than our current system. The Sumerians and Babylonians did not
sponsor bankruptcy professionals and services with costly taxpayer
investments.
In the Post-War Era, Americans also experimented with laws and
programs that explicitly selected white Europeans for protection
unavailable to other ethnic groups. An important example of such a
selective protection strategy had its roots in Roosevelt's New Deal. In
1933, Congress created the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), a
federal agency which sought to stimulate economic growth through home
building and to provide financial assistance for those who might not
otherwise be able to purchase a home.488 The agency innovated long-term,

483. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line, 458 U.S. 50 (1982); Tabb, supra note
296, at 38-39.
484. See Moss & Johnson, supra note 406, at 311.
485. See id. at 311-14.
486. Seeid. at312.
487. SULLIVAN ETAL., supra note 471, at 140.
488. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED
STATES 195 (1985).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

61

Florida Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

self-amortizing mortgage loans with uniform payments over the duration
of the loan.4" 9 However, the agency also took the lead in developing
racially discriminatory appraisal practices.49° For the agency, "[r]acial
homogeneity was explicitly identified as a criterion for evaluating
properties; but it was clear that not all homogeneous neighborhoods were
equally valued."49 ' For example, the agency appraised a St. Louis County
neighborhood as having "little or no value today, having suffered a
tremendous decline in values due to the colored element now controlling
the district., 492 Perhaps more importantly, in 1934 Congress and FDR
created the Federal Housing Administration, which facilitated inexpensive
home purchase financing by offering federal insurance for mortgage
loans.493 By insuring lenders against the risk of default, creditors could
offer a greater number of lower-priced home loans.4 94 Unfortunately, this
valuable federal program was reserved almost exclusively for the use of
white Americans with European ancestry. 495 The FHA's underwriting
manual stated:
Areas surrounding a location are to be investigated to
determine whether incompatible racial and social groups are
present, for the purpose of making a prediction regarding the
probability of the location being invaded by such groups. If a
neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that
properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social
and racial classes. A change in social or racial occupancy
generally contributes to instability and a decline in values. 496
These policies created a legacy of discriminatory home financing which
extended well past the Second World War and, many argue, continues
today. For example, although from 1934 to 1959 the FHA financed sixty
percent of home purchases in the United States, from the mid-40s through
the mid-50s, less than two percent of the FHA's loans went to AfricanAmericans. 497 For middle-class Americans in the twentieth century, family

489. Id. at 196.
490. See Gregory D. Squires, Community Reinvestment: An Emerging Social Movement, in
FROM REDLINING TO REINVESTMENT: COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO URBAN DISINVESTMENT 1, 4
(Gregory D. Squires ed., 1992).
491. Id.
492. JACKSON, supra note 488, at 200; Squires, supra note 490, at 4.
493. JACKSON, supra note 488, at 203; R. ALLEN HAYS, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND
URBAN HOuSING 85 (2d ed. 1995).
494. Squires, supra note 490, at 5.
495. See id.
496. Id. (quoting U.S. FEDERAL HousiNG ADMINISTRATION, UNDERWRITING MANUAL 937

(1938)).
497. Id. at 6.
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homes have been the most important source of security for purchasing
inexpensive credit. 49' The difficulty black families had in finding cheap
financing for home purchases was an important factor preventing their
migration to the suburbs along with white Americans. 499 Relegated to the
decaying inner cities, a disproportionate number of black families rented
their homes instead of buying them. 0 Because home equity is the most
important security by which middle and lower income families can obtain
long term inexpensive credit, discriminatory mortgage insurance policies
in the mid-twentieth century may well have significantly contributed to a
greater African-American vulnerability to high-cost lenders in the latter
twentieth century. By selectively protecting only European Americans,
early federal home financing policies helped create a tradition of excluding
racial minorities from access to the means to procure cheap credit."0 '
Charitable lending efforts also have continued to suffer from their
historic limitations despite later twentieth century attempts to morph them.
For instance, in 1977 Congress tried to reinvent charitable lending as
community reinvestment. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) is
premised upon the notion that financial institutions should have a duty to
provide for the credit needs of members in their local community.0 2 The
law requires banks to identify their service area and indicate how they are
meeting the credit needs of low and moderate income groups within their
area.503 If a lender does not adequately extend credit to its low and
moderate income customers, then federal regulatory agencies are
authorized to deny applications of the lender for deposit insurance,
50 4
charters, establishment of branch offices, or other similar transactions.
Although the law has helped some low-income communities, especially
where activist and community watchdog groups have vocally sought
enforcement of the law, the CRA's impact has generally been limited.
Unfortunately, "federal regulatory agencies have rarely initiated any action
on the basis of a CRA evaluation."5 5 While some fair lending advocates
insist the approach holds promise, community reinvestment suffers from
the same problems as earlier charitable lending efforts. The motivation for
creditors to lend to low-income neighborhoods is based on the fear of
enforcement efforts of federal regulators. The motivation of federal

498.
historical
499.
500.
501.
502.

See generally CONLEY, supranote 241, at 1-4,32-42, 121-22, 150-52 (1999) (discussing
importance of home ownership as a factor in the relative wealth of African-Americans).
Squires, supra note 490, at 6-7.
CONLEY, supra note 241, at 37-42.
Id.
See generally 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2901-2905 (West 2002).

503. See id.
504. See generally id.

505. Squires, supra note 490, at 11.
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regulators is based on the charitable ambitions of Congress. Despite
Congressional goodwill, lenders have little incentive to lend and regillators
have little incentive to find violations.5 0 6 In 1989, one befuddled Senator
questioned the lack of regulatory enforcement:
I think it to be somewhat incredible that the substance of the
testimony is mostly that you haven't found any violations
when the evidence is pretty clear out there that a lot of
violations have tO be taking place .... [W]e have incredible
testimony .... I'm not trying to pick on anybody, but I want
to suggest that I find it pretty
close to remarkable that we
50 7
never find any violations.
Another Congressman went even further saying "[t]he Community
Reinvestment
Act... has become monument to regulatory inaction."50 8
The incentive
structure behind community reinvestment does
not
harness the profit motives of lenders. The result is chronic undercapitalization. Morever, where community reinvestment lending does
occur, it tends to devolve into simple profit-seeking behavior. For instance,
in recent years consumer watchdog groups have complained that banks
have turned to purchasing predatory mortgage loans from shady brokers in
order to satisfy their reinvestment requirements. Recalling the supply
problems of the mons pietatis as well as late nineteenth-century American
cooperative lending societies, the recent comments of a community
reinvestment advocate would have been as applicable centuries ago as they
are today: "[t]he present state of access to capital in low-income
communities is improving but nevertheless very inadequate. Although
there have been major improvements with new institutions and
instruments, there are still huge gaps." 5°9 Community reinvestment has not
provided enough low-cost funds to displace aggressive profit seeking highcost lenders in significant numbers. Although today the federal government
has filled in where the captains of industry left off, whether community
506. Allen J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years: It Works, But
Strengthened FederalEnforcement Is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293, 296 (1993); Stephen
A. Fuchs, DiscriminatoryLending Practices:Recent Developments, CausesandSolutions, 10 ANN.

REV. BANJNG L. 461,479-80 (1991); Richard D. Marisco, FightingPoverty Through Community
Empowerment and Economic Development: The Role of the Community Reinvestment and Home
Mortgage DisclosureActs, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 281, 282 (1995).
507. Discriminationin Home MortgageLending HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Consumer
andRegulatoryAffairs of the Committee on Banking, Hous., and UrbanAffairs, U.S. Senate, 101st
Cong. 118 (1989) (statement of Senator Alan J. Dixon).
508. DiscriminatoryMortgageLending Patterns,Field HearingBefore the House Committee
on Banking, Finance,and UrbanAffairs, 101st Cong. 2 (1989) (statement of Chairman Gonzales).
509. Daniel M. Leibsohn, FinancialServices Innovation in Community Development, 8 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COM. DEV. L. 122, 128 (Winter, 1999).
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reinvestment will succeed in the future depends on the ability of regulators
and advocates to overcome competitive market forces in a way charitable
lenders of previous centuries could not.
In the Post-War Era, credit unions became the prototypical American
cooperative lending institutions. Drawing on war and depression-hardened
leaders, as well as responsible yet credit hungry consumers, in the two
decades after 1945 the number of credit unions grew 155.2% and the
number of credit union members grew 489.4%."1 Government and
employer sponsorship facilitated the gains.5" Credit unions retained the
significant advantage of freedom from taxation. 1 2 The groups that
provided the common bond for credit union membership also tended to
provide free or subsidized management assistance, overhead, and a ready
pool of potential members." 3 In 1970, Congress created the Federal Credit
Union Administration and insured credit union deposits with federal funds,
further stabilizing the industry." 4 In terms of credit sales, credit unions
have used their production cost advantages to generally offer below market
interest rates for similar credit products. During the Post-War Era, the
staple loan for most credit unions became automobile financing."' 5 In the
late 1970s and early 1980s, almost half of all credit union loans financed
car purchases, and these loans in turn constituted a little less than twenty
percent of all car loans nationwide."1 6 For millions of Americans, there can
be no doubt credit union membership has provided an invaluable and
socially constructive source of financial services and inexpensive credit."1 7
However, as in past ages, credit unions and other cooperative lenders
have not significantly altered the financial destinies of the most vulnerable
debtors. Despite the originating spirit of cooperative idealism, two noted
credit union scholars conceded
credit union leaders had to confront the fact that the nature of
the movement had changed greatly and that they were serving
members with different patterns of employment and needs.
Adequate savings could not be derived from the lower income
groups and the very poor were not good credit risks. The
ultimate effect was that the credit union movement developed
more of a middle income orientation than one devoted to
lower-income groups. Thus, . . the main thrust of

510.

PUGH & INGRAM,

511.
512.
513.
514.
515.

Seeid. at 12-13.
See id. at 12.
Id. at 33-34.
Id.at 6.
Id. at 25.
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management became one of establishing sound management
practices designed to stabilize the individual units while
permitting steady growth."1 8
Although the common bond requirements for credit union membership
loosened around the country, management practices and economies of
scale pushed the credit union industry toward a smaller number of larger
credit unions.5 9 Beginning in the 1970s, large credit unions focusing on
economies of scale came to overshadow smaller unions that focused on
responding to the needs of a core common bond group. Many credit unions
merged. 20 In 1965, credit unions with over five billion in assets held only
27.5% of total industry assets.12' By 1980, credit unions with over five
billion in assets accounted for 77.2% of all industry assets.522 When the
boom in second-tier lending hit during the early 1980s, credit unions were
focused on providing costly services such as automatic teller machines,
credit cards, trust services, and automated telephone services to middle and
upper income members, rather than moderately priced credit to high-risk
borrowers. 23
2. Deregulation and the Illusion of Current Interest Rate Caps
In the 1970s, government expenditures on the Vietnam War overheated
the economy, leading to inflationary pressures which made it harder for
banks to gather funds to lend.5 24 By the late 1970s, growing unemployment
exacerbated the impact of still rampant inflation.525 Federal monetary
policy sought to slow the rapidly diminishing value of currency by
allowing high interest rates.52 6 As a result, short-term commercial market
interest rates rose to above twenty percent.527 Although constant creditor
lobbying had reduced many state interest rate caps to a confusing
patchwork, most states still had some upper interest rate limit.528 But as
rising market equilibrium rates forced depository institutions' cost of funds
higher, it became difficult for banks and others to profitably lend within

518. PUGH & INGRAM, supra note 258, at 6.

519. Id. at 6-7, 19-20.
520. Id.
521. Id. at 19.
522. Id.
523. FERGUSON & McKILLOP, supra note 258, at 23-24; MACDONALD & GASTMANN, supra

note 470, at 231-32; PUGH & INGRAM, supranote 259, at 10, 19, 26, 34-35; Melissa Allison, Area
Credit Unions Not Serving All, Study Says, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15, 2001, at Business 1.
524. BEARES, supra note 19, at 12.
525. Id.
526. Id.

527. KEEST, supra note 19, at 54.
528. Id. at 55.
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these legal usury limits.529 "There was a fear that creditors would be
understandably reluctant to lend money at rates below their cost of funds
and that mortgage loans and other kinds of consumer credit would dry
up. 53° State legislatures responded with a variety of actions, almost all of
which significantly decreased regulation of chargeable rates.
Many states repealed general usury ceilings completely,
allowing parties who were not regulated by special usury
statutes to contract for the payment of any agreed rate. Other
states modified their general usury laws so that the ceilings
would fluctuate with some published market interest rate. For
example, several states set their ceilings to five or six
percentage points above the federal discount rate. Most states
simply raised their interest ceilings to a point not binding on
traditional lenders.53 '
Congress also joined in. Among other interest rate deregulatory actions,
Congress banned any state interest rate caps on home or mobile home first
mortgages.532
These temporary economic pressures have proven less enduring than
the United States Supreme Court's effort at deregulation in the landmark
5 33
decision of Marquette NationalBank v. Firstof Omaha Service Corp.
Interpreting Section 85 of the National Bank Act of 1863, the Court held
that in the Civil War Era, Congress had intended to preempt state interest
rates to the extent they conflicted with the rates charged by out of state
lenders.5 34 The Marquette Court held that the interest rate caps of a card
issuer's home state trumped the interest rate caps of the card holder's home
state.5 35 This set off two races: first for credit card lenders to move their
operations to states with no interest rate caps, and second for state
legislatures to remove their usury laws in order to attract or hold onto
rapidly expanding credit card companies.536 By the early 1980s, states
around the union including Delaware, South Carolina, South Dakota, and

529. BEARES, supra note 19, at 12; Christopher C. DeMuth, The Case Against Credit Card
Interest Rate Regulation, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 201, 201 (1986).
530. KEEST, supra note 19, at 54.
531. Id. at 55.
532. For example, previous banking regulations allowed only national banks to operate under
a variable interest ceiling. Congress extended this privilege to all federally insured depository
lenders. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (hereinafter
DIDA), Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980).
533. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
534. Id. at 312-13.
535. Id.
536. See KEEST,supra note 19, at 74 n.121.
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Utah had abolished all interest rate controls.537 Even though bastions of
interest rate regulation like Minnesota soon followed along by raising
interest rate caps, the damage was already done. In theory, if every state
legislature in the union but one passed low interest rate caps, then lenders
could simply set up operations (either in fact or on paper) within that one
state. Lenders could export that state's unregulated interest rates to every
other state, regardless of objections of the other forty-nine democratically
elected state legislatures. In practice, nine Supreme Court justices
eliminated two hundred years of democratic state interest rate regulation
of bank loans. 5 8
Although the Marquette case involved credit cards, the doctrine
subsequently spread to other types of lending. In the 1990s, the best
example was payday lending. Because payday lenders typically charge
between 391 and 600 percent, their services do not fit within any of the
state usury laws which survived through the 1980s. Many of the states
which retained interest rate caps, however, such as Georgia, Pennsylvania,
and Virginia, have markets of impoverished potential debtors too tempting
for payday lenders to resist. In order to circumvent these caps, payday
39
lenders now broker payday loans on behalf of federally insured banks.
By exploiting the Supreme Court's constitutionalization ofperceived Civil
War Era Congressional intentions, payday lenders have managed to capture
the legal authority of the United States Constitution to justify loans with
interest rates more than twice as high as those typically offered by mafia
loan sharks. 4 ° One scholar explained that these developments have

537. Id.; Peterson, supra note 17, at 553.
538. William F. Baxter, Section 85 of the NationalBank Act and Consumer Welfare, 1995
UTAH L. REV. 1009, 1010-11, 1028; Richard P. Eckman, The DelawareConsumerCredit BankAct
and 'Exporting' Interest Under Section 521 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980, 39 Bus. LAW. 1264, 1264-70 (1984); Donald C. Langevoot,
Statutory Obsolescence and the JudicialProcess: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal
Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 686 (1987); Moss & Johnson, supra note 406, at 333;

White, supra note 17, at 447-48.
539. JEAN ANN Fox& EDMUND MIERZWINSKI, RENT-A-BANK PAYDAY LENDING: How BANKS
HELP PAYDAY LENDERS EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS 10-12 (Nov. 2001), availableat

http://www.pirg.org/reports/consumer/payday/200 1/paydayreportnov I 3.pdf (last visited Feb. 13,
2003).
540. Al Guart, "Loanshark" Banks Bite Apple, N.Y. POST, Apr. 7, 2002, at 23 ("The lenders
aren't leg-breaking mobsters. They're out-of-state banks that skirt New York's usury laws to make
a killing through what is known as 'payday' loans."). In April of 2002, Virginia finally relented to
licensing payday lenders as they were already present. Carol Hazard, Payday Lending gets Warner
OK, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 10, 2002, at B I ("Until now, [payday] lenders have teamed
with obscure national banks to skirt state laws that prohibit triple-digit interest rates."). Eagle
National Bank, Country Bank, Brickyard Bank, and Crusader Savings Bank are all examples of
federally insured banks which engage in a high volume of payday lending. NCRC Calls for
Immediate CRA Examsfor Abusive Payday Lenders, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Apr. i1, 2002, availableat
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been hidden from the public and state legislators by the
camouflage of usury laws on the books of almost all states
that appear to cover loans to that state's debtors. Day by day
these local laws have become a more exaggerated illusion;
under the Marquette doctrine, the sternest state laws are the
first to be undermined and the quickest to fall.54
For thousands of years social and government leaders have socialized
their people with strong messages condemning high-cost personal debt. 42
American government, by gradually removing or at least muddling the old
general usury interest rate caps, has abdicated this leadership role. This
resignation combined with the sweeping cultural changes wrought by an
explosion in mainstream moderately priced consumer credit has eroded a
once unified moral stance towards high-cost debt. Today's high-cost
debtors are in at least one sense worse off than those of a century ago. Back
then, almost all debtors would have had a lifetime of socialization
regarding the "evil" of personal debt. Today's high-cost debtors, however,
sign credit contracts with the same prices as a century ago, but do so with
none of the same moral condemnation to warn them of the risks. In a very
real sense, America's culture has become one of reckless borrowing. For
many who can afford such carelessness, the consequences are not severe
and are perhaps in some ways even beneficial: monthly payments,
overtime, mild anxiety about bills, and perhaps less time with the kids, all
offset by the fiscal disciplining of credit contracts and the genuine value of
consumer products. But for those who cannot afford imprudent credit
decisions, the consequences have become as grave as they were more than
a century ago when the first "loan sharks" appeared.
IV. THE MODERN INNOVATION AND UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
DISCLOSURE REGULATION

Throughout history there has been no common terminology used in
credit contracts. After the explosion of mainstream moderately priced
consumer credit use following World War II, the different meanings that
http://www.usnewswire.com/topnews/first/0411-132.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2002). Although
the Marquettedecision cast itself as merely a case of statutory interpretation, footnote 31 establishes
that state interest rate caps are not applicable to federally chartered banks by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Marquette,439 U.S. at 318-19 n.31 ("To the extent the
enumerated federal rates of interest are greater than permissible state rates, state usury laws must,
of course, give way to the federal statute."). See generally Comment, Syndicate Loan-Shark
Activities and New York's Usury Statute, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 167 (1966) (reporting extortionate
criminal loanshark interest rates averaging 250% annually).
541. White, supra note 17, at 447-48.
542. See generally TUCKER, supra note 286, at 1-15.
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lenders ascribed to terms became more noticeable than at any other time
in human history. Even the most basic contractual terms such as interest
rates had no commonly shared definition. The result was that consumers
neither shopped for cheap credit nor even understood how much they were
actually paying for the credit to which they agreed. A 1964 study asked
families to estimate the average interest rate on their consumer debt. 43 The
average response was 8%--a third of the true cost of 24%."' The
complexity of quoted credit prices was causing the manifold confusion. For
example, there are a wide variety of methods for computing interest, which
can produce a wide variety of actual costs. Lenders might calculate rates
through the discount method, the discount-plus-fee method, the add-on
method, the actuarial method, or perhaps others. 4 Some lenders would
quote yearly interest rates, while others might quote monthly or even
weekly rates. 46 Moreover, on many monthly loans "the interest was
computed not on the declining balance actually owed by the borrower, but
instead on the original amount borrowed." '47 Thus, these creditors charged
interest on money that debtors had already repaid, which "meant that the
real rate of interest was approximately double the one quoted.""54
Compounding the problem, state governments also used a large and
incompatible variety of terms and classifications in statutes regulating
consumer credit. 49 Although this may have been less of a problem for
sophisticated commercial debtors, the new breed of consumer debtors
lacked the expertise and patience necessary for distilling the true meaning
of credit contracts.5 The result was that consumer debtors rarely
understood the true price of credit contracts to which they agreed.55 '
A. The Rise of Truth in Lending
Truth in lending sought to remedy this confusion. 52 The basic idea was
that government should require creditors to calculate and quote interest
rates and other important contractual terms in a clear and uniform
543. H.R. Rep. No. 90-1040, reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1970.
544. Id.
545. See PAUL H. DOUGLAS, IN OUR TIME 105-06 (1968).
546. See id. at 95.
547. Id.
548. Id.
549. KEEST, supra note 19, at 48.
550. See Barry A. Abbott & John W. Campbell, The Truth in Lending Act After 15 Years: Its
Goals andItsLimitations,9 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 1, 2 n.4 (1984) (providing illustrative example).
551. See Ford Motor Credit v. Millhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 559 (1980); Mourning v. Family
Publ'ns Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 363-69 (1973); JOHN R. FONSECA, I HANDLING CONSUMER
CREDIT CASES 301 (3d ed. 1986); KEEST & KLEIN, supra note 25, § 1.1; Abbott & Campbell, supra
note 550, at 1-2; Rubin, supra note 27, at 233-34.
552. Mourning, 411 U.S. at 364.
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manner."5 3 Former Senator Paul H. Douglas of Illinois is commonly
credited with innovating some of the first modem credit price disclosure
proposals." 4 Years later Senator Douglas recounted a story ofthe first time
he suggested such a requirement. Working for FDR's National Recovery
Administration for the consumer finance industry, Douglas served on a
committee responsible for drafting proposed credit code revisions.5
At the first meeting of the code authority in 1934, I brought
up these facts and suggested that the members of the industry
should quote their rates on an annual rather than a monthly
basis and charge interest only on the unpaid balance. Never
did the temperature of a meeting drop so sharply and so far.
A chilling silence set in and the authority shortly adjourned.
I received a letter suggesting that I might
A few days later,
5 56
resign.
to
want
Douglas did not dare to revisit the proposal for twenty-five years and until
he had a decade of experience in the United States Senate. 5 7
When Senator Douglas did finally introduce the first federal credit price
disclosure bill in 1960, the idea was not received any better than in 1934.
An awesome array of opponents including the nation's automobile dealers,
finance companies, mail order houses, the National Association of
Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the American Bankers
Association, the American Bar Association, virtually all Congressional
Republicans, and most of the Southern Democrats denounced the bill. 5 '
One commentator colorfully summarizes what followed:
Congress spent the eight years from 1960 to 1968 debating
the Truth-in-Lending Act. According to the military metaphor
that is almost obligatory in these cases, the process must be
counted as an epic battle. Forces were rallied, maneuvers
undertaken, salvoes exchanged, and casualties incurred.
While the reality was political rather than military, it was no
less intensely fought and, at some points, no less gruesome.559
The magnitude of Congress' debate is somewhat tarnished when one
realizes the bill was not reported out of the Senate Banking Committee for
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debate by the whole Senate until 1967."6 In reality, much of the struggle
was between only a few influential members of a Senate Subcommittee. 6 '
As for casualties, it is worth noting that Senator Douglas' defeat in the
1966 election bears a striking resemblance to the political demise of
Governor Hai Jui in the late Chinese Ming Dynasty. Both eroded their
political capital through alienating powerful commercial interests in
fighting for widespread credit reform of regulatory systems based on
inadequate interest rate caps. Both also fell from power despite their
informed and passionate commitment to populist government policy.
While early bills all faltered, they did provide Senator Douglas and later
Wisconsin Senator William Proxmire the excuse to hold extensive
hearings exploring the issue and hammering out the details. 62 Particularly
influential were a series of four 1963 hearings held outside of Washington
D.C. in New York City, Pittsburgh, Louisville, and Boston.563 Supporters
of the legislation hoped that these hearings would raise public awareness
and put pressure on Banking Committee members to allow the bill onto the
Senate floor.'"
In particular, the Boston hearings may have helped spawn one of the
first statutes which can fairly be characterized as modern credit disclosure
law. 65 In 1966, both the Canadian province of Nova Scotia and the State
566
of Massachusetts adopted local versions of the Truth in Lending Act.
Portentously, the Massachusetts legislation included almost the same
disclosure requirements as the federal bill. 567 This state statute came to
create a feedback effect in the effort to pass uniform federal disclosure
rules.

560. See id. at 255.
561. See id. at 245.
562. See id. at 245-50.
563. See id. at 250-5 1.
564. Id.
565. DOUGLAS, supra note 545, at 99. Senator Douglas commonly called credit disclosure an
old idea, citing the requirement that loan contracts be written down in Hammurabi's ancient
Babylonian code. See id.; see also HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1, at 26-27. However, this may be
rhetorical flourish since the Babylonian rule was probably directed not at debtor understanding so
much as preventing false contracts and violations of other code provisions. The Babylonian rule is
probably better characterized as an early version of the much more common statute of frauds.
566. DOUGLAS, supra note 545, at 99.
567. Rubin, supra note 27, at 252. One important difference between the Massachusetts rules
and the federal bill was that Massachusetts did not include a private right of action for debtors to
sue violating creditors. Instead, the state rule provided that "failure to comply barred recovery of
finance charges and subjected the lender to a fine of up to $500 or imprisonment of up to six
months, or both." Id. at 252 n. 116 (citing 1966 Mass. Acts ch. 284 §§ 29-30; 1966 Mass. Acts ch.
587, §§ 10-11).
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How effectively [the Massachusetts law] was working was an
open question, but clearly it had not produced the commercial
Armageddon which the opponents of Truth-in-Lending had
predicted. Small businesses had not closed overnight, nor had
the state economy collapsed, no sales clerks had suffered
nervous breakdowns at the credit counter, and no bank
officials had hanged themselves from their flourescent lights.
With life in Massachusetts going on pretty much as it had
before, the opposition found itself somewhat embarrassed by
the vigor of its prior rhetoric. 6
This state law, combined with 1968 election results favoring supporters of
the disclosure bill, led the Senate Banking Committee to allow the bill out
onto the Senate floor where it quickly passed. 69
In the House, Representative Leonore Sullivan led a much faster and
more dramatic charge than the plodding Senate culminating in the ultimate
passage of a much more robust statute.570 The composition of the House of
Representatives was decidedly more liberal than the Senate. This enabled
Sullivan to introduce a much more liberal bill which included many
substantive provisions in addition to the disclosure bill passed by the
Senate.571 She and her Democratic colleagues on the House Banking
Committee's Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs inserted provisions
requiring more comprehensive disclosure including those regarding first
and second mortgages and credit advertising.572 Additional substantive
proposals included a national interest rate cap of eighteen percent
prohibition of all wage garnishments and confessions of judgment in
consumer credit cases, the establishment of a national commission on
consumer finance, and creation of new, presidential power to control
consumer credit rules during economic crises.573
House Republicans reacted by supporting the comparatively
conservative Senate bill.574 Many of the substantive provisions, including
the national usury limit, were bargaining chips which House Democrats
intended to trade away in order to strengthen the Senate bill.575 On the
House floor, Republicans, looking to salvage a "tough on crime" theme out

568.
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570.
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fairly be
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Id. at 252-53 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 251-52.
See id. at 255-63. Kathleen Keest and Gary Klein have adroitly pointed out that if Paul
is the father of Truth in Lending, Representative Sullivan, the chief House sponsor, must
counted as its mother. KEEST & KLEIN, supra note 25, at 31 n.4.
Rubin, supra note 27, at 255-57.
Id. at 256.
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of the impending consumer legislation, added provisions making
extortionate credit collection a federal crime. 576 When the legislation
surfaced from aj oint House and Senate Conference Committee it "retained
the structure and discourse of the parent Senate bill," but included many
of the added House provisions on first and second mortgages, credit life
insurance, credit advertising, wage garnishment, administrative
enforcement, loansharking, and the National Commission on Consumer
Finance.577 Because the final bill went far beyond disclosure, it was
renamed the Consumer Credit Protection Act.5 78 However, Congress
retained the "Truth in Lending" label for the disclosure provisions,
which
5 79
still made up the most important and influential bulk of the act.
The most important requirements of the Truth in Lending provisions
centered around the disclosure of the cost of credit based on standard
uniform requirements set out by the act and by the Federal Reserve
Board. 5 s" The two most important disclosures were the "finance charge"
and the "annual percentage rate." The finance charge is "the sum of all
charges, payable directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to the
extension of credit., 5 11 It includes all interest and fees that a creditor
requires the debtor to pay. The annual percentage rate is an interest rate
based on the actuarial method and calculated in accordance with
regulations set out by the Federal Reserve Board.582 The Act was enforced
with tough civil penalties. It gave debtors the right to sue their creditors
where the creditor failed to disclose prices and other contract provisions in
accordance with the law.583 To deter noncompliance, creditors found to be
in violation of the Act were liable to the debtor for actual damages,
statutory damages, attorney's fees, and court costs. In extreme cases a
noncomplying creditor was even subject to criminal prosecution. 84
B. The Unique Promise of Disclosure
Although, unsurprisingly, neither industry nor consumer advocates have
ever been entirely satisfied with the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the
disclosure approach has in general garnered wide acceptance. It has only
been in the past decade that consumer advocates have become

576.
577.
578.
579.
580.
581.

Id. at 261.
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id.
JOHN R. FONSECA, CONSUMER CREDIT COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 1:4 (2d ed. '1984).
15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2002); see also FONSECA, supra note 580, §1:4; DEE PRIGDEN,
CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW §§ 6:1, 6:2 (1990 & Supp. 2002).
582. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1606(a) (West 2002).
583. KEEST & KLEIN, supra note 25, at 34.
584. Id.
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progressively disenchanted with disclosure law. Nevertheless, TILA has
remained the cornerstone of Federal consumer credit regulation, and
further, most state governments have come to rely heavily on disclosure
provisions in state laws. Moreover, industry, rarely welcoming government
oversight, has still come to a grudging acceptance of TILA. In particular,
high-cost creditors have advocated disclosure rules to deflect legislative
pressure for more substantive rules. 5
In retrospect, Congress' adoption of TILA was only possible because
the price disclosure approach has distinct political and theoretical
advantages over other consumer credit policy options. In theory, disclosure
simultaneously provides consumer protection and promotes market
outcomes consistent with the conditions classical economics prescribes for
efficient market economies. This characteristic makes the disclosure
approach unusually attractive in the American political climate. Economic
discourse in the United States has typically been characterized by two
groups of thinking: those-anchored by Adam Smith-advocating
relatively less or no governmental control in the distribution of scarce
resources, and those-anchored (albeit in the American case very distantly)
by Karl Marx-advocating more or complete governmental control. This
dichotomy of economic thinking has had profound influence on
policymakers seeking to deal with problems arising in the respective rights
ofdebtors and creditors. The disclosure strategy for controlling the harmful
consequences of high-cost lending has the rare advantage of falling within
an ideological overlap palatable to both of these usually divisive
perspectives.
Disclosure is acceptable in the classical economic perspective because
it promotes informed decisionmaking. For classical economists, the ideal
method of constructing social policy was to leave nearly all policy
decisions to individual economic behavior. Classical economists believed
society could rely on its individual members to protect their own best
interests, and in turn protect overall social well-being at the same time.
Individuals neither intend nor generally recognize that their selfish actions
promote societal welfare, but that nevertheless do so. When every member
of society is making well-informed decisions in their own best interest, the
collective result is better policy than any government planning board might
make. The famous metaphor Adam Smith used to describe this predicted
phenomenon was that individual self-interested decisions would act as "an
invisible hand" guiding social policy to the optimal outcome. In Smith's
words:

585. Keest, supra note 32, at 360.
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[O]f which the produce is likely to be the greatest value, every
individual, it is evident, can, in his local situation, judge much
better than any statesman or lawgiver can do for him. The
statesman, who should attempt to direct private people in
what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would not
only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but
assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to
no single person, but to no council or senate whatever, and
which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a
man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself
fit to exercise it."'
Thus, in this view there is a presumption against governmental interference
with each individual's own decisions about whether or not to purchase a
good or service, with credit being no exception.
Nevertheless, most economists are willing to agree that governmental
action is sometimes necessary to protect the market conditions which
facilitate competition. Where the private decisionmaking process in some
way breaks down, the government must intervene to either reestablish the
private decisionmaking or correct the failure. One introductory economics
textbook plainly explains.
Adam Smith extolled the virtues of private markets,
arguing that consumers and producers "promote the public
interest" more effectively than any government. If this were
always true, then government intervention could only harm
the public interest. Smith's argument holds, however, only
when certain ideal conditions prevail. When these conditions
are not satisfied, market outcomes are not optimal. In such
cases government may serve the public interest. Among these
reasons for market failure, and therefore government
regulation, are natural monopoly, externalities and imperfect
information."7
Information is important because it is a necessary prerequisite to
efficient market decisionmaking. Efficient market outcomes can only come
about as a result of individuals selecting those product options with the
lowest opportunity costs.5"' Opportunity costs are the costs of forgone
alternatives to any economic decision. "[G]iven limited or scarce resources
and time, the undertaking of any activity or the expenditure of any funds
means that we must forgo some other activity or some other use of these
586. SMITH, supra note 440, at 225-26.
587. JAMES F. RAGAN, JR. & LLOYD B. THOMAS, JR., PRINCIPLES OF MICRO ECONOMICS 371
(1993) (emphasis added).
588. KARL E. CASE & RAY C. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 2-4 (4th ed. 1996).
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funds."58 9 The driving force behind market-based policymaking is

harnessing the good sense and local perspective of each individual to make
the best decisions available to that person.5 sg Without accurate information
about the quality and especially the price of any good, no person can
minimize their opportunity costs, since they cannot compare the value of
that product to their next best option. Thus, in a policymaking system of
private decisionmaking, where individuals act without accurate cost
information, there is no policymaking at all, rather just the random and
often tragic outcomes of market anarchy.
Disclosure regulation of creditors fits within the traditional classical
economic perspective because disclosure is directed at fixing a breakdown
in the private decisionmaking process which guides markets to optimal
outcomes. Traditional government regulation controls the private decisions
of debtors. For example, where there are interest rate caps, debtors are not
free to choose loans at above ceiling prices. Classical economics
recommends debtors have the freedom to make whatever bargains they
choose, provided they understand the consequences of their actions. Or as
Jeremy Bentham explained, "no man of ripe years and sound mind, acting
freely and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered.., from making such
bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit." '' But to the
extent a debtor does not have his or her "eyes open," for classical
economics, all bets are off. Unlike interest rate caps and other control
devices, disclosure regulation-at least in theory-increasesthe freedom
of consumers through giving the opportunity to open one's own eyes. With
a uniform method of learning the costs and characteristics of credit
contracts, debtors can determine which credit contracts are in their best
interests. With disclosure regulation, consumers have relatively greater
freedom to control their financial destiny. In theory, each debtor is
empowered to protect their own best interest, and in doing so will
contribute to the overall welfare of society.
On the other hand, disclosure regulation is also acceptable to the
control-oriented perspective in American economic discourse. This
perspective is skeptical that private decisionmaking of individuals in
unregulated markets can actually create the society we all hope to have. 92
589. ROBERT B. CARSON & WADE L. THOMAS, THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS AND ANALYSIS 508 (1991); see also PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS,

ECONOMICS 119 (15th ed. 1995) ("The opportunity cost is the value of the good or service
forgone.").
590. SMITH, supra note 440, at 225-26.

591. See HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 1,at 81 (quoting Bentham and describing the historical
context of Bentham's arguments).
592. See, e.g., E.K. HUNT, PROPERTY AND PROPHETS: THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC AND

INSTITUTIONAL IDOLOGIEs 192 (7th ed. 1995) (serving as a stark example of the social liberal
approach).
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Often these thinkers will point to actual stories of economic injustice, as
well as empirical data demonstrating economic inequality, to show that
market outcomes are not what we want. Apologists for governmental
control of markets also often point to the assumptions of classical
economic models, arguing that these assumptions are false, and therefore
generate flawed predictions. 93 Many of our nation's most respected
political leaders consistently advocate regulation at odds with the
predictions of economic models. For instance, the continuing support of
interest rate caps in many states, despite widespread circumvention,
demonstrates that policymakers and the American public have not followed
blindly the recommendations of classical economics. Although exceptions
for various lenders are both common and complex, all but six states retain
some interest rate cap language in their statute books. 94 For those that take
this control-oriented statutory language seriously, the emphasis of
government action should not be on facilitating private policymaking, but
on protecting society's vulnerable members.
This emphasis on protection is why disclosure regulation also fits well
within the perspective of those that advocate governmental control of
markets. Disclosure regulations provide consumers with an important
opportunity to protect themselves from credit bargains that are not truly in
their own best interests. 95 Although thinkers with this control-oriented
perspective are likely to hope for additional regulations that more
completely clamp down on high-cost lending (such as interest rate caps
with stiff enforcement and penalties), disclosure regulations are at least a
palatably good start.
Historically, the basic strategy of modem price disclosure represents a
fundamentally new approach to solving the problems associated with
consumer credit. Other American efforts have been variations on older
strategies invented long ago on other continents. Interest rate caps
throughout most of American history were little different than those
enacted in Ming China, Rome, and Babylon.5 96 American charitable
lending strategies, including cooperative lending societies and community
reinvestment efforts, suffer from the same problems as did the first Italian
montespietatum 97 American cooperative strategies including saving and
loan societies and credit unions, albeit important contributions, have not
been able to include those who need their services most.5 98 And sadly,
racially discriminatory mortgage loan policies such as those used by the

593.
594.
595.
596.
597.
598.

Id.
Fox & MIERZWINSKI, supra note 539, at 25-26.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (describing the purpose of the Truth in Lending Act).
For instance, compare note 74, supra with note 273, supra.
Compare note 223, suprawith notes 434 & 509, supra.
See supra note 518.
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Federal Housing Administration in the thirties are prime examples of
selective protection of a favored majority from the risks of high-cost
borrowing. 599 Truth in Lending does not properly fit into any of these
classifications. Although the relative novelty of modem disclosure
regulation does not by itself demonstrate greater promise than these older
strategies, that so many of us can agree about the basic theoretical
advantages of disclosure, may. Both classical market liberals and controloriented supporters of regulation tend to agree on the formidable
theoretical potential of price disclosure policies in regulating consumer
credit.60° This area of agreement is notable not just because it is rare, and
not just because it facilitates legislative compromise, but also because the
agreement itself speaks well about the value of the approach. None of
history's other strategies for controlling the harmful consequences of highcost lending captures the ideological overlap between laissez-faire
capitalists and protection-oriented government regulators so well as does
price disclosure.

599. Many believe similar discrimination continues to exist in mortgage lending markets. For
an introduction to this extensive debate, see Harold A. Black, Is There Discriminationin Mortgage
Lending? What Doesthe Research Tell Us?, 27 REV. OFBLACKPOL. ECON. 23 (1999); Cathy Cloud
& George Galster, What Do We Know About RacialDiscriminationin MortgageMarkets?, 22 REV.
OF BLACK POL ECON. 101 (1993); Theodore E. Day & S. J. Liebowitz, Mortgage Lending to
Minorities: Where's the Bias?, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 3 (1998); Stephen A. Fuchs, Discriminatory
Lending Practices:Recent Developments, Causes and Solutions, 10 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 461
(1991); Fred Galves, The DiscriminatoryImpact of TraditionalLending Criteria:An Economic and
Moral Critique, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1467 (1999); Glenn W. Harrison, MortgageLending in
Boston: A Reconsiderationofthe Evidence, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 29 (1998); Helen F. Ladd, Evidence
on Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 41 (1998); Stanley D. Longhofer,
Discriminationin Mortgage Lending: What Have We Learned?, ECON. COMMENT., Aug. 15, 1996
at 1; Robert E. Martin & R.Carter Hill, Loan Performanceand Race, 38 ECON. INQUIRY 136
(2000); Alicia H. Munnell et al., MortgageLending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data,86 AM.
ECON. REV. 25 (1996); Reynold F. Nesiba, RacialDiscriminationin ResidentialLending Markets:
Why EmpiricalResearchersAlways See It andEconomic Theorists Never Do, 30 J. ECON. ISSUES
51 (1996); Ron Nixon, ApplicationDenied: Do Lending Institutions OverlookHispanics?, 11 HISP.
30 (1998); Ronald K. Schuster, Lending Discrimination:Is the SecondaryMarket Helping to Make
the 'American Dream' a Reality?, 36 GONZ. L. REV. 153 (2000/2001); Peter P. Swire, The
PersistentProblem of Lending Discrimination:A Law and Economics Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REV.
787 (1995); see also ROBERT SCHAFER & HELEN F. LADD, DISCRIMINATION INMORTGAGE LENDING
(1981).
600. Lenders made a similar point in explaining support for Truth in Lending as derived from
"the traditional yankee faith in the shrewdness of the consumer, and his ability to police the market
place and choose the best buy." Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Impact of Truth-in-Lending Disclosures
on Consumer Market Behavior:A Critiqueof the Criticsof Truth-in-Lending Law, 9 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 117, 120 (1984) (quoting Johnathan M. Landers, Some Reflections on Truth in Lending,
1977 IL. L. J. 669).
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C. The Unfulfilled Potentialof Truth in Lending:
Truth Is Not Enough
Sadly, the thirty-five year history of modem credit price disclosure
regulation has evinced a wide gap between Truth in Lending theory and
market reality. Although the basic notion of preventing credit problems
before they develop with a uniform price tag disclosure sounds simple, the
practical implementation of TILA turned out to be extremely
complicated." The statute charged the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) with
ironing out the details of the law in what was called Regulation Z.602 In
addition to Regulation Z, between 1968 and 1980 the FRB issued
approximately 1500 advisory opinions interpreting what the rules meant. 0 3
In order to help creditor's digest this vast amount of technical information,
the FRB also issued informal pamphlets. 6 In some cases, creditors relied
on these pamphlets in designing their disclosure forms, only to have the
courts later rule the pamphlets themselves were incorrect.60 5
Following passage, consumer advocates did not hesitate to make use of
the new laws.
Legal Services attorneys made extensive use of the TILA on
behalf of low-income consumers. In addition the private bar
developed a consumer segment which relied heavily on TILA.
Creditors who did not comply with the Act found themselves
defendants in thousands of lawsuits filed on the basis ofTILA
noncompliance, or found themselves losing what had
previously been routine collection actions because of TIL

counterclaims. 6

Between 1969 and 1980 over 14,000 suits alleging TILA violations were
filed in federal court. 7 By 1979, Truth in Lending litigation constituted

601. See Abbott &Campbell, supra note 550, at 3; Elwin Grifith, Truth in Lending-The Right
of Recission, Disclosure of the Finance Charge, and Itemization of the Amount Financed in
Closedend Transactions, 6 GEo. MAsoN L. REv. 191, 192-94 (1998); Kofele-Kale, supra note 600,
at 126-29; Jonathan M. Landers & Ralph J. Rohner, A FunctionalAnalysis ofTruth in Lending, 26
UCLA L. REv. 711, 713-25 (1979); Rubin, supra note 27, at 279-80, 306.
602. 15 U.S.C. § 1604; KEEST& KLEIN, supra note 25, at 43.

603. KEEST & KLEIN, supra note 25, at 36.
604. See generally Ives v. W.T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that reliance

on federal reserve board staff letters and pamphlets was not justified).
605. Id.; see KEEST & KLEIN, supra note 25, at 35-36, 368 n.85.
606. KEEST & KLEIN, supra note 25, at 34.

607. See David S. Willenzik & Mark Leymaster, Recent Trends in Truth-in-Lending
Litigation, 35 BUS. LAW. 1197 n.4 (1980). This, however, does not include suits filed in state courts
where debtors also asserted TILA defenses. Id. at 1197 n.5.
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about two percent of the civil case load in federal courts. °8 Congress,
hoping to insure enforcement of the intentions of the Act, included

language urging courts to broadly interpret TILA requirements and hold
creditors to the strict letter of the law.6 9 This requirement forced courts61to
0
impose penalties on creditors who made only minor disclosure errors.
Just as advocates of TILA had seized on the horror stories of cheated
debtors, opponents of the legislation found new ammunition in the woes
of creditor compliance troubles.6" ' Amplified by the finest lobbyists the
consumer credit industry could buy, the stories of creditor compliance
problems gradually forced Congress to reconsider the ardor with which
they passed TILA.612
Independent of creditor complaints about litigation and the difficulty of
compliance, the credit industry as well as many neutral academics led a
rhetorical challenge to TILA asserting the information provided to debtors
was not useful. A body of academic literature had developed discussing
Truth in Lending even before Congress adopted the Act, but it has grown
larger and decidedly more skeptical. 613 The early objection which resonated
the most was the claim that TILA caused "information overload., 614 The
argument rested on studies showing debtors did not understand most ofthe

608. See Federal Reserve Board, Regulatory Analysis of Revised Regulation Z, 46 Fed. Reg.
20941, 20942 (1981); see also KEEST & KLEIN, supra note 25, at 36.
609. See, e.g., Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 791 F.2d 699, 704 (9th Cir.
1986); Bizier v. Globe Fin. Serv., 654 F.2d 1,3 (1st Cir. 1981); Smith v. Wells Fargo Credit Corp.,
713 F. Supp. 354, 355 (D. Ariz. 1989).
610. See, e.g., Smith v. No. 2 Galesburge Crown Fin. Corp., 615 F.2d 407, 416-17 (7th Cir.
1980) ("It is not sufficient to attempt to comply with the spirit of TILA .... Rather, strict
compliance with the required disclosures and terminology is required . . . . [W]e will not
countenance deviations from those requirements, however minor they may be in some abstract
sense." (citations omitted)), overruled by Pridegon v. Gates Credit Union, 683 F.2d 182 (7th Cir.
1982).
611. KEEST&KLE1N, supra note 25, at 35.
612. Id. at 35-36.
613. A sample of the academic literature includes: Abbott & Campbell, supra note 550,
passim; William K. Brandt & George S. Day, Information Disclosure and Consumer Behavior: An
Empirical Evaluation of Truth in Lending, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 297 (1974); Davis, supra note
31, at 906; Robert W. Johnson, The New Law of Finance Charges: Disclosure, Freedom of Entry,
and Rate Ceilings, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 671, 673-76 (1968); Robert L. Jordan & William
D. Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1285 (1966); KofeleKale, supra note 600, at 146-47; Homer Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented
Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REV.445 passim (1968); Landers & Rohner, supra note 601, at 751-52;
Paul R. Moo, Legislative Control of Consumer Credit Transactions, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
656, 661-62 (1968); Rubin, supra note 27, at 306; William C. Whitford, The Functions of
Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 400. See also S. Rep. No. 9673, at 2-3 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 281-82.
614. Kofele-Kale, supra note 600, at 128.
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disclosed information.6 5 Because TILA required disclosure of too much
information, disclosures resembled just another legal form, which debtors
did not bother to read.616 Embracing this view, a Governor of the Federal
Reserve Board told Senators:
[I]n our opinion, the total present disclosure requirements are
simply too extensive to permit effective use by the vast
majority of consumers .... [T]he mass of information now
provided may produce a kind of "information overload" that
overpowers many consumers and renders the entire disclosure
statement a forbidding and incomprehensible document.
Indeed, behavioral research suggests that when confronted
with more than a few "bits" of information, consumers cease
to read or retain any of the material offered.617
Opponents of reform countered that most of the complexity of disclosures
was due to creditors' unnecessary and over-aggressive contractual efforts
to protect themselves in every possible circumstance of default.618
Consumer advocates also argued that information overload could be solved
by visually segregating the most important information apart from less
important disclosures. 611 Thus, consumers could have simplified
disclosure, but still have the important, more complex information
available if they chose to explore it. But, after the FRB-the very
administrative agency charged with implementing the Act---called for
620
abandoning many TILA disclosures, fundamental change was inevitable.
The 1968 Act endured small amendments to correct technical problems
in 1970, 1974, twice in 1976, and again in 1978.621 But by 1980 Congress
bowed to the inescapable industry pressure and the growing tide of
deregulation around the country. The Truth in Lending Simplification and
Reform Act (1980 Act) cut out many of the most difficult provisions with
respect to creditor compliance.622 At the same time, Congress preempted

615. See id.
616. See id.
617. Simplify and Reform the Truth in Lending Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
ConsumerAffairs of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs United States Senate, 95th
Cong. 16 (1977) (statement of Philip C. Jackson, Jr.).
618. KEEST & KLEIN, supranote 25, at 36 n.37.

619. Id. at 36.
620. In addition, the Federal Trade Commission also expressed concern over creditor
compliance troubles. Simplification of the Truth in Lending Act: Oversight HearingsBefore the
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Affairs, 95th
Cong. 6 (1978) (statement of Michael Pertschuk, FTC Chairman).
621. KEEST & KLEIN, supra note 25, at 34 n.27.
622. See Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, tit. VI, 94 Stat.
168 (1980).
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state interest rate caps on first mortgage home loans, effectively allowing
mortgage lenders to charge whatever interest rates home equity debtors
might agree to.623 The changes to Truth in Lending were so thorough that
the Federal Reserve Board considered the law a "new" Truth in Lending
Act, rather than an amended version of the old statute.62 4 The most
important changes included the limitation of statutory penalties to only
"significant" violations of the Act, elimination of itemization of the finance
charge, and in some instances elimination of itemization of the amount
financed. 625 Also, the 1980 Act eliminated or streamlined a variety of
secondary, but potentially important, disclosures relating to the legal right
to acceleration, security interests, late charges, and rebates. Finally, and
perhaps in practical terms most important, the 1980 Act required the FRB
to promulgate "safe haven" forms which further encouraged uniformity
and gave an added assurance to lenders about liability risks.62 6
Many changes, however, had nothing to do with making disclosure
documents simpler, but rather focused on protecting major players in the
lending markets. For instance, in the 1968 Act, assignees of the original
creditor were sometimes held equally liable for any Truth in Lending
violations. 627 This encouraged the secondary lending market to police loan
originators. But under the 1980 Act, assignees became liable only for
violations apparent from the face of the contract.628 The 1980 Act also
reduced the maximum recovery for multiple class actions, eroding the
incentive of plaintiffs lawyers to engage in major litigation battles with
large lenders.629 One scholar recently explained, "it was undoubtedly the
onslaught of TIL lawsuits, most of which were being won by consumers,
more than the failure of the Act to assist consumers in comparison
shopping that led Congress to enact a major overhaul of the Act, effective
in 1980.,,63 It is also worth noting that the claim that Truth in Lending
lawsuits in the pre-1980 era were largely premised on technical problems
with secondary disclosure requirements is something of a myth. On the
contrary, more than half of TILA litigation in this period challenged the
accuracy of finance charges "not a 'technicality,' but one of the two most

623. The Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act was passed as part ofthe Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act which preempted state interest rate caps on first
mortgage home loans. DIDA, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1735f-7a).
624. KEEST & KLEIN, supra note 25, at 34.
625. Id, at 35-36.
626. See 15 U.S.C. § 1604(b) (2002).
627. PRIGDEN, supra note 581, § 4:3.
628. Id.
629. Id.
630. Id. § 4:2.
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fundamental disclosures mandated by TIL."63 ' Nevertheless, when the
Supreme Court quickly resolved several of the most important
controversies Congress left unaddressed, many creditor compliance
concerns were essentially eliminated. The result was that soon after
simplification the levels of litigation over TILA subsided to "relatively
sparse" levels. 32
1. The Market for High-Cost Credit Information
While industry has come to a grudging acceptance of Truth in Lending
as litigation and compliance problems have largely been solved, it is far
less clear whether the Act has achieved the ultimate goal of protecting
consumers by creating informed credit decisions. Unfortunately there are
strong indications that, at least in the market for high-cost credit, Truth in
Lending has failed almost entirely in promoting price informed borrowing
decisions among the most vulnerable debtors. In the high-cost credit
market, structural and market forces act, not to promote price competition,
but to promote confusion and strategic lending behavior.633 High-cost
lenders have a greater incentive to erect barriers to price shopping than
moderate and low-priced lenders. The reason relatively inexpensive lenders
sell their loan products at lower prices is because their clientele are
responsive to those prices. The lender offering the cheapest loan has every
incentive to advertise that price. But for lenders who have abandoned price
competition for other means of acquiring customers, the wisest course is
to hide those prices for as long as possible.634 The ideal high-cost debtor is
one who continues paying without even realizing the true opportunity costs
of her purchasing decision.
One way of discouraging comparison of loan products is by making
those products complex. After-the-fact legal battles are at least partially to
blame in encouraging high-cost credit contract complexity. Because in our
legal system courts take the text of contractual provisions
seriously-usually regardless of whether the parties understood their own
631. KEEST & KLEIN, supra note 25, at 36; see also Truth in Lending Simplification and
Reform Act, Hearingson S.108 Before the Sentate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and UrbanAffairs,
96th Cong. 30-31 (1979) (statement of Richard Hobbs, National Consumer Law Center).
632. FONSECA, supra note 551, § 1:1; KEEST & KLEIN, supra note 25, at 35-36; PRIGDEN,
supra note 581, § 4.3.
633. W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformationof Contracts by
StandardForms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21,38-39 (1984) (making a similar point about form contracts
in general); see also R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J.Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability ofan
Informed Minority to Correctfor Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 640-46 (1996)

(providing a useful summary of related articles).
634. Brian Ratchford makes a related point with respect to the economic model of human
capital. See Brian T. Ratchford, The Economics of Consumer Knowledge, 27 J.CONSUMER RES.
397, 406-07 (2001).
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bargain-creditors have a great incentive to pack their documents to
preempt every contingency they can imagine. Affirmative defenses in
litigation as well as statutory penalties for flawed disclosure and other
debtor consumer protection rules create perverse incentives to craft
complex contractual provisions which undermine the ability of consumers
to make meaningful comparisons between competing products. 35 Even
where the added complexity of a contract does not provide legal protection
for a lender in the long run, the threat of protection can be just as effective.
High-cost debtors do not know which lending practices are and are not
enforceable. This means complexity which looks defensible is often good
enough. Especially, if it can scare off the few overworked and often
inexperienced lawyers who serve the nation's most vulnerable debtors.
Even absent litigation risks, in the high-cost credit market, many
creditors inject complexity into their contracts and the negotiation process
preceding them simply for the strategic value of the complexity itself.
High-cost mortgage debtors often complain that lenders present stacks of
irrelevant brochures, letters, and advertisements in addition to already
complex settlement forms in order to cloak their true prices. The story of
John Evans, an eighty-seven-year-old retired laundry pressman from
Columbia, South Carolina, is indicative.636 Mr. Evans and his wife bought
their home in 1960. Since his retirement seven years ago he has worked
part time bagging groceries at a local Kroger supermarket. A telemarketer
from Collateral One Mortgage Company called Mr. Evans and convinced
him they could refinance his loan with lower monthly payments. Anxious
to stretch his small paycheck and social security income farther, he
expressed interest. Collateral One, a seven-year-old mortgage lender with
operations in Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee
immediately sent a salesman to Mr. Evans' home. Soon after, Collateral
One signed up Mr. Evans for a $71,000 mortgage with higher monthly
payments and a 10.792% interest rate. Financed in the loan were more than
$6,100 in fees which will cost around $26,000 over the life of the loan.
And, after thirteen years of regular monthly payments, Mr. Evans at 101
years of age will be due to make a balloon payment of $58,622. The
spokesman for Collateral One insisted Mr. Evans was fully informed about
the terms of his completely fair loan. Collateral One provided Mr. Evans
all the required paperwork detailing all loan terms and other information
prior to closing. They emphasize Mr. Evans never objected or indicated he

635. See Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification ofContract Law: The Objective Theory of

Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1274-76 (1993) (discussing Professor
Prosser's concerns over this incentive inthe context of contractual waiver of product liability).
636. Mr. Evans story is chronicled in Rick Brundrett, How Mounting Loans Devastated 87Year-Old, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Feb. 24, 2002, at Al. Alsosee Editorial, Predatory Lending
A Shameful Practice That Must Be Ended, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Feb. 24, 2002, at Al.
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could not understand the loan terms. For his part, Mr. Evans says, "[he]
thought the contract was all right," but admits he cannot read, having left
school after the first grade. 637 What he does know for certain is that he was
not told his monthly payments would be more than $100 larger than before.
With his limited fixed income Mr. Evans can barely make ends meet and
is afraid he "can't hang on much longer., 638 If he stops making payments,
he will lose his home in foreclosure.639
An anonymous former branch manager for Associates Financial
Service, a major national high-cost lender, paints a similar picture of
typical high-cost mortgage loan closings. The former manager confided to
a noted Virginian investigative journalist:
"The sales methods are so deceiving." ...[W]ith all the
numbers and documents involved, it's easy for a loan officer
to throw out some figures and say, "I can save you $25,000,
isn't that great?" The loan officer nods his head up and down
and makes eye contact. The bewildered customers nod their
heads yes too. "They'll be signing their lives away ...... It's
not until too late that they suddenly realize, "I have an $800a-month house payment. '
Contrasting the legal doctrine of "informed consent" which governs
medical doctors, the former high-cost lending manager emphasized in his
business, the norm is to sell credit products under "the doctrine of assumed
consent." 64 Such lax communication with potential debtors combined with
the increasing complexity of creditor contracts threatens to undermine our
system of rational choice policymaking. Credit contracts are often the most
important contracts a consumer will sign in a lifetime. When courts enforce
contracts, as though there were a real meeting of the minds as to all
material terms, when in fact there was not, an enormous potential exists for
lenders to include provisions which charge more than the amount to which
the customer actually agreed.
Independent of information barriers erected by high-cost creditors,
high-cost debtors often have limited resources and skills to invest in price
shopping." 2 The costs of acquiring information must be evaluated relative
to the resources of credit shoppers. Because current price disclosures only

637.
638.
639.
640.

Brundett, supra note 636.
Id.
See id.
Michael Hudson, "Signing Their Lives Away"-Ford Profits from Vulnerable

Consumers, in MERCHANTS OF MISERY: How CORPORATE AMERICA PROFITS FROM POVERTY 42,

47 (Michael Hudson ed., 1996).
641. id.
642. See Peterson, supra note 17, at 565.
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provide information about one credit contract in a vacuum, in order to
make a price comparative decision, debtors must still travel to other
creditors, learn the prices they offer money at, and then compare which is
the best deal. Those, like Mr. Evans, who rely on creditors to come to them
as telemarketers or door-to-door salespersons take extreme risks." 3
Comparing product price and quality in some markets can be a relatively
easy task. At a grocery store, a consumer might compare the prices of
several different breakfast cereals, looking at the ingredients and the
convenience of packaging, recalling advertising claims, and contrasting the
quantities offered all in a matter of minutes or even seconds. This is
because in the market for breakfast cereals shopping costs are low.
But in the market for high-cost credit, making a similar comparison
involves traveling between different locations, asking for the relevant
documentation, conversing with clerks, potentially negotiating on the
purchase price of a similar financed good, and probably undergoing
multiple credit checks. Moreover, the most inexpensive lenders may have
short operating hours, intimidating employees and environments, parking
congestion, might frown on bringing children along for the application
process, and might unintentionally or even intentionally assemble other
more subtle, but nevertheless socially profound, barriers as simple as
offhand rude remarks or disapproving stares. A debtor must also have an
arsenal of resources to keep these shopping costs from skyrocketing. If, for
example, a debtor uses public transportation, taking the bus between
different potential creditors could take hours upon hours. If the debtor is
mobility-limited by a disability, old age, or illness, traveling to more than
one or two creditor locations may be impossible. If the debtor has difficulty
reading, the time which it would take to wade through many different
disclosure statements alone would be prohibitive. At some point shopping
costs will outweigh any uncertain benefits of reduced prices which might
be gained from shopping, making it irrational for many if not most or all
consumers to do pre-transactional shopping.
The problems of cost comprehension and price comparison are only
magnified for the growing number of Americans who speak little or no
English. Bringing a friend or family member along to translate roughly
doubles the shopping costs. In practice, "Spanish speaking consumers
essentially rely on the verbal promises of a salesman to get through the
process."" 4 Unscrupulous high-cost lenders aggressively target Spanish
speakers to generate heterogeneously inflated prices. A Port Lavanca,
Texas consumer poignantly complained to the Texas Attorney General
643. Id.
644. Reggie James et al., In Over Our Heads: PredatoryLending andFraudin Manufactured
Housing, in 5(!) CONSUMERS UNION SOUTHWEST REGIONAL OFFICE PUBLIC POLICY SERIES 1, 16
(2002), availableat http://www.consumersunion.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2002).
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about the credit practices of mobile home dealers. The Spanish letter
translates, "[t]hey are soliciting business amongst the folks that have poor
'
English skills in order to cheat ...unsophisticated buyers."645
Some economists predict that consumers adopt shopping strategies
which effectively cope with these types of information problems. For
example, when consumers face a wide diversity of product choices, finding
the best deal becomes prohibitive. Because the costs of examining the
benefits of each possible option outweigh the potential gains from finding
the optimal choice, consumers have no incentive to find the best deal. But,
if consumers use a few important criteria to screen out options that are
unlikely to be ideal, they can come up with an option that is the best choice
given their circumstances. Then the consumer selects the best option from
the limited set of choices. Although the selected option may not in fact be
ideal, if the consumer uses sensible screening criteria, it will still be close
enough to force price and quality competition in the market. In these cases,
consumers are thought to "satisfice" rather than "optimize. 646
But even if we assume prospective high-cost debtors do attempt to
satisfice, it is still unlikely they could effectively force price competition.
In the market for high-cost lending, search costs are so high that consumers
must typically screen out all but one or two product options from further
more detailed investigation. For instance, a recent Consumers Union study
of the Texas manufactured home market indicates buyers seeking financing
must pay expensive credit report and application fees as well as place
deposits long before they ever see a contract or price disclosure
statement. 47 The price of a manufactured home loan is almost always
much higher at closing than when first quoted."t Moreover, sales staff

645. James et al., supra note 644, at 16-17; see also Steven W. Bender, Consumer Protection
for Latinos: Overcoming Language Fraud and English-Only in the Marketplace, 45 Am.U. L. REV.
1027, 1034-35 (1996).
646. JAMES G. MARCH &HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 140-41 (1958); SCOTT PLOUS,
THE PSYCHOLOGYOF JUDGEMENT ANDDECISIONMAKING 94-95 (1993); David M. Grether et al., The
Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV.
277, 285-89 (1986). Satisficing behavior can be conceptualized as either a welfare maximizing
response to imperfect information or as a problem of irrational behavior. See, e.g., AVERY WIENER
KATZ, FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 268 (1998). In this Article, I take
satisficing behavior to be consistent with welfare maximization. Consumers rationally satisfice
when the opportunity costs of pursuing larger product data sets outweigh the predictive potential
gains to further shopping. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily imply that high-cost debtors
always behave rationally. There may be irrational cognitive errors which impede optimal market
outcomes in addition to transaction cost distortions. However, irrational behavior is beyond the

scope of this article.
647. James et al., supra note 644, at 4-6.
648. RESPA requires lenders provide a "Good Faith Estimate" of closing costs within three
days after a customer applies for a loan. 12 U.S.C.A. § 260 1(b)(1) (West 2002). However, RESPA
does not include any penalties or liability for wild inaccuracies on the estimate or even failure to
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often caution borrowers not to shop around since the outdated credit
reporting system used by many manufactured home lenders penalizes the
credit ratings of borrowers for whom lenders submit multiple report
requests in a short duration. 649 The story of Porfirio P. from El Paso, Texas
is typical of the direct financial charges imposed on those who try to shop.
In order to find the best deal, Porfirio left a $100 deposit with one El Paso
mobile home lender and then a $300 deposit with a second lender, buying
from a third.65° When he asked for his initial two deposits back, both
mobile home dealer/lenders refused. His "exercise in comparison
shopping ... left him $400 out of pocket until the [Texas] Attorney
General intervened." 51 Sometimes manufactured home buyers are asked
to sign blank documents and dealers often refuse to give buyers copies of
loan contracts. 652 The Federal Reserve Board and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development confirm that the practice of charging
application fees to potential borrowers before providing any closing cost
or finance3 charge estimates is frequent and widespread all around the
country.

65

Even "fast loan" businesses have subtle but significant ways of raising
shopping costs. For instance, payday and car title lenders often telephone
first time loan applicants' bosses or human resource managers to verify
applicants are employed. Employment verification almost always occurs
before debtors see a contract or any TILA disclosures.6 4 Telephone
employment verification serves the lender's interests in several respects.
Obviously, the practice helps evaluate loan risk. But, it also dramatically
increases search costs for first time loan purchasers. Payday lenders
themselves admit their customers almost always have unsteady
employment.655 Most borrowers are understandably nervous about

provide the estimate at all. Both the Federal Reserve Board and HUD have characterized RESPA
good faith estimates as "unreliable." Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System & United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development, Joint Report to Congress Concerning
Reform to the Truth in Lending Act and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 20 (1998),
available at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/RptCongress/tila.pdf (last visited May 15, 2002).

649. James et al., supra note 647, at 4.
650. Id. at 4.

651.
652.
653.
Housing
654.

Id. at 4-6.
Id.
See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System & United States Department of
and Urban Development, supra note 648, at II.
See Peterson, supra note 17, at 573; Christopher Peterson, Only UntilPayday: A Primer

on Utah's Growing Deferred Deposit Loan Industry, 15 UTAH BAR J. 16, 16 (2002).

655. One industry funded demographic survey of payday loan debtors remarks, "[p]ayday
advance customers are not deeply rooted in their employment. 50% of respondents have had their
current job for three years or less, and 70% have had their current job for five years or less." 10
DATA CORPORATION, UTAH CONSUMER LENDING ASSOCIATION: UTAH CUSTOMER STUDY 30 (2001)

(available on file with author).
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exposing their financial circumstances to their uncommitted and
sometimes capricious employers. After the first employment verification
telephone call, many prospective debtors immediately end their search
because they (perhaps correctly) predict that embarrassment and the risk
of jeopardizing their job from additional phone calls will outweigh any
potential savings from searching for a cheaper loan.656 Moreover, the
practice encourages a form of artificial brand loyalty. By only verifying
employment over the telephone for the first loan, lenders create a subtle but
stiff "penalty" for borrowers who choose to look elsewhere in the future.65 7
Under this incentive structure the priority for lenders is to make themselves
the first option potential borrowers will inspect. Telephone employment
verification creates an incentive to compete with flashy signs, promises of
quick cash, location, and name recognition, rather than price reduction.
Search costs may be so high, borrowers satisfice after inspecting only one
or perhaps two market options-an insufficient number to force price
competition.
Payday lenders systematically delay divulging accurate comparative
price information such as the annual percentage rate of their loans. A
nationwide survey found only thirty-seven percent of payday lenders
contacted for price information would divulge even a nominally accurate
annual percentage rate over the telephone.65 "Others claimed they 'didn't
know' or that the APR was equal to the fee for a two-week loan." 659 A
different local study focusing on lenders in Salt Lake City found that even
when approached at store locations over sixty-five percent of payday
lenders would not disclose the rate of their loans in annual percentage rate
format.660 These results indicate nearly two-thirds of the nation's payday
lenders are in consistent violation ofthe TILA's most basic requirement to
respond to oral credit rate inquiries only in terms of the annual percentage
rate.661
Moreover, in the high-cost credit market, many of the inexpensive and
more informal shopping strategies used by upper class borrowers are not
available. Some economists predict that markets self-correct despite

656. Peterson, supra note 17, at 573.
657. This penalty has also been conceptualized as a "sunk" cost. Gilian K. Hadfield et al.,
Information-Based Principlesfor Rethinking Consumer Protection Policy, 21 J.CONSUMER POL'Y
131, 139 (1998).
658. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP AND CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, SHOW ME
THE MONEY! A SURVEY OF PAYDAY LENDERS AND REVIEW OF PAYDAY LENDER LOBBYING INSTATE
LEGISLATURES 6 (2000).

659. Id.
660. Peterson, supra note 17, at 564-65.
661. The Truth in Lending Act states, "In responding orally to any inquiry about the cost of
credit, a creditor, regardless of the method used to compute finance charges, shall state rates only
in terms of the annual percentage rates... ." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1665a (West 2002).
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information asymmetries because consumers use abstracted information
sharing strategies such as business reputation to offset seller advantages.662
This is to say, consumers can effectively shop through more informal
channels such as gleaning a producer's reputation from friends, coworkers, and family. But, in the market for high-cost credit, competition
through creditor reputation is unlikely to succeed. Initially, because entry
and exit costs are low for high-cost creditors, the market is characterized
by "a large number of fly-by-night operators with few sunk costs and only
modest investments in reputational capital."66' 3 Because many high-cost
lenders do not invest time and effort in building a solid reputation, they
have little to fear from word of mouth criticism. Moreover, high-cost
debtors often are less embedded within their communities. Because highcost debtors tend to have more fragile workplace, neighborhood,
community, church, and family relationships, they may be less integrated
into effective reputation based shopping networks. For example, an inner
city single mother of four working nights as a nurse is likely to have less
access to reliable information about the reputation of various payday
lenders, than two affluent married suburban CPAs would have about the
reputation of various banks. Also, high-cost debtors are unlikely to share
reputation information because they often suffer from embarrassment and
shame over past credit failures and the prospect of imminent default. One
study indicated that less than a quarter of borrowers behind on their home
mortgages ever mention their trouble to family friends.6" Sharing word of
mouth criticism of high-cost lenders often means exposing embarrassing
financial problems.665 Finally, all reliable shopping information must at
some point be obtained on a first hand basis. If virtually no one in a family
or neighborhood has access to reliable and effective shopping information,
then there is no basis for an effective informal word of mouth shopping
process to begin. One Latino social advocate explains,
[i]n many white families, there is a long history of home
ownership, so there is someone to help walk them through the
process. Many Latinos are first generation home-owners.
There is no one to say, "Here's what you should do and here's
who you should talk to when getting a loan." 6

662. See Hadfield et al., supra note 657, at 161 (noting regulations affecting business
reputation can provide effective consumer protection at a low cost).
663. Id. at 155.
664. JANETFORD, THEINDEBTEDSOCIETY: CREDITANDDEFAULTINTHE 1980s, at 126 (1988).
665. CASKEY, supra note 22, at 70-71; FORD, supra note 664, at 126-30; W.C.A.M. Dessart
& A.A.A. Kuylen, The Nature,Extent, Causes, andConsequences ofProblematicDebt Situations,
9 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 320, 328 (1986).
666. Ron Nixon, Application Denied: Do Lending Institutions Overlook Hispanics?, I1
HISPANIC 30, 30 (1998) (quoting Luis Artega, executive director of the Latino Issues Forum in San
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Because many low income and minority communities are conspicuously
devoid of branches of lower cost credit providers, such as credit unions and
some banks, shopping may become extremely time consuming for entire
social groups. As a result these debtors are likely to select credit on the
basis of familiarity, the "convenience" of low initial shopping cost
investments, and other non-price related factors.667
2. The Limitations of Current Disclosure Rules
Sadly, our current credit disclosure laws do not meaningfully address
these information distortions, and sometimes encourage them. Initially,
current disclosures come too late. Truth in Lending as well as the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act allow creditors to manipulate the timing
of information exchange to inefficiently increase the transactional costs of
acquiring price information. Truth in Lending disclosures
come at, or very shortly before, the consummation of a
transaction to which the consumer is already verbally and
psychologically committed. At this point, comparative
shopping by the consumer is unlikely. Moreover, it is equally
unlikely that at this point the consumer will opt to pay with
cash. Thus, [Truth in Lending] does not put us[e]able credit
information into the consumer's hands at a time when it will
affect transactional behavior.668
One study of lenders in the New Orleans area found that, even when
specifically asked for disclosure information prior to signing the
agreement, every lender surveyed "refused to issue a credit disclosure
statement at this point in the transaction. 669 Instead, such statements were
"issued only at the time the loan is consummated, never prior to that
time. ' ° But by then, consumers have already invested a significant time
and effort into obtaining the loan. Even short delays in receiving disclosure

Francisco).
667. Even if a simpler disclosure procedure existed, "improved disclosures may not aid
comparison shopping significantly in underserved markets where there is less competition." Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System & United States Department of Housing, supra note
648, at 51; see also A. CHARLENE SULLIVAN, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSUMER CREDIT

ENVIRONMENT 35 (1989) ("Consumers tended to choose among the various classes of credit
grantors on the basis of perceived relative costs, but chose a particular creditor on the basis of
familiarity."); Melissa Allison, Poorer Areas of Chicago Also Remain Poor in Bank Branches,
KNIGHT RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Nov. 26, 2001, available at 2001 WL 31004762.
668. Landers & Rohner, supra note 601, at 715-16 (footnotes omitted).
669. Simplify and Reform the Truth in Lending Act: Hearings, supra note 617, at 333.
670. Id. at 334.
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statements, when encountered with every lender, can erode borrowers'
willingness to compare loans.
Furthermore, Truth in Lending regulations have departed so far from
the original vision of a simple all cost inclusive price tag, the key material
disclosures themselves can often be a source of disinformation.The credit
industry has for years seized on the complaint that credit disclosures are
not useful because they are too hard to understand. 71 But, a significant
amount of confusion is attributable to the industry's unnecessarily complex
contracts which make current disclosures awkward. The complexity of
disclosure statutes, regulations, administrative interpretations, and case
law, as well as the disclosure statements they produce is a symptom of
creditors' evasion. As consumer advocates, regulators, and policymakers
have attempted to respond to the endless evolution of new contractual
provisions and practices, they have lost sight of a simple truth: credit
contractsdo not have to be complicated Creditors can always protect their
investment by raising interest rates. Contract and in turn regulatory and
then disclosure complexity only develops when lenders seek to protect
their investment through uncomparable contract provisions such as junk
closing fees, pre-payment penalties, credit insurance, and other hidden
revenue producers, rather than interest rates. The principle advantage of
these relatively complex and difficult to compare provisions is that they
forestall and confuse debtor price resistance.672
Perhaps the most serious among the Truth in Lending Act's drafting
problems is the increasingly misleading calculation of the finance charge
disclosure. Theoretically, the finance charge is the total dollar amount
debtors must pay to borrow the principal including interest as well as other
non-interest charges.673 Ideally, the finance charge should be equal to the
total amount financed minus the principal of the loan. 74 Original
proponents of Truth in Lending believed the finance charge would be an
extremely powerful shopping device for consumers, since it would make
comparing prices a simple matter of comparing a single dollar figure
representing all the costs associated with borrowing a given amount. If a
consumer wanted to borrower a certain amount, all she would have to do
is compare each lenders' finance charge, and she would immediately know
which contract was the least expensive. The finance charge is also crucial

671.

KEEST & KLEIN, supra note 25, at 35.

672. As Kathleen Keest has persuasively explained, high-cost creditors "place the point at

which prices hit market resistance higher by deceptively understating the price." Keest, supra note
32, at 362.
673. See RALPH J. RoHNER& FRED H. MILLER, THE LAW OF TRUTH INLENDING

4.01 [2][c][i]

(1984).
674. See id.
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because it is the basis for calculating the annual percentage rate, which is
simply a yearly percentage expression of the finance charge.675
But in the years since Truth in Lending, high-cost mortgage lenders
have learned to exploit regulatory exceptions to calculation of the finance
charge disclosure. When Congress passed Truth in Lending in 1968, most
mainstream lenders described all non-interest charges as "points." These
points would cover all the incidental costs of closing a loan including title
searches, appraisals, and others. One point is usually equal to one percent
of the total amount financed. But, over the past twenty years lenders have
increasingly "unbundled" the costs which originally justified charging
points into a variety of junk fees.
Now, in addition to points (sometimes outrageously high),
those costs that points were designed to cover (and more) are
unbundled and separately passed on: underwriting fees,
warehousing fees, interim funding fees, loan processing fees,
document preparation fees, loan disbursement fees, lenders'
closing attorney's fees, courier and expedited delivery fees to
ferry the paper between the lender and closing agent. Of
course, more familiar closing costs are also passed on: ...
title-related fees, credit insurance, property insurance,
mortgage
guarantee insurance, broker's fees. The list goes
67
on.

These fees create enormous difficulty for regulators as well as federal and
state courts. Courts must grapple with the invention of each new fee to
determine whether it is properly calculated as a finance charge and
therefore included in the annual percentage rate. Different types of lenders
have different fees and even the same lender will have different fees for
different types of loan products. The result is a body of law that is rarely
penetrable by the attorneys and judges who work in the legal trenches
where-in the best case scenario-high-cost lending disputes are resolved.
Because high-cost lending cases are notoriously labor intensive for
plaintiffs' attorneys, in practice if not in law, it is left to the discretion of
lenders whether to include junk fees in the finance charge.677

675. See id.
676. KEEST & KLEIN, supra note 25, at 77.
677. The few attorneys that do provide services to high-cost borrowers must be very selective
because of the formidable time commitment each case involves. Cynthia Vinarsky, Youngstown,
Ohio, Program Helps Homeowners Victimized by PredatoryLenders, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus.
NEWS, Apr. 14,2002, availableat 2002 WL 19772538. Moreover, many debtors themselves prefer
to cut their losses and walk away from the hassle of a lawsuit even after learning of a creditor's
illegal actions. See Deborah A. Schmedemann, Time andMoney: One State'sRegulation of CheckBased Loans, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 973, 995 (2000). -

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss3/4

94

Peterson: Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Comsumer Credit: The Historic
HIGH-COST CONSUMER CREDIT: TRUTH IN LENDING ACT

The Truth in Lending statute itself, its regulations, rare court oversight,
and inadequate debtor access to trained attorneys allow lenders to wedge
more and more of these fees into exceptions to the finance charge. Because
the annual percentage rate is derived from the finance charge, these
seemingly innocuous exceptions can completely undermine the whole
transaction cost reducing value of Truth in Lending. In order to know the
total price of borrowing a certain amount of money, consumers must
search through the documents, find every non-finance charge inclusive fee,
and then add those fees to the finance charge themselves. In order to do
this debtors must wait until all of the final documents are prepared. And
then, they must start all over again and go through the documents for each
loan they want to consider. When customers want to rely on the annual
percentage rate, there is no guarantee it is accurate, since it is derived from
an often horribly distorted finance charge. In reality, most high-cost
debtors have trouble understanding the simple notion of a finance charge
itself. Most debtors cannot distinguish interest from an annual percentage
rate, or understand why the latter is much more reliable. And virtually no
debtors can identify and distinguish those fees not included in the finance
charge and then comprehend why that understanding is absolutely crucial
to knowing the true price of the loan.
The result is that there is no single easily comparable figure which
describes the price a borrower will pay for financing-but, to the casual
observer it looks like there is. These junk fees are almost always financed
as part of the loan principal. Since they do not come directly out of the
consumer's pocket, unsuspecting borrowers cannot tell the difference. In
the high-cost credit market, borrowers who do not figure this process out
until it is too late are forced to pay outrageous fees for worthless services,
as well as interest on those fees, in monthly payments over a course of
years-sometimes over a lifetime. And, if the borrower refuses to pay, the
lender will use well-paid veteran lawyers to quickly and mercilessly take
the borrower's home-possibly reaping a big additional home equity
windfall in the process. In the hands of sophisticated but shameless highcost lenders, the TILA as it is currently written may not provide any pretransactional shopping protection to debtors. Since prospective borrowers
can never tell beforehand which lenders are packing the loan with nonfinance-charge-inclusive fees, Truth in Lending only serves to create a
veneer of legitimacy and safety where there is none. Credit industry
lobbying to preserve the legality of these practices has so successfully
battered down "Truth in Lending" with manipulative complication, ever
expanding exceptions, unnecessary delays, and outright deception, even
U.S. Circuit Judge Richard Posner, quarterback for the neo-classic
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economic analysis of law team recently quipped "[s]o much for the Truth
in Lending Act as a protection for borrowers."67
The irony is this system may hurt forthright and efficient lenders as
much as debtors. Lax finance charge disclosure calculations and other
disclosure distortions create a disincentive for all lenders to comply with
the spirit of Truth in Lending. Lenders who in good faith include all fees
within the finance charge, offer disclosures promptly, and do not bury key
price tag information in a stack of misleading and irrelevant information
are likely to hurt their own competitiveness. The mainstream banker's
opposition to uniform bright line no-exceptions price tag disclosure may
be born out of an instinctive reaction against government regulation, rather
than good business sense. Because all creditors operate under the same
field of government regulation, lenders who intend to comply with the law
have much more to fear from easily circumvented disclosure regulations
than bright line uniformly enforced regulations. Lenders who are not afraid
of efficiency and price competition have nothing to fear from robust
disclosure rules. It is only creditors who have something to hide-namely
the prices of their loans-who should fear more thorough and consistently
enforced disclosure.679
What the basic approach of Truth in Lending fails to capture is that
truth and understanding are not always (or perhaps are rarely) synonymous
concepts. One cannot have understanding based on false information,
therefore truth is a necessary element of understanding. But, one can have
true information and not understand it. In the best ofcurrent circumstances,
status quo federal law is only concerned with whether disclosures truthfully
and completely describe the cost of a loan. The true descriptions provided
by federal disclosure rules only provide an opportunityto understand credit
prices. If the past thirty years of high-cost consumer credit experience teach
one lesson, it is that truth is not enough-vulnerable high-cost debtors
need understanding.
V. CONCLUSION

Although the history of consumer credit in America retains many
unique features, the policies we have relied upon to protect vulnerable
debtors from the danger of high-cost credit are in most cases older than our
country. Sadly, these strategies have not reliably cured the social ills
associated with high-cost debt nor prevented our most resent surge in the
high-cost credit market. Ironically, many advocates of these policies are
quixotically unaware of the histories of failure plaguing each policy option

678. Emery v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 71 F.3d 1343, 1346(7th Cir. 1995); see also Keest, supra
note 32, at 364 (making a similar point).
679. KEEST & KLEIN, supra note 25, at 75.
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which date back hundreds or even thousands of years. This Article has
attempted to provide a new historically grounded classification of high-cost
credit policy which helps highlight these limitations. Debtor amnesty,
interest rate caps and other contractual restrictions, selective protection
schemes, charitable lending, cooperative lending, and the over reliance on
unregulated markets have all had histories indicating inherent drawbacks.
As a result our efforts have tended to protect those who least need it-the
relatively affluent.
Today America is in the throws of an identity crisis with respect to
consumer credit. Social conservatives do not know how to resolve Biblical
injunctions against abusive money lending and their tradition of stalwart
thrift with their embrace of laissez faire capitalism. Social liberals do not
know how to resolve their empathy for the plight of working poor and
lower-middle class debtors with their new found commitment to market
decisionmaking. Both conservatives and liberals alike have embraced
mainstream moderately priced consumer credit. But as of yet both groups
have lacked the cultural sophistication to morally distinguish relatively
new mainstream moderately priced credit with the millennia old high-cost
credit sold in the second tier alternative finance market. It is precisely this
collective moral disorientation which has allowed payday lenders,
pawnbrokers, rent-to-own retailers, rapid tax refund lenders, car title
lenders, and predatory home and manufactured home lenders to cloak
themselves with mainstream legitimacy like never before. It is this moral
disorientation which has allowed such lenders to slip within the
jurisdiction of laws designed to protect the relatively affluent upper and
upper-middle classes. It is this disorientation which has allowed some
banks to depart from the honorable tradition of American banking by
stooping to triple digit interest rate payday lending.
In this respect, the TILA and disclosure laws in general have thus far
proven a mixed blessing. From a long term historical perspective, unlike
other American high-cost credit policy strategies, the disclosure approach
is relatively untried. Despite limitations made apparent over the past thirtyfive years, the disclosure approach to preventing harmful social
consequences of high-cost credit may yet prove more valuable than other
far older strategies. However, to date, Truth in Lending has not lived up to
its potential. The challenge for consumer advocates is to rhetorically
recapture disclosure law from industry lobbyists. To do so, consumer
advocates must recast the goal of disclosure law as aiming not merely to
truthfully describe contracts, but as aiming to create practical contractual
understanding on the part of vulnerable debtors. Anything less risks
wasting the historically unique opportunity of credit disclosure law as yet
another demobilizing illusion of debtor protection.
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